Law Commons^™

A Trigger Warning: Red Flag Laws Are Still Constitutionally Permissible And Could Reduce The Suicide Rates In The Country's Most Vulnerable States, Joseph C. Campbell

Journal of Law and Health

Montana, Alaska, and Wyoming lead the United States in a category coveted by no one: the suicide rate. Firearm ownership drives the rate to the disproportionate level it reaches year after year and the states are left with little recourse. This article argues the usefulness and constitutionality of narrowly tailored red-flag laws aimed exclusively at reducing the rate of suicide in these mountain states. The article follows Supreme Court jurisprudence leading up to New York Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and offers an analysis that complies with the hyper textualist history and tradition test laid out by Scalia in …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Why The Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies Of Constitutional Textualism, Ken Levy

Ken Levy

No abstract provided.

The Faith And Morals Of Justice Antonin Scalia, David Forte

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

It is because of Justice Scalia's suspicion of philosophy and of history that he becomes an outspoken textualist. But why should text carry greater authority? Why should the written word, rather than evolving tradition, be of higher authority, particularly to a Roman Catholic? To understand Antonin Scalia's affirmation of the centrality of text, we must, as many already have, seek to find out how the man viewed his religion and how he practiced it.

Smith, Scalia, And Originalism, Amul R. Thapar

Catholic University Law Review

To many principled Originalists and proponent of religious liberty, the opinion in Employment Division v. Smith poses a puzzle. Many commentators believe Smith contradicts the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and hinders the right to religious freedom. Yet it was written by Justice Scalia, a self-professed Originalist and lion of the law. I attempt to resolve this puzzle, reviewing Justice Scalia’s speeches and opinions on religious liberty. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith reflects his commitments to certain jurisprudential principles. Viewing these principles in the light of New Originalism, though, it becomes clear how Smith most likely does …

Pennsylvania Gas: Trusts, Takings, And Judicial Temperaments, Joshua Ulan Galperin

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Perhaps it is their role in our survival, or our economic growth, or the environment. Whatever the reason, energy and natural resource conflicts seems to be unique in the way they can drive significant doctrinal change even outside of energy and natural resource law. Pennsylvania has been a fountainhead of these conflicts. In 1921, Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act and lesser known Fowler Act, which sought to protect surface owners from anthracite coal mine subsidence and to increase tax revenue from anthracite mining, ignited the legal wrangling that eventually led to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. That U.S. Supreme Court decision transformed …

Rwu First Amendment Blog: Michael J. Yelnosky's Blog: Janus V. Afscme And "Weaponizing The First Amendment 06-30-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest

Maine Law Review

Justice Scalia's engaging essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” and the four comments it provokes, should provide lawyers, judges, and other lawmakers with an interesting evening. Instead of presenting a theoretical view of the role of the federal courts in interpretation, Justice Scalia sketches out a case for “textualism.” “Textualism” is one of several currently contending methods of interpreting statutes and the United States Constitution, and is currently popular among federal judges who see their role as restricting government's powers to those expressly stated in the …

Rwu First Amendment Blog: Dean Yelnosky's Blog: Ruling Could Destroy Labor Unions As We Know Them 2-26-2018, Michael J. Yelnosky

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Newsroom: 'You Can't Help Being In Awe' 1-30-2018, Michael M. Bowden, Edward Fitzpatrick

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former golf course.

I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend. What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice Scalia’s tenure on the …

Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that.

Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a …

Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, The Judicial Method, And The Limits(?) Of Originalism, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Crawford v. Washington, which revamped (and even revolutionized) interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, just might be Justice Scalia’s most important majority opinion, for three reasons. First, its impact on the criminal justice system has been immense, and even if the case is overruled in the near future, as seems quite possible, that effect will still likely exceed the concrete impact of any other opinion that he wrote. Second, and more importantly, Crawford emphasizes the trite but crucial point that methodology matters. Crawford has generally been a boon to criminal defendants and a bane to prosecutors. When …

Justice Scalia As Neither Friend Nor Foe To Criminal Defendants, Tung Yin

Akron Law Review

At first glance, Justice Scalia may appear to have been something of a “friend” to criminal defendants, as he authored a number of opinions ruling against law enforcement. However, his opinions reflect his fidelity to his constitutional vision of originalism rather than an intent to favor criminal defendants. Nevertheless, these cases are often offered as legitimate examples of how he did not have a purely results-oriented approach to deciding criminal procedure issues. Yet, a closer examination of Justice Scalia’s “defendant-favorable” opinions suggests that the results often have an air of unreality to them. In practice, there is no way for …

