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The Underutilized Foreign Investor, Griffin Weaver

Griffin Weaver

For most states, if not all, the push for economic advancement is at the front of every administration’s agenda. This is especially true for developing countries in the Middle East whose standard of living and international power is largely tied to its economic condition. An important indicator, if not condition, of a state’s economic health is the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) received by the state. This inflow of money is essential for the growth and stability of a state’s economy. As one U.S. official once noted, the United States “need[s] a net inflow of capital of $3 billion …

Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision-making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the rarity of genuine …

The Problem Of Nonprofit Executive Pay?: Evidence From U.S. Colleges And Universities, Brian D. Galle, David I. Walker

Brian D. Galle

Nonprofit organizations suffer from agency problems that are similar to or perhaps even more severe than those observed at for-profit companies. As a result, one might expect the executive pay setting process in the two sectors to reflect similar deficiencies. This Article explains why the managerial power theory that was developed to help explain for-profit executive pay is plausibly applicable to nonprofits. More importantly, this Article offers new evidence based on data from a large panel of colleges and universities collected across a nine year period that supports the idea that potential stakeholder outrage plays a role in limiting nonprofit …

Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Now over 36 years old, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. Over the past thirty-six years NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership …

Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen

D. Bruce Johnsen

As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …

The Stock Market Reaction To Class Action Filings Post Pslra, Mark S. Klock

Mark S Klock

Using a substantially larger sample than has been used before, and a sample that includes the Great Financial Crisis and its ensuing recession, I investigate the stock market reaction to securities class action filings following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act through the first quarter of 2012. I find that on average, even after adjusting for market downturns, there is a statistically significant negative abnormal return at the time of filing. There is also a statistically significant negative abnormal return during the weeks preceding the filing indicating that the market partially, but not fully, anticipates these filings. …

Janus Capital Group, Inc. V. First Derivative Traders: The Culmination Of The Supreme Court’S Evolution From Liberal To Reactionary In Rule 10b-5 Actions, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

“Political” decisions such as Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business (“Obamacare”) reflect the reactionary bent of several Supreme Court justices. But this reactionary trend is discernible in other areas as well. With regard to Rule 10b-5, the Court has handed down a series of decisions that could be grouped into four trilogies. The article examines the trend over the past 40 years which has become increasingly conservative and finally reactionary.

The first trilogy was a liberal one, arguably overextending the scope of Rule 10b-5. This was followed by a conservative trilogy which put a brake on such extension, …

Sovereign Investing And Corporate Governance: Evidence And Policy, Paul Rose

Paul Rose

Discussions of corporate governance often focus solely on the attractiveness of firms to investors, but it is also true that firms seek out preferred investors. What, then, are the characteristics of an attractive investor? With nearly $6 trillion in assets, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are increasingly important players in equity markets in the United States and abroad, and possess characteristics that firms prize: deep pockets, long-term (and for some, theoretically infinite) investment horizons, and potential network benefits that many other shareholders cannot offer. However, despite their economic power, their reach, and their general desirability as investors, SWFs are almost entirely …

The Management Of Public Natural Resource Wealth, Paul Rose

Paul Rose

As improved but often more environmentally-obtrusive technologies such as hydraulic fracturing facilitate the extraction of billions of dollars in natural resource wealth, more states are now faced with a welcome but exceedingly complex set of problems: Who should benefit from natural resources extracted from public lands? If the state retains much of this wealth in the form of tax receipts, how should these funds be spent? What do states owe to the communities from which these resources were extracted? What do states owe to future generations? While these are questions of first impression for a few, fortunate states, a number …

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Janus Capital Group, Inc. V. First Derivative Traders: The Culmination Of The Supreme Court’S Evolution From Liberal To Reactionary In Rule 10b-5 Actions, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

“Political” decisions such as Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business (“Obamacare”) reflect the reactionary bent of several Supreme Court justices. But this reactionary trend is discernible in other areas as well. With regard to Rule 10b-5, the Court has handed down a series of decisions that could be grouped into four trilogies. The article examines the trend over the past 40 years which has become increasingly conservative and finally reactionary.

The first trilogy was a liberal one, arguably overextending the scope of Rule 10b-5. This was followed by a conservative trilogy which put a brake on such extension, …

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

David G. Yosifon

Delaware corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, for corporate law …

Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. …

Veil-Piercing Unbound, Peter B. Oh

Peter B. Oh

Veil-piercing is an equitable remedy. This simple insight has been lost over time. What started as a means for corporate creditors to reach into the personal assets of a shareholder has devolved into a doctrinal black hole. Courts apply an expansive list of amorphous factors, attenuated from the underlying harm, that engenders under-inclusive, unprincipled, and unpredictable results for entrepreneurs, litigants, and scholars alike. Veil-piercing is misapplied because it is misconceived. The orthodox approach is to view veil-piercing as an exception to limited liability that is justified potentially only when the latter is not, a path that invariably leads to examining …

