Law Commons^™

Congress' Power Is Properly Vested, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Faith And Dynamic Stability: Thoughts On Religion, Constitutions, And Transitions To Democracy, David C. Gray

David C. Gray

This essay, written for the 2009 Constitutional Schmooze, explores the complex role of religion as a source of both stability and instability. Drawing on a broader body of work in transitional justice, this essay argues that religion has an important role to play in the complex web of overlapping associations and oppositions constitutive of a dynamically stable society and further contends that constitutional protections which encourage a diversity of religions provide the best hope of harnessing that potential while limiting the dangers of religion evidenced in numerous cases of mass atrocity.

Court's Campaign-Financing Decision Endangers Democracy, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.

Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry

Leslie Meltzer Henry

Despite extensive scholarly, legislative, and judicial attention to privacy, our understanding of privacy and the interests it protects remains inadequate. At the crux of this problem is privacy’s protean nature: it means “so many different things to so many different people” that attempts to articulate just what it is, or why it is important, generally have failed or become unwieldy. As a result, important privacy problems remain unaddressed, often to society’s detriment. In his newest book, Understanding Privacy, Daniel J. Solove aims to reverse this state of affairs with a pluralistic conception of privacy that recognizes the societal value of …

Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry

Danielle Keats Citron

Despite extensive scholarly, legislative, and judicial attention to privacy, our understanding of privacy and the interests it protects remains inadequate. At the crux of this problem is privacy’s protean nature: it means “so many different things to so many different people” that attempts to articulate just what it is, or why it is important, generally have failed or become unwieldy. As a result, important privacy problems remain unaddressed, often to society’s detriment. In his newest book, Understanding Privacy, Daniel J. Solove aims to reverse this state of affairs with a pluralistic conception of privacy that recognizes the societal value of …

Establishing Guidelines For Attorney Representation Of Criminal Defendants At The Sentencing Phase Of Capital Trials, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

No abstract provided.

Incorporating The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Framework Into Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence Through The Introduction Of A Contingent-Based And Legislatively-Driven Constitutional Theory, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

No abstract provided.

Back To The Future: Discovery Cost Allocation And Modern Procedural Theory, Martin H. Redish, Colleen Mcnamara

Martin H Redish

It has long been established that as a general rule, discovery costs are to remain with the party from whom discovery has been sought. While courts have authority to "shift" costs in an individual instance, the presumption against such an alteration in traditional practice is quite strong. Yet at no point did the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ever make an explicit decision to allocate discovery costs in this manner. Nor, apparently, did they (or anyone since) ever explain why such an allocation choice is to be made in the first place. As a result, our …

No Good Deed Goes Unpublished: Precedent-Stripping And The Need For A New Prophylactic Rule, Edward Cantu

Edward Cantu

This paper addresses the “open secret” that federal appellate courts often strip their opinions of precedential value as a means to forgo fair, principled and/or thorough adjudication of issues raised in appeals. Is there a basis in contemporary constitutional doctrine for a presumption that appellants suffer constitutional injury when courts dispose of their appeals using non-precedential opinions? The author answers “yes.” The argument centers on case law establishing so-called “constitutional prophylactic rules,” which work to “overprotect” a given core right—that is, to create a presumption of constitutional injury without proof of it—when such is the only effective way of protecting …

A Loss For Words: "Religion" In The First Amendment, Mason Binkley, J.D.

Mason Binkley, Esq.

No abstract provided.

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution. Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution. Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.” But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. This Article uses canons of construction to …

Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article seeks to demonstrate that plain meaning textualists do not apply plain meaning textualism to the entire Constitution. Instead, plain meaning textualists indulge their personal predilections and apply the doctrine of “partial textualism,” which selectively applies plain meaning textualism to only part of, rather than the entire, Constitution. Partial textualism destroys any possible fairness value to plain meaning textualism. Indeed, such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the goals of plain language textualism. Through examining the Takings Clause, this Article demonstrates that a plain meaning textualist will commonly apply plain meaning textualism to a part of the Constitution that …

Violent Crimes And Known Associates: The Residual Clause Of The Armed Career Criminal Act, David C. Holman

David Holman

Confusion reigns in federal courts over whether crimes qualify as “violent felonies” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for felons convicted of possessing a firearm who have three prior convictions for violent felonies. Many offenders receive the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years based on judges’ guesses that their prior crimes could be committed in a violent manner—instead of based on the statutory crimes of which they were actually convicted. Offenders who do not deserve a minimum sentence of fifteen years may receive it anyway.