Originalism And The Criminal Law: Vindicating Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence - And The Constitution, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Akron Law Review

Justice Scalia was not perfect—no one is—but he was not a dishonest jurist. As one commentator explains, “[i]f Scalia was a champion of those rights [for criminal defendants, arrestees], he was an accidental champion, a jurist with a deeper objective—namely, fidelity to what he dubbed the ‘original meaning’ reflected in the text of the Constitution—that happened to intersect with the interests of the accused at some points in the constellation of criminal law and procedure.” Indeed, Justice Scalia is more easily remembered not as a champion of the little guy, the voiceless, and the downtrodden, but rather, as Texas Gov. …

The Death Penalty And Justice Scalia's Lines, J. Richard Broughton

Akron Law Review

In Justice Scalia’s lone dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson, he lamented that, after the Court had upheld a law that he believed violated the separation of powers, “there are now no lines.” Lines were of critical importance to Justice Scalia – in law and in life – and informed much of his work on criminal law issues (Morrison, after all, was a case about the nature of federal prosecutorial authority). In the area of capital punishment, in particular, Justice Scalia saw clear lines that the Court should not cross. He believed that the Constitution contemplates the …

Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: An Unabashed Foe Of Criminal Defendants, Michael Vitiello

Akron Law Review

Justice Scalia’s death has already produced a host of commentary on his career. Depending on the issue, Justice Scalia’s legacy is quite complicated. Justice Scalia’s commitment to originalism explains at least some of his pro-defendant positions. Some of his supporters point to such examples to support a claim that Justice Scalia was principled in his application of his jurisprudential philosophy. However, in one area, Justice Scalia was an unabashed foe of criminal defendants: his Eighth Amendment jurisprudential dealing with terms of imprisonment. There, based on his reading of the historical record, he argued that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel …

The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis And Justice Antonin Scalia On Stare Decisis, P. Thomas Distanislao Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Impact Of Justice Scalia's Replacement On Gender Equality Issues, Wilson R. Huhn

ConLawNOW

The last forty-six years may be accurately described as the era of the modern Republican Supreme Court. As a result of presidential elections, Republican presidents have nominated all ten of the Justices appointed to the United States Supreme Court between 1969 and 1991. Republicans have thus controlled the Court since 1970. During this period the right to gender equality was recognized and the right to marriage equality was realized. However, also during this period many Republican Justices staunchly opposed gender equality, and far more remains to be accomplished.

Since Justice Scalia’s death, the Supreme Court has been deadlocked on a …

Newroom: Yelnosky: Future Of Public Sector Union 'Dues' 01-14-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Why The Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies Of Constitutional Textualism, Ken Levy

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Scalia In The Casebooks, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Paulson K. Varghese

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the time since Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely death, much has been written about what his influence has been and what his influence will be. In this Essay, we try to quantify Scalia’s influence in law school constitutional-law curricula by studying how often his ideas are explored in constitutional-law casebooks. In particular, relative to other justices, we look at how often Scalia’s opinions (for the Court, or his separate opinions) are excerpted in the principal cases and how often he is referred to by name in the notes preceding and following the principal cases. We find that Scalia is at …

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia

Journal Articles

In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …

Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote two major opinions considering the nondelegation doctrine. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, he accepted and applied a very broad, indeed virtually unlimited, view of Congress's power to delegate authority to administrative agencies that was consistent with the Court's precedents since the New Deal. In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, however, he concluded that the constitutional structure formally barred the delegation of naked rulemaking power to an agency that was untethered to other law execution tasks. This essay analyzes Justice Scalia's nondelegation jurisprudence in light of the general jurisprudential commitments he championed throughout his …

Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …

Clarence Thomas, Fisher V. University Of Texas, And The Future Of Affirmative Action In Higher Education, Scott D. Gerber

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer

All Faculty Scholarship

Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of “Psychic Injury.” Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and …

When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn

Scholarly Works

Although Justice Scalia generally described himself as an originalist, his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council rejected originalist arguments. Why? This article suggests that pre-Lucas precedent and the ambiguity of the historical record might justify his methodology.

Montgomery V. Louisiana: An Attempt To Make Juvenile Life Without Parole A Practical Impossibility, Erin Dunn

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.