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Articles 31 - 60 of 195
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Constitutional Ratchet Effect, Kevin M. Stack
The Constitutional Ratchet Effect, Kevin M. Stack
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Conservatives And The Court, Robert F. Nagel
Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: A Response To Five Views, James E. Fleming
Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: A Response To Five Views, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
En mi libro reciente, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, adelanto una crí-tica sostenida al originalismo en todas sus formas y defiendo tanto lo que Ronald Dworkin llamó una “lectura moral” de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América como lo que, junto a Sotirios A. Barber, he llamado una “aproximación filosófica” a la interpretación constitucional. En este ensayo para el Simposio sobre el libro, respondo a cinco comentarios muy pensa-dos. Primero, en contra del comentario de Sot Barber, justifico el responder a la “resurgencia persistente del originalismo” y el tratar de “salvar al ori-ginalismo nuevo de sí mismo” al …
Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Signing Statements, Executive Power And Zivotofsky, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Signing Statements, Executive Power And Zivotofsky, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
Law Faculty Publications
This Article explores whether the President should interpret the Constitution aggressively and, if so, whether the President should act on such aggressive interpretations. Part I examines whether the presidential oath and other constitutional duties obligate the President to interpret the Constitution. Part II considers constitutional signing statements as the manifestation of an aggressive approach to presidential constitutional interpretation. Part III considers whether the Constitution is a legal document or a political document, and how that determination might affect how aggressive the President should be when interpreting the Constitution. Part IV considers how the Supreme Court's and Congress's constitutional interpretations might …
Reflections Of An Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), Gary S. Lawson
Reflections Of An Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are …
The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming
The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In my book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 1 I reject originalisms—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the United States Constitution, or a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively …
The Meming Of Substantive Due Process, Jamal Greene
The Meming Of Substantive Due Process, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Substantive due process is notoriously regarded as a textual contradiction, but it is in fact redundant. The word "due" cannot be honored except by inquiring into the relationship between the nature and scope of the deprived interest and the process-whether judicial, administrative, or legislative-that attended the deprivation. The treatment of substantive due process as an oxymoron is what this Essay calls a constitutional meme, an idea that replicates through imitation within the constitutional culture rather than (necessarily) through logical persuasion. We might even call the idea a "precedent," in the nature of other legal propositions within a common law system. …
Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen
Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.
This Article investigates these points and their …
Rule Originalism, Jamal Greene
Rule Originalism, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutional rules are norms whose application depends on an interpreter's identification of a set of facts rather than on her exercise of practical judgment. This Article argues that constitutional interpreters in the United States tend to resolve ambiguity over constitutional rules by reference to originalist sources and tend to resolve uncertainty over the scope of constitutional standards by reference to nonoriginalist sources. This positive claim unsettles the frequent assumption that the Constitution's more specifw or structural provisions support straightforward interpretive inferences. Normatively, this Article offers a partial defense of what it calls "rule originalism," grounded in the fact of its …
How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh
Journal Articles
If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many have begun to call the “positive turn” in originalism. Defenses of originalism in this vein are “positive” in that they are based on the status of the Constitution, and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law: …
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and we find them …
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and we find them …
Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson
Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Some of my earliest and fondest memories regarding constitutional theory involve Mike McConnell. He was a participant at the very first Federalist Society conference in 1982, at a time when the entire universe of conservative constitutional theorists fit comfortably in the front of one classroom. More importantly, at another Federalist Society conference in 1987, he gave a speech on constitutional interpretation that, unbeknownst to him, profoundly shaped my entire intellectual approach to the field by emphasizing the obvious but oftoverlooked point that different kinds of documents call for different kinds of interpretative methods.1 In 2015, it is more than an …
The Moral Reading All Down The Line, James E. Fleming
The Moral Reading All Down The Line, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
Michael W. McConnell has written an elegant and illuminating article about constitutional interpretation.' He seeks to show how five major methodological approaches fit together. The five approaches he discusses are: "originalism, precedent, longstanding practice, judicial restraint, and living constitutionalism (here called the normative approach)."'2 He distinguishes two camps with respect to these approaches. One camp, he notes, "advocates for (or against) a particular approach ... on the assumption that these approaches are mutually inconsistent and that the task is to determine which is best . . . .3 The other camp "treats the various common approaches as mere tools in …
Newsroom: Logan On Justice Scalia's Vitriol, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Newsroom: Logan On Justice Scalia's Vitriol, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Life of the Law School (1993- )
No abstract provided.
The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson
The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total failure. The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed “convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.” Unwilling to either allow all governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional. Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard.
A careful reading of the history of the framing …
Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming
Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
Ronald Dworkin famously argued that the best interpretation of a Constitution should both fit and justify the legal materials, for example, the text, original meaning, and precedents. In his recent book, Against Obligation (Harvard University Press, 2012), Abner S. Greene provocatively and creatively bucks the tendencies of constitutional theorists to profess fidelity with the past in constitutional interpretation. He rejects originalist understandings of obligation to follow original meaning in interpreting the Constitution. And indeed he rejects interpretive obligation to follow precedent. In this Essay I focus on Greene’s arguments against interpretive obligation to the past, in particular, his argument that …
Secession, Then And Now, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Secession, Then And Now, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Secession has been back in the news of late. Hundreds of thousands of individuals across the country signed petitions seeking permission for their states to leave the United States after President Obama’s reelection; Governor Perry riffed on Texas’s departure from the Union “if Washington continues to thumb their nose at the American people”; and members of the Second Vermont Republic insist the Green Mountain State would be better off alone. Overseas, a bid for Scottish independence from the United Kingdom nearly prevailed last fall.
