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Articles 91 - 102 of 102
Full-Text Articles in Law
Disclosure And Corporate Morality: Beginning A Dialogue, David A. Lipton
Disclosure And Corporate Morality: Beginning A Dialogue, David A. Lipton
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
Not available.
Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Redefining Corporate Law, David K. Millon
The Delaware Judiciary And The Meaning Of Corporate Life And Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
The Delaware Judiciary And The Meaning Of Corporate Life And Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.' treats several important questions that arise in connection with hostile corporate takeovers. At the same time, it leaves three critical issues unanswered. In this article, we first briefly describe what the Time decision did, comparing Chancellor William Allen's somewhat discursive Chancery Court opinion with the more peremptory ruling of the Supreme Court. Next, we identify three unarticulated but potentially far-reaching implications of both the Supreme Court's and Chancellor Allen's reasoning that threaten to destabilize seemingly settled doctrine governing the conduct of target company management.
Theories Of The Corporation, David K. Millon
Misreading The Williams Act, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Misreading The Williams Act, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Missing The Point About State Takeover Statutes, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Missing The Point About State Takeover Statutes, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
The Eventual Clash Between Judicial And Legislative Notions Of Target Management Conduct, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
The Eventual Clash Between Judicial And Legislative Notions Of Target Management Conduct, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute And The Need For New Judicial Analysis Of State Takeover Legislation, Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute And The Need For New Judicial Analysis Of State Takeover Legislation, Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
Conventional wisdom holds that corporate takeovers benefit both shareholders and society in general. In examining the constitutionality of state takeover statutes, numerous courts have uncritically adopted this view of takeovers. As a result, they have consistently invalidated state statutes as burdening interstate commerce, both by depriving shareholders of premiums and supposedly impeding an efficient reallocation of resources. This conventional wisdom has been challenged by recent empirical evidence on the adverse efficiency effects of many mergers. In light of this evidence indicating a divergence of investor and other interests in takeovers, Professor Lyman Johnson argues for revised judicial analysis of takeover …