Law Commons^™

Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, And Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

None available.

Who Let You Into The House?, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Recent Congressional corporate governance initiatives have reallocated to independent directors the functions of hiring and supervising the work of certain “gatekeepers,” and some have proposed such a reallocation with respect to general counsel, as a means to address cognitive biases and capture by senior management that may prevent inside counsel from identifying and preventing corporate misconduct. That proposal, however, does not sufficiently account for the positive effect on corporate conduct arising from a close relationship of trust and confidence between general counsel and the CEO or other senior managers. Eliminating such a relationship is likely to undermine access to internal …

Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.

Equity Swaps And Implications In Company Law: An Examination Of Singapore Law, Chao-Hung Christopher Chen

Christopher Chao-hung CHEN

This article explores issues from the use of equity swaps by corporate stakeholders under Singapore law. The article accepts that non-disclosure of economic interests might have an impact on market efficiency and corporate governance. To address potential problems, Singapore should consider revising the Takeover Code, while it requires further regulatory impact analysis to decide whether amendments to the Securities and Futures Act and the Companies Act are needed. As an alternative, companies can use their articles of association to impose a duty of disclosure before statutory intervention. In addition, the trading of equity swaps by directors raises issues about fiduciary …

Corporate Governance And The New Trend Of Directors In Company Law In Other Countries, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen, Shuaisheng Huang

Christopher Chao-hung Chen

No abstract provided.

Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas

Eugenio J. Cárdenas

This Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School (October 21, 2011), inquires on whether emerging capital markets are shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of global legal convergence. It ventures into this puzzle of globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development, in light of the increasing phenomenon of regulatory convergence and international cooperation among securities regulators, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement.

Focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, namely Brazil’s securities market. The study explores Brazil’s …

Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, And The Redefinition Of Corporate Purpose Without Law, David Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.

The Disaster At Bhopal: Lessons For Corporate Law?, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Prepared for a conference at New England Law School marking the upcoming twenty-fifth anniversary of the disaster at Bhopal, this essay asks whether we have anything still to learn from what occurred in the early morning hours in Bhopal on December 3, 1984, and in the hours, days, and weeks that followed. Is there reason to believe, for example, that corporations have a tendency to create the context in which such disasters are more likely? More recent corporate behavior poses the same question, whether it pertains to environmental destruction, injuries to consumers, collusion with illegal governmental activities, or financial malfeasance. …

The Impact Of "Going Private" On Corporate Stakeholders, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

As capital markets in the United States increasingly "go private," it is unclear how the privatization of corporate finance will affect non-shareholder stakeholders of firms, most centrally employees, communities, and the environment. Some scholars and public policy experts believe that concern for such stakeholders should not hold any relevance in the discussion of corporate law in general, and thus may be presumed to believe the same about a conversation about privatization. In such a view, these concerns lie outside the realm of corporate governance law; they therefore should be of no great moment in the debate over whether public policy …

New Principles For Corporate Law, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are the notions that corporations are voluntary, private, contractual entities, that they have broad powers to make money in whatever ways and in whatever locations they see fit. The primary obligation of management is to shareholders, and shareholders alone. Corporations have broad powers but only a limited role: they exist to make money. Those who maintain these principles – a group that includes most of the legal scholars who teach and write in the area – have derived the narrow role of corporations in one of …

Democracy And The Dominance Of Delaware In Corporate Law, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

Among the grandest debates within corporate law is whether the dominance of Delaware is the result of a “race to the bottom” -- toward a legal regime that benefits managers at the expense of the shareholders -- or a “race to the top” -- toward an efficient, shareholder-centric governance framework. This paper argues that this debate is largely beside the point. Even if Delaware’s dominance is the result of a competition resulting in law that efficiently serves the interests of shareholders, it is nevertheless illegitimate. This is because the internal affairs doctrine, on which Delaware’s preeminence depends, in effect allows …

An Experimental Test Of Fairness Under Agency And Profit Constraints (With Notes On Implications For Corporate Governance), Kent Greenfield, Peter Kostant

Kent Greenfield

Building on the scholarship using ultimatum game experiments to explore the presence of fairness norms in bargaining exchanges, the authors test whether such norms are affected by agency relationships alone or agency relationships linked with a duty to maximize returns to the principal. The findings are dramatic. The study, the first of its kind, indicates a significant decrease in a concern for fairness (defined as a willingness to share a pot of money) when a participant in a bargaining transaction acts as an agent for another and owes a duty to maximize the return to the principal. We find no …

