Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
-
- Columbia Law School (8)
- University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (8)
- Cornell University Law School (6)
- Georgetown University Law Center (6)
- William & Mary Law School (6)
-
- University of Washington School of Law (4)
- University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (3)
- University of Michigan Law School (3)
- University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law (3)
- University of Pittsburgh School of Law (3)
- Washington and Lee University School of Law (3)
- Boston University School of Law (2)
- University of Miami Law School (2)
- University of the Pacific (2)
- Brooklyn Law School (1)
- Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1)
- Florida State University College of Law (1)
- Fordham Law School (1)
- Mitchell Hamline School of Law (1)
- Notre Dame Law School (1)
- University of Baltimore Law (1)
- University of Colorado Law School (1)
- University of Connecticut (1)
- University of Kentucky (1)
- University of the District of Columbia School of Law (1)
- Keyword
-
- Corporate governance (9)
- Corporations (8)
- Regulation (5)
- Shareholders (3)
- Business (2)
-
- Business judgment rule (2)
- Corporate fraud (2)
- Corporate law (2)
- Corporation law (2)
- Duty of care (2)
- Efficiency (2)
- Enron (2)
- Enron Corp (2)
- Fiduciary duty (2)
- Homo economicus (2)
- Limited liability (2)
- Multinational enterprises (2)
- Practice of law (2)
- Private Sector (2)
- Privatization (2)
- Social responsibility of business (2)
- Southern California Law Review (2)
- Tax competition (2)
- ATDs (1)
- Acounting Law (1)
- Administrative procedure (1)
- Adolph A. Berle (1)
- Agency law (1)
- Agency theory (1)
- Agent liability (1)
- Publication
-
- Faculty Scholarship (16)
- Articles (11)
- All Faculty Scholarship (9)
- Cornell Law Faculty Publications (6)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (6)
-
- William & Mary Annual Tax Conference (5)
- Scholarly Articles (3)
- Scholarly Works (3)
- Faculty Publications (2)
- Journal Articles (2)
- McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles (2)
- Faculty Articles and Papers (1)
- Law Faculty Scholarly Articles (1)
- Other Publications (1)
- Publications (1)
- Scholarly Publications (1)
Articles 61 - 70 of 70
Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Law: A Year In The Life Of Indiana Corporate Law, Leah Chan Grinvald
Corporate Law: A Year In The Life Of Indiana Corporate Law, Leah Chan Grinvald
Scholarly Works
The area of corporate law is a broad area, as it can expansively be defined as the law that affects incorporated businesses. Within this definition, other areas of law such as contract, agency and tort law are included because corporations are affected by these laws in one form or other. However, this Article will address only a narrow slice of corporate law, including issues of shareholder lawsuits, the well-established corporate doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, sections of the Indiana Business Corporation Law and sections of the Indiana Securities Act.
A Reexamination Of Glanzer V. Shepard: Surveyors On The Tort- Contract Boundary, Victor P. Goldberg
A Reexamination Of Glanzer V. Shepard: Surveyors On The Tort- Contract Boundary, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In international commodity transactions, intermediary certifiers of quantity and quality play a crucial role. Sometimes they err, and when they do, the aggrieved party can pursue remedies against the counterparty or against the intermediary, either in contract or tort. The remedy against the intermediary has depended, at least in part, on whether the plaintiff was in privity. Even absent privity, the aggrieved party could possibly recover in tort (or perhaps as a third-party beneficiary). So held Cardozo in the leading New York case Glanzer v. Shepard. Section I of this paper reviews the Glanzer litigation, with special emphasis on how …
Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Ownership Structure And The Evolution Of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons From The United Kingdom, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Enron And The Dark Side Of Shareholder Value, William W. Bratton
Enron And The Dark Side Of Shareholder Value, William W. Bratton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article addresses the implications that the Enron collapse holds out for the self-regulatory system of corporate governance. The case shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed. Even as academics have proclaimed rising governance standards, some standards have declined, particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder value. The Article's inquiry begins with Enron's business plan. The Article asserts that there may be more to Enron's "virtual firm" strategy than meets the eye beholding a firm in collapse. The Article restates the strategy as …
What Enron Means For The Management And Control Of The Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon
What Enron Means For The Management And Control Of The Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The Enron case plays on many different dimensions, but its prominence is not merely part of popular culture's obsession with scandal du jour. Rather, the Enron situation challenges some of the core beliefs and practices that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s. These amount to an interlocking set of institutions that constitute "shareholder capitalism," American-style, 2001, that we have been aggressively promoting throughout the world. We have come to rely on a particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock market prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability …
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid", John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance. Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions – and Enron is surely that – tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming what he or she already believed.
Playing Favorites With Shareholders, Stephen J. Choi, Eric Talley
Playing Favorites With Shareholders, Stephen J. Choi, Eric Talley
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most vexing historical debates in corporate law concerns whether regulations or markets are better equipped to address managerial agency costs within public corporations. Although corporate law scholars have traditionally favored immutable legal imperatives as an elixir for misaligned incentives,an increasing number of commentators place greater faith in market mechanisms to accomplish the same task. While many such mechanisms operate simultaneously (including markets for output, labor, and capital), perhaps none has received more attention than the oft-celebrated "market for corporate control" as a means for achieving deterrence. By providing a constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the …
The Evolution Of Corporate Law: A Cross- Country Comparison, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West
The Evolution Of Corporate Law: A Cross- Country Comparison, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West
Faculty Scholarship
The importance of law and legal institutions for economic development is widely acknowledged today. The invention of credit mechanisms to support long-distance trade has been hailed as one of the preconditions for the development of capitalism in Europe. The corporate form is regarded as another milestone for industrialization, the creation of viable market economies, and ultimately economic prosperity. Many former socialist countries quickly enacted new corporate codes or revived their pre-World War Two ("WWII") legislation. The failure of major privatization efforts to enhance enterprise efficiency is attributed to weaknesses in corporate governance, of which the corporate law is a crucial …
On The Demise Of Shareholder Primacy ( Or, Murder On The James Trains Express), Eric Talley
On The Demise Of Shareholder Primacy ( Or, Murder On The James Trains Express), Eric Talley
Faculty Scholarship
The hypothetical introduced by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine's Essay exposes an important arena of corporate governance where adherence to the traditional norm of "shareholder primacy" is particularly troublesome. In fact, it is hard to find an analogous domain of corporate governance law that is as jarringly discontinuous as that found in the factual circumstances suggested by Strine's hypothetical. Explicitly, the legal scrutiny accorded to managers who resist a hostile acquisition depends critically on whether a court invokes the Revlon doctrine or the Unocal doctrine as the appropriate governing standard. Under the former (and its progeny), shareholder primacy arguments carry …