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Articles 31 - 42 of 42
Full-Text Articles in Law
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
All Faculty Scholarship
This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …
Tax Law Uncertainty And The Role Of Tax Insurance, Kyle D. Logue
Tax Law Uncertainty And The Role Of Tax Insurance, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
In the broadest sense, this is an article about legal or regulatory uncertainty and the role that private and public insurance can play in managing it. More narrowly, the article is about tax law enforcement and the familiar if ill-defined distinctions between tax evasion, tax avoidance, and abusive tax avoidance. Most specifically, the article is about a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax indemnity insurance or transactional tax risk insurance that provides coverage against the risk that the Internal Revenue Service (Service) will disallow a taxpayer-insured's tax treatment of a particular transaction. The question is whether …
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …
But Can She Keep The Car? Some Thoughts On Collateral Retention In Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, Marianne B. Culhane, Michaela M. White
But Can She Keep The Car? Some Thoughts On Collateral Retention In Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, Marianne B. Culhane, Michaela M. White
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Strategic Planning For Financial Institutions In A New Legal And Economic Environment, Carl Felsenfeld, William T. Lifland, Ernest T. Patrikis, Frank Scifo, William J. Sweet Jr.
Strategic Planning For Financial Institutions In A New Legal And Economic Environment, Carl Felsenfeld, William T. Lifland, Ernest T. Patrikis, Frank Scifo, William J. Sweet Jr.
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Leach Keynote Address, James A. Leach
Leach Keynote Address, James A. Leach
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Reinsurance: Bad Faith Considerations And Insolvency Dilemma, Hui-Ju Hsieh
Reinsurance: Bad Faith Considerations And Insolvency Dilemma, Hui-Ju Hsieh
LLM Theses and Essays
Reinsurance is insurance that an insurance company purchases from another insurance company. The original insurance company is called the reinsured, and the insurance company that is contracted is called the reinsurer. The main purpose of reinsurance is to disperse or spread the risk of loss. The reinsurance relationship is frequently characterized as an exercise of fiduciary responsibility based upon an undertaking of utmost good faith between contracting parties. However, disputes arise; most litigation involving reinsurance has been between reinsurers and persons not party to the reinsurance agreement. This paper’s first major area of discussion is the relationship between the reinsurer …
Post Smith V. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation With A Proactive Perspective, Lynn A. Howell
Post Smith V. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation With A Proactive Perspective, Lynn A. Howell
Cleveland State Law Review
The Van Gorkom decision was viewed by many as the catalyst which triggered the dramatic increases in the number of shareholder suits filed, director and officer (hereinafter D & 0) insurance policy cancellations, skyrocketing premiums, and the flight of the outside directors.' Devastating decisions like Van Gorkom could be prevented or at least be of a lesser magnitude if corporate counsel chose to use the proactive approach to corporate representation by employing the techniques of preventive law. The theory is similar to the time honored cliché "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." This Article will address …
Disbursement Of Insurance Money Covering An Insured's Legal Expenses As Incurred, Arthur P. Xanthos
Disbursement Of Insurance Money Covering An Insured's Legal Expenses As Incurred, Arthur P. Xanthos
Fordham Urban Law Journal
In the Southern District of New York, Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. held that the D & O insurance carrier was obligated to pay the insured's costs as they accrue, subject to reimbursement should adjudication show that there were no grounds for coverage. This Note proposes that the Pepsico rule favoring the insured is the more judicious view regarding interim payments. This Note discusses the differing interpretations of D & O policy defense cost clauses, and then analyzes the Pepsico rule from the standpoints of reasonable expectations, contract interpretation and unconscionability. After comparing D & O insurance with standard …
Where Have All The Directors Gone: Corporate Director And Officer Liability And Coping With The Insurance Crisis, Richard A. Myers Jr.
Where Have All The Directors Gone: Corporate Director And Officer Liability And Coping With The Insurance Crisis, Richard A. Myers Jr.
Cleveland State Law Review
Smith v. Van Gorkom set in motion a trend of increased exposure for directors and officers of American corporations....Directors and officers insurance may be either unavailable or unaffordable,...As a general rule, the best way to cope with the change in the business environment and the insurance crisis is to plan in advance for it. Through careful corporate structuring and planning, while remaining flexible, a small company can maximize their protection from liability. The factors to consider range from a careful drafting of the corporate articles and bylaws to the creation of captive insurance companies.