The courts’ application of …

Deconstructing Transnationalism: Conceptualizing Metanationalism As A Putative Model Of Evolving Jurisprudence, Paul Enríquez

Paul Enriquez

This Article builds upon Philip C. Jessup’s revolutionary scholarship to pave new pathways for interdisciplinary research and expand the normative constitutional framework of universal human problems. To that end, this Article ties American constitutional theory to the new era of international globalization and provides context that facilitates the discussion of racial and ethnic diversity in education from a domestic and international perspective. By arguing for compelling treatment of diversity in elementary and secondary learning institutions, this Article introduces a new theory of constitutional interpretation vis-à-vis international law. This theory, called metanationalism, rejects Harold Koh’s theory of transnationalism and demonstrates that …

The Death Penalty On Trial, Linus Koh

Linus Koh

No abstract provided.

Noncitizens And Citizens United, James Ianelli

James Ianelli

No abstract provided.

The Original Scope Of The Congressional Power To Regulate Elections, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Courts testing the constitutionality of federal campaign finance laws usually focus on First Amendment issues. More fundamental, however, is the question of whether campaign finance laws are within Congress’s enumerated power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.” This Article is an objective examination into the intended scope of this congressional power, using numerous sources overlooked by other legal writers. The Article concludes that the intended scope of the power was wide enough to authorize most modern congressional election statutes, but not wide enough to support modern federal campaign finance laws.

Graham V. Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision Of Childhood And The Role Of Judges, Tamar R. Birckhead

Tamar R Birckhead

This short essay examines Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime. This essay argues that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion is grounded not only in Roper v. Simmons, which invalidated the death penalty for juvenile offenders on Eighth Amendment grounds, and Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for the offense of rape of a child, but also in Establishment Clause cases set …

Pearson, Iqbal, And Procedural Judicial Activism, Goutam U. Jois

Goutam U Jois

In its most recent term, the Supreme Court decided Pearson v. Callahan and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that, even at this early date, can safely be called “game-changers.” What is fairly well known is that Iqbal and Pearson, on their own terms, will hurt civil rights plaintiffs. A point that has not been explored is how the interaction between Iqbal and Pearson will also hurt civil rights plaintiffs. First, the cases threaten to catch plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma: Iqbal says, in effect, that greater detail is required to get allegations past the motion to dismiss stage. …

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …

The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument and law. I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in the forms that Bobbitt has described. I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point to the literal meaning of the text itself. This conception helps explain how a canonical text's meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that might accomplish …

The Right To Arms In The Living Constitution, David B. Kopel

David B Kopel

This Article presents a brief history of the Second Amendment as part of the living Constitution. From the Early Republic through the present, the American public has always understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right to own firearms for self-defense. That view has been in accordance with élite legal opinion, except for a period in part of the twentieth century.

"Living constitutionalism" should be distinguished from "dead constitutionalism." Under the former, courts looks to objective referents of shared public understanding of constitutional values. Examples of objective referents include state constitutions, as well as federal or state laws to protect …

State Court Standards Of Review For The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer

David B Kopel

Cases on the right to arms in state constitutions can provide useful guidance for courts addressing Second Amendment issues. Although some people have claimed that state courts always use a highly deferential version of "reasonableness," this article shows that many courts have employed rigorous standards, including the tools of strict scrutiny, such as overbreadth, narrow tailoring, and less restrictive means. Courts have also used categoricalism (deciding whether something is inside or outside the right) and narrow construction (to prevent criminal laws from conflicting with the right to arms). Even when formally applying "reasonableness," many courts have used reasonableness as a …

