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Articles 1 - 24 of 24
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Faith And Morals Of Justice Antonin Scalia, David Forte
The Faith And Morals Of Justice Antonin Scalia, David Forte
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
It is because of Justice Scalia's suspicion of philosophy and of history that he becomes an outspoken textualist. But why should text carry greater authority? Why should the written word, rather than evolving tradition, be of higher authority, particularly to a Roman Catholic? To understand Antonin Scalia's affirmation of the centrality of text, we must, as many already have, seek to find out how the man viewed his religion and how he practiced it.
Pennsylvania Gas: Trusts, Takings, And Judicial Temperaments, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Pennsylvania Gas: Trusts, Takings, And Judicial Temperaments, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Perhaps it is their role in our survival, or our economic growth, or the environment. Whatever the reason, energy and natural resource conflicts seems to be unique in the way they can drive significant doctrinal change even outside of energy and natural resource law. Pennsylvania has been a fountainhead of these conflicts. In 1921, Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act and lesser known Fowler Act, which sought to protect surface owners from anthracite coal mine subsidence and to increase tax revenue from anthracite mining, ignited the legal wrangling that eventually led to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. That U.S. Supreme Court decision transformed …
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Michael J. Yelnosky's Blog: Janus V. Afscme And "Weaponizing The First Amendment 06-30-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Michael J. Yelnosky's Blog: Janus V. Afscme And "Weaponizing The First Amendment 06-30-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky
Law School Blogs
No abstract provided.
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Dean Yelnosky's Blog: Ruling Could Destroy Labor Unions As We Know Them 2-26-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Dean Yelnosky's Blog: Ruling Could Destroy Labor Unions As We Know Them 2-26-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky
Law School Blogs
No abstract provided.
Newsroom: 'You Can't Help Being In Awe' 1-30-2018, Michael M. Bowden, Edward Fitzpatrick
Newsroom: 'You Can't Help Being In Awe' 1-30-2018, Michael M. Bowden, Edward Fitzpatrick
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman
Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that.
Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a …
Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, The Judicial Method, And The Limits(?) Of Originalism, Gary S. Lawson
Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, The Judicial Method, And The Limits(?) Of Originalism, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Crawford v. Washington, which revamped (and even revolutionized) interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, just might be Justice Scalia’s most important majority opinion, for three reasons. First, its impact on the criminal justice system has been immense, and even if the case is overruled in the near future, as seems quite possible, that effect will still likely exceed the concrete impact of any other opinion that he wrote. Second, and more importantly, Crawford emphasizes the trite but crucial point that methodology matters. Crawford has generally been a boon to criminal defendants and a bane to prosecutors. When …
Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley
Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley
Journal Articles
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote two major opinions considering the nondelegation doctrine. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, he accepted and applied a very broad, indeed virtually unlimited, view of Congress's power to delegate authority to administrative agencies that was consistent with the Court's precedents since the New Deal. In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, however, he concluded that the constitutional structure formally barred the delegation of naked rulemaking power to an agency that was untethered to other law execution tasks. This essay analyzes Justice Scalia's nondelegation jurisprudence in light of the general jurisprudential commitments he championed throughout his …
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …
Newroom: Yelnosky: Future Of Public Sector Union 'Dues' 01-14-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Newroom: Yelnosky: Future Of Public Sector Union 'Dues' 01-14-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
Why The Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies Of Constitutional Textualism, Ken Levy
Why The Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies Of Constitutional Textualism, Ken Levy
Journal Articles
No abstract provided.
Scalia In The Casebooks, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Paulson K. Varghese
Scalia In The Casebooks, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Paulson K. Varghese
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In the time since Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely death, much has been written about what his influence has been and what his influence will be. In this Essay, we try to quantify Scalia’s influence in law school constitutional-law curricula by studying how often his ideas are explored in constitutional-law casebooks. In particular, relative to other justices, we look at how often Scalia’s opinions (for the Court, or his separate opinions) are excerpted in the principal cases and how often he is referred to by name in the notes preceding and following the principal cases. We find that Scalia is at …
Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary S. Lawson
Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …
“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer
“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of “Psychic Injury.” Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and …
When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn
When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn
Scholarly Works
Although Justice Scalia generally described himself as an originalist, his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council rejected originalist arguments. Why? This article suggests that pre-Lucas precedent and the ambiguity of the historical record might justify his methodology.
A Thought Experiment, Louis Michael Seidman
A Thought Experiment, Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Herewith, Justice Antonin Scalia's long lost dissenting opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.