Caremark's Irrelevance, Mercer E. Bullard

Mercer E Bullard

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. is commonly held out as the iconic corporate law case on liability for a failure of legal compliance, but the true source of corporate law as to legal compliance is the higher standard established by other sources of law. The expected cost of liability, both criminal and civil, for violations of federal healthcare regulations, for example, is a far stronger determinant of corporate compliance systems than potential liability under Caremark. Other areas of industry-specific regulation, such as for financial services, telecommunications and energy, similarly play a greater role than state corporate law in …

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

In a previous publication The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, (with Kara Altenbaumer-Price) we examined: The IT Governance Institute’s Executive Summary and Framework for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.1 (COBIT®); reviewed the Weill and Ross Corporate and Key Asset Governance Framework; and observed “that in a survey of audit executives and board members, 58 percent believed that their corporate employees had little to no understanding of how to assess risk.” We further described the new SEC rules on risk management; Congressional action on cyber security; legal basis for director’s duties and responsibilities relative to IT governance; …

Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why The Capital-Managed Rather Than The Labor-Managed Enterprise Is The Predominant Organizational Form In Market Economies, 73 Ohio State L.J. 219 (2012, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I …

Regulation Not Prohibition: The Comparative Case Against The Insurable Interest Doctrine, Sharo Michael Atmeh

Sharo M Atmeh

American law requires an insurable interest—a pecuniary or affective stake in the subject of an insurance policy—as a predi-cate to properly obtaining insurance. In theory, the rule prevents both wagering on individual lives and moral hazard. In practice, the doctrine is avoided by complex insurance transaction structuring to effectuate both origination and transfers of insurance by individuals without an insurable interest. This paper argues that it is time to ab-andon the insurable interest doctrine. As both the English and Aus-tralian experiences indicate, elimination of the insurable interest doctrine will have little detrimental pecuniary effect on the insurance industry, while freeing …

Exit, Voice And International Jurisdictional Competition: A Case Study Of The Evolution Of Taiwan’S Regulatory Regime For Outward Investment In Mainland China, 1997-2008, Chang-Hsien Tsai

Chang-hsien (Robert) TSAI

This Article explores the interplay of demand and supply forces in the market for law through international jurisdictional competition led by offshore financial centers. To do so it uses the example of the evolution of a regulatory regime imposed by an onshore jurisdiction, Taiwan, to control outward investment into mainland China (“China-investment”). The argument is that jurisdictional competition brought about by capital mobility or exit will provoke legal changes to prevent the departure of capital when laws reduce the value of remaining within the jurisdiction. The case study is used to examine the extent to which jurisdictional competition fuelled by …

Legitimacy, Accountability, And Partnership: A Model For Advocacy On Third World Environmental Issues, David A. Wirth

David A. Wirth

To date, there has been little effort to define the characteristics of responsible environmental reform efforts by private citizens and organizations in the United States on foreign environmental problems, such as the quality of foreign aid. Moreover, there have been virtually no attempts to identify a principled role for American lawyers in Third World environmental issues. This Essay will respond to these lacunae by articulating a new approach to advocacy based on a partnership model. In Part I, this Essay identifies the need for American public interest advocates to establish partnerships with directly affected groups on Third World environmental issues. …

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Frank J. Garcia

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …

Relational Contract Theory And Management Contracts: A Paradigm For The Application Of The Theory Of The Norms, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the explanation and understanding of contractual obligations and business relations' rules and practice. After presenting the key literature about the norms theory and especially defining the content of MacNeil's norms, we define management contracts as relations, characterised by a high relational element and we explain why, investigating all their features, which make them a suitable object for …

Taxing Shared Economies Of Scale, Brad Borden

Bradley T. Borden

Economies of scale exist if long-run average costs decline as output rises. All else being equal, the decline in average costs should lead to greater profitability, making economies of scale attractive to businesses. Nobel laureate George Stigler recognized that economies of scale should help determine the optimum size of a firm. To obtain economies of scale and optimum firm size, parties may integrate resources or grant access to resources without integrating. Such arrangements create shared economies of scale. Tax law must consider the effects of shared economies of scale and address them. In particular, the varying degrees of scale-sharing raise …

Invisible Ink In The Eighth Arrondissement, Karl T. Muth

Karl T Muth

IMPORTANT: This document may prompt you for a username and password. If this occurs, please simply click "cancel" and the document will load. Thank you. This Article deals with the history of the secret contract that governs the distribution of economic rents enjoyed by Formula One. It further explores the environment in which this secret contract evolved and briefly discusses applications for secret contracts in other scenarios and industries.

How Law Constructs Wealth Patterns [Panel Remarks], Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

No abstract provided.

Shareholders, Unicorns And Stilts: An Analysis Of Shareholder Property Rights, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: Shareholders rights advocates argue that shareholders have the right to control the corporation. This article examines the basis for the claims. It begins with an analysis of rights, then moves to an analysis of legal rights, which is followed by an analysis of property rights as a species of legal rights. The article then examines the historical context, rationale and development of shareholder rights which leads to the analysis of current shareholders’ rights. The article concludes with some comments and suggestions concerning future development of corporate governance thinking.