The Keystone Of The Second Amendment: Quakers, The Pennsylvania Constitution, And The Questionable Scholarship Of Nathan Kozuskanich, David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer

David B Kopel

Historian Nathan Kozuskanich claims that the Second Amendment-like the arms provision of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution-is only a guarantee of a right of individuals to participate in the militia, in defense of the polity. Kozuskanich’s claim about the Second Amendment is based on two articles he wrote about the original public meaning of the right to arms in Pennsylvania, including the 1776 and 1790 Pennsylvania constitutional arms guarantees.

Part I of this Article provides a straightforward legal history of the right to arms provisions in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and of the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution. We examine Kozuskanich’s claims about …

A New Global Constitutional Order?, David Schneiderman

David Schneiderman

Accompanying the rise of new transnational legal rules and institutions intended to promote global economic integration are questions about the linkages between transnational legality and constitutional law. In what ways does transnational economic law mimic features of national constitutional law? Does transnational law complement in some ways or supersede in other ways what we typically describe as constitutional law? To these questions we can now add the following: are transnational rules and institutions a proper subject of study for comparative constitutionalists? This chapter makes a case for the incorporation of forms of transnational legality into comparative constitutional studies. Taking as …

Promoting Equality, Black Economic Empowerment, And The Future Of Investment Rules, David Schneiderman

David Schneiderman

It generally is assumed that rules to protect and promote foreign investment are sufficiently flexible to address the specific needs of developing and less developed countries. What happens, however, when the typical model of investment treaty rubs against national constitutional commitments, such as those mandating the promotion of equality in post-apartheid South Africa? This paper explores such tensions in the context of free trade and investment negotiations between the United States and the South African Customs Union. South Africa’s plan to generate a new black middle class via a program of Black Economic Empowerment, it turns out, was a contributing …

Commerce In The Commerce Clause: A Response To Jack Balkin, David B. Kopel, Robert G. Natelson

David B Kopel

The Constitution’s original meaning is its meaning to those ratifying the document during a discrete time period: from its adoption by the Constitutional Convention in late 1787 until Rhode Island’s ratification on May 29, 1790. Reconstructing it requires historical skills, including a comprehensive approach to sources. Jack Balkin’s article Commerce fails to consider the full range of evidence and thereby attributes to the Constitution’s Commerce Clause a scope that virtually no one in the Founding Era believed it had.

Clear As Mud: How The Uncertain Precedential Status Of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, David R. Cleveland

David R. Cleveland

While unpublished opinions are now freely citeable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, their precedential value remains uncertain. This ambiguity muddles the already unclear law surrounding qualified immunity and denies courts valuable precedents for making fair and consistent judgments on these critical civil rights issues. When faced with a claim that they have violated a person’s civil rights, government officials typically claim qualified immunity. The test is whether they have violated “clearly established law.” Unfortunately, the federal circuits differ on whether unpublished opinions may be used in determining clearly established law. This article, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain …

Time To Bury The Shocks The Conscience Test, Rosalie Levinson

Rosalie Berger Levinson

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was 'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government'...to prevent governmental power from being 'used for purposes of oppression.'"1 Historically, Magna Carta was aimed a·t limiting the power of the king. Today, substantive due process is invoked to challenge arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, and property by officials, such as police officers, jail guards, public-school educators, public employers, and members of zoning boards. However, the Supreme Court has emasculated its efficacy as a limitation on executive power. …

Mcdonald V. Chicago, The Fourteenth Amendment, The Right To Bear Arms And The Right Of Self-Defense, Richard L. Aynes

Richard L. Aynes

The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in the case of McDonald v. City of Chicago to consider this question: "Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses." This case follows and seeks to build upon District of Columbia v. Heller which held that the Second Amendment protects both the right to self-defense and what has been termed an individual right to bear arms. Of course, Heller’s application is limited to the federal government and has no direct …