Interpretation, Jamal Greene
Interpretation, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Interpretation is the means by which the Constitution and its clauses are brought to bear on actual cases and controversies. Although much of the Constitution appears self-explanatory, as with its requirement that the president be at least thirty-five years old, much is subject to reasonable disagreement. The approaches to interpretation that form this chapter’s subject are the main tools scholars and judges have developed to resolve that disagreement. Those tools encompass five domains of argumentation, broadly conceived: text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences. As a general matter, interpretation that draws on resources wholly outside these five domains — via an …
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
Articles
According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …
Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford
Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford
UF Law Faculty Publications
One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued) authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding, and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to …
Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain
Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain
Faculty Scholarship
"To secure the blessings of liberty," the Preamble to the US Constitution proclaims, "We the People . . . ordain and establish this Constitution." The Constitution is said to secure liberty through three principal strategies: the design of the Constitution as a whole; structural arrangements, most notably separation of powers andfederalism; and protection of rights. This chapter focuses on this third strategy of protecting liberty, in particular, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We first examine the several approaches taken to the "Incorporation" of certain basic liberties "enumerated" in the Bill of Rights to apply to the state governments. We …
According To The Spirit And Not To The Letter: Proportionality And The Singapore Constitution, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee
According To The Spirit And Not To The Letter: Proportionality And The Singapore Constitution, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
When interpreting the fundamental liberties in the Singapore Constitution, courts presently do not engage in a proportionality analysis – that is, a consideration of whether limitations on rights imposed by executive or legislative action bear a rational relation with the object of the action, and, if so, whether the limitations restrict rights as minimally as possible. The main reason for this appears to be the expansive manner in which exceptions to the fundamental liberties are phrased, and the courts’ deferential attitude towards the political branches of government. This paper considers how the rejection of proportionality has affected the rights to …
Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson
Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
In The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2013), Richard Epstein says that he "incorporates but goes beyond" originalist theory by calling for adjudication "in sync with" classical liberal theory political theory, which Professor Epstein claims underlies the Constitution. Without in any way detracting from the numerous virtues of this book, I argue that this is primarily a work of constitutional construction rather than constitutional interpretation. From the standpoint of interpretation, the background rules that best supplement the constitutional text are found in eighteenth-century fiduciary law rather than in classical liberal political theory, though the latter is …
On Creativity In Constitutional Interpretation, Pierre Schlag
On Creativity In Constitutional Interpretation, Pierre Schlag
Publications
In the present article a particular aspect of constitutional interpretation will be considered. This aspect is called "creative" and involves retrieving the meaning of an object of interpretation. It is with regard to this particular aspect or moment of interpretation that creativity is often viewed as something to be avoided, to be shunned. If the task at hand is to "retrieve" some meaning, then the idea that this meaning can be created, in whole or in part, seems quite simply antithetical to the enterprise at hand. It suffices to note that many jurists and legal thinkers believe that interpretation as …
J. Skelly Wright And The Limits Of Liberalism, Louis Michael Seidman
J. Skelly Wright And The Limits Of Liberalism, Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This essay, written for a symposium on the life and work of United States Court of Appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright, makes four points. First, Judge Wright was an important participant in the liberal legal tradition. The tradition sought to liberate law from arid formalism and to use it as a technique for progressive reform. However, legal liberals also believed that there were limits on what judges could do–-limits rooted in both its liberalism and its legalism. Second, Wright occupied a position on the left fringe of the liberal legal tradition, and he therefore devoted much of his career to …
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Book Chapters
If the Supreme Court mythologizes Blackstone, it is equally true that Blackstone himself was engaged in something of a mythmaking project. Far from a neutral reporter, Blackstone has some stories to tell, in particular the story of the hero law. The problems associated with using the Commentaries as a transparent window on eighteenth-century American legal norms, however, do not make Blackstone’s text irrelevant today. The chapter concludes with my brief reading of the Commentaries as a critical mirror of some twenty-first-century legal and social structures. That analysis draws on a long-term project, in which I am making my way through …
Meaning And Belief In Constitutional Interpretation, Andrei Marmor
Meaning And Belief In Constitutional Interpretation, Andrei Marmor
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The distinction between a concept and its different conceptions plays a prominent role in debates about constitutional interpretation. Proponents of a dynamic reading of the Constitution-espousing interpretation of constitutional concepts according to their contemporary understandings typically rely on the idea that the Constitution entrenches only the general concepts it deploys, without authoritatively favoring any particular conception of them-specifically, without favoring the particular conception of the relevant concept that the framers of the Constitution may have had in mind. Originalists argue, to the contrary, that fidelity to the Constitution requires an understanding of its provisions according to the particular conception of …
Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming
Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an essay on one or both books.