The Economic Theory Of Derivative Actions, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

This paper offers a model to formalize the economic theory of derivative actions developed during the last 30 years. From this perspective, the derivative action presents two interrelated problems. The first is how to solve the collective action problem that prevents that minority shareholders file a suit. The second is how to control the risk of collusive settlements between the defendant manager and the plaintiff’s attorney. This model identifies the fundamental tradeoffs that are implicit in these problems, as well as an optimum that could be used as normative benchmark. In brief, it argues that if the goal of derivative …

Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference Presentation: Mitigating The Harmful Effects Of Proxy Access (Sec Rule 14a-11), Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Presentation given at the Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference (June 15, 2011)

Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros

Pavlos E. Masouros

This article critically analyzes the Shareholder Rights Directive ("SRD") (Directive 2007/36/EC). It is essentially an attempt to show that the deficit in the European corporate governance model with regard to the status of the shareholders persists even in the post-SRD era and that we still have a long distance to cover in order to truly empower shareholders in the EU. The SRD along with certain other Company Law Directives and the various European national corporate laws form a synthesis that falls short of providing shareholders with the full potential of getting their corporate governance voice through within listed corporations.

First …

The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing

John Lessing

Good corporate governance requires a range of regulatory checks and balances - or mechanisms - to be effective. If one mechanism fails, the system will fail like a chain with a weak link. This article provides an overview and brief explanation of the main checks and balances a country needs to have a good corporate governance system. It is of particular relevance to countries with transition economies. However, it is also important in developed countries as recent corporate collapses and failures in the financial system have illustrated.

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …

Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague

Robert Sprague

This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …

Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle

Robert Sprague

There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …

Employee Participation In Corporate Governance: An Ethical Analysis, Michael Lp Lower

Michael LP Lower

This paper outlines why CST has called for employees to be involved in the governance of the firms that they work for and a share in ownership. It points out the economic issues involved as part of its broader ethical analysis. The John Lewis Partnership is pointed to as a good working model. The possible use of ESOPs to bring about desirable changes is considered. The case for mandatory codetermination is outlined.

Enhancing The Efficiency Of Board Decision Making: Lessons Learned From The Financial Crisis Of 2008, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, the employment compensation policies and decisions of Wall Street corporate boards have come under close scrutiny. More specifically, the willingness to approve company wide compensation plans that resulted in the paying out of billions of dollars in bonuses even in the face of deteriorating financial and economic conditions. If only these and other Wall Street firms had retained the bulk of these large annual bonuses over the last several years when the financial markets were noticeably in decline, perhaps the economic impact of the current financial crisis would have been less …

John Paul Ii And Employee Participation In Corporate Governance, Michael Lp Lower

Michael LP Lower

Catholic Social Thought ("CST") has called for employees to be active participants in the governance of the enterprises for which they work. This article looks at what CST has to say about employee participation. It shows that John Paul II's distinctive contribution was to lay bare the theological and philosophical justifications for CST's approach to this issue.

The North Dakota Publicly Trade Corporations Act: A Branding Initiative Without A (North Dakota) Brand, Joshua P. Fershee

Joshua P Fershee

Any time a new market is entered and a new brand is created, whether it is the market for corporate governance laws or consumer electronics, it is essential to understand the market and have a clear vision of what the brand is supposed to be. When the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act (Act) became law on July 2, 2007, the state of North Dakota officially entered (or tried to enter) the corporate governance market. Rather than adding to the already significant debate about the value of increased shareholder rights or arguing that the Act was bad (or good) for …

Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

Natural Law And Agency Theory, Michael Lp Lower

Michael LP Lower

Corporate governance scholarship is awash with theories of the firm: these are "stories" or metaphors that try to shed light on the nature and purpose of the firm as an institution and on one or more of the following questions:

(i) how the institution of the firm "evolved" (or its economic or social purpose); (ii) whether "the firm" is a reality or a rhetorical device; and (iii) the relationship between "the firm" and stakeholders, political society and so on.

Theories of the firm are used both to explain and to help develop law and policy. If the theory is misconceived, …

Lawyer Responsibilities In The New Disclosure & Corporate Governance Regime, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.