Everything You Wanted To Know About Justice Scalia But Were Afraid To Ask, Or Don't Look Now But Justice Scalia's Originalism Approach Is Fatally Flawed, Arthur R. Landever
Everything You Wanted To Know About Justice Scalia But Were Afraid To Ask, Or Don't Look Now But Justice Scalia's Originalism Approach Is Fatally Flawed, Arthur R. Landever
Law Faculty Presentations and Testimony
I do not deny Justice Scalia's valiant efforts to vote based upon his originalist principles. But both a justice and an observer are well advised to understand the implications of the culture surrounding the Supreme Court. Originalism, in assuming present culture plays little part, and in seeking to operate in a closed universe, distorts the reality of judicial decision-making, and to that extent, risks unsound constitutional interpretations.
Storm In A Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’S Use Of Foreign Law, Austen L. Parrish
Storm In A Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’S Use Of Foreign Law, Austen L. Parrish
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In this Article, Professor Parrish explores the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign law as persuasive authority in a number of highly contentious cases. The backlash has been spirited, with calls for foreign law to be categorically barred from constitutional adjudication, and even for Justices to be impeached if they cite to foreign sources. Last year, the condemnation of comparative constitutionalism reached a high note, as a barrage of scholarship decried the practice as illegitimate and a threat to our national sovereignty. The …
Our Law, Their Law, History, And The Citation Of Foreign Law, David J. Seipp
Our Law, Their Law, History, And The Citation Of Foreign Law, David J. Seipp
Faculty Scholarship
The objection to citation of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions is bad history and bad law. First, let me briefly review how the objection has come to prominence recently. On June 26, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas, striking down a same-sex sodomy statute. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the course of his dissenting opinion, wrote that the majority's citation of foreign law was "meaningless dicta," "[d]angerous dicta."' He added that the majority's opinion was "the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda."
Originalism And Formalism In Criminal Procedure: The Triumph Of Justice Scalia, The Unlikely Friend Of Criminal Defendants?, Stephanos Bibas
Originalism And Formalism In Criminal Procedure: The Triumph Of Justice Scalia, The Unlikely Friend Of Criminal Defendants?, Stephanos Bibas
All Faculty Scholarship
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia's majority opinion reinterpreted the Confrontation Clause to exclude otherwise reliable testimonial hearsay unless the defendant has been able to cross-examine it. In Blakely v. Washington, Justice Scalia's majority opinion required that juries, not judges, find beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that trigger sentences above ordinary sentencing-guidelines ranges. Crawford and Blakely are prime case studies in the strengths, weaknesses, and influence of originalism and formalism in criminal procedure. Crawford succeeded because it cleared away muddled case law, laid a strong foundation in the historical record, and erected a simple, solid, workable rule. …
Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, And A Power Theory Of The First Amendment, Jay S. Bybee
Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, And A Power Theory Of The First Amendment, Jay S. Bybee
Scholarly Works
There are few cases that contrast more starkly than Justice Robert Jackson's opinion for the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. Although we praise Barnette for its soaring defense of the Free Speech Clause and excoriate Smith for its crabbed reading of the Free Exercise Clause, in fact, Justice Jackson and Justice Scalia are not so far apart. When we read Barnette and Smith in context, we will find that Justice Jackson and Justice Scalia treaded common ground with respect to the First Amendment. …
A Matter Of Power: Structural Federalism And Separation Doctrine In The Present, Frances Howell Rudko
A Matter Of Power: Structural Federalism And Separation Doctrine In The Present, Frances Howell Rudko
Faculty Publications
Public reaction to the 1823 Supreme Court decision in Green v. Biddle prompted John Marshall’s letter to Henry Clay, who had argued the case as amicus curiae for the defendant. The letter is significant because Marshall, who had been a legislator himself, candidly expresses not only his personal dissatisfaction with the congressional assault on the 1823 decision but also the constitutional basis for his opinion. The significance of Marshall’s extrajudicial opinion becomes more apparent when it is considered in the aftermath of the recent tug-of-war between Congress and the Court which culminated in the decision in City of Boerne v. …
Textualism's Selective Canons Of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, And Deference To Executive Agencies, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
This Article demonstrates that textualist Judges, most notably Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy, have applied some canons too aggressively, and slighted others. Textualist Judges have overused clear-statement rules that narrow statutory meaning, especially as a means to promote federalism and states' rights. On the other hand, textualists have neglected canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority Because canons must be applied on a case-by-case basis and different canons can conflict, it is impossible to formulate one rule for how they should be applied. Nevertheless, the common textualist approach of selectively favoring some canons at the …
Justice Scalia And The Commerce Clause: Reflections Of A State Tax Lawyer, Walter Hellerstein
Justice Scalia And The Commerce Clause: Reflections Of A State Tax Lawyer, Walter Hellerstein
Scholarly Works
This paper considers Justice Scalia's substantive views of the restraints that the commerce clause imposes on state taxation. My purpose is to examine critically Justice Scalia's dormant or "negative" commerce clause analysis of the state tax issues on which he has opined and to draw from that examination some general conclusions about Justice Scalia's commerce clause jurisprudence.