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An Issue Of Absolution: Section 391 Of The Companies Act, Pearlie Koh
An Issue Of Absolution: Section 391 Of The Companies Act, Pearlie Koh
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
There is an obvious tension in the imposition of directors’ duties. Whilst directors being the management, and therefore the eyes, ears and brain of the corporate person, must be given sufficient discretion to take on entrepreneurial (and hence risky) ventures with a view to profit maximisation, there is also the need to curb excesses, as the potential or opportunity for mismanagement, negligence and fraud is omnipresent. [T]his short article considers section 391 of the Companies Act (Cap 50), arguably the statutory nemesis of directors’ duties. Section 391 gives jurisdiction to the court hearing the case to relieve an officer from …
Once A Director, Always A Fiduciary?, Pearlie Koh
Once A Director, Always A Fiduciary?, Pearlie Koh
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The corporate director is subject to duties of good faith and loyalty. As he stands in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the company on whose board he sits, he is subject to strict obligations of self-denial. Indeed, ensuring adherence to an absolute rule in this regard is justified by the need to control, albeit in a necessarily imperfect and arguably ineffective manner, the exercise of discretion by the director who stands in an undoubted position of power with respect to the company. A director therefore is obliged to avoid a conflict of interests and is prohibited from profiting from his office. …
The Director's Fiduciary Obligations: A Fresh Look?, Pearlie Koh
The Director's Fiduciary Obligations: A Fresh Look?, Pearlie Koh
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
It is a pillar of equity that a person in a fiduciary position must not make a profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict (per Lord Upjohn in Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 123). The House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 demonstrated the unrelenting nature, and some have argued inequitable severity (see, e.g., Jones, (1968) 84 L.Q.R. 472), of the director-fiduciary’s obligations to his company. Such absolutism (Lowry …