Law Commons^™

Politics And The Business Corporation, Robert H. Sitkoff

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This essay explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-standing regulation of corporate political speech. The essay has three parts. First, it contends that the conventional justifications for regulating corporate interventions in politics -- that corporate donations unnaturally skew the political discourse (bad politics) and that corporate political donations harm shareholders (agency costs) -- assume irrational investors and substantial capital market inefficiency. Drawing on public choice theory, the essay also explores the aim of retarding rent-seeking as an alternative justification for regulating corporate interventions in politics. Second, the essay reexamines the history of the regulation …

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …

Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors In Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article evaluates two possible explanations for why shareholders of public corporations tolerate board control of corporate assets and outputs: the widely accepted monitoring hypothesis, which posits that shareholders rely on boards primarily to control the "agency costs" associated with turning day-to-day control over the firm over to self-interested corporate executives, and the mediating hypothesis, which posits that shareholders also seek to "tie their own hands" by ceding control to directors as a means of attracting the extracontractual, firm-specific investments of such stakeholder groups as executives, creditors, and rank-and- file employees.

Part I reviews each hypothesis and concludes that each …

Trust Law, Corporate Law, And Capital Market Efficiency, Robert H. Sitkoff

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

In both the publicly-traded corporation and the private donative trust a crucial task is to minimize the agency costs that arise from the separation of risk-bearing and management. But where the law of corporate governance evolved in the shadow of capital-market checks on agency costs, trust governance did not. Thus, even more than that of close corporations, the law and study of private trusts offers an illuminating counterfactual -- a control, as it were -­ for a playful thought experiment about the importance of capital market efficiency to the law and study of public corporations. The animating idea for this …

Using Charitable Contribution Planning Opportunities With Family Business Succession Planning, J. William Gray Jr.

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Practical Issues When Appraising Privately Held Business, Robert F. Mizell, Craig G. Bell

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Selected Buyer And Seller Issues When Contemplating M&A Transactions In An Uncertain Economy, Thomas R. Frantz

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Analyzing The Noncompensatory Partnership Option Proposed Regulations, Dennis A. Diersen

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Use Of Limited Liability Entities In Tax Strategies And Techniques For Business Acquisitions And Dispositions, Thomas P. Rohman

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

The Impact Of The 2003 Tax Act On Privately Held Business, Samuel P. Starr

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility Of A Capitalist Reimagination, David A. Westbrook

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Conflicts In The Regulation Of Hostile Business Takeovers In The United State And The European Union, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay focuses on hostile business takeovers to illustrate the significance that cultural differences among nations can play in developing a harmonized European Union law. After 12 years of development, the EU Directive regulating hostile takeovers, to everyone’s surprise, was voted down in the EU Parliament in 2001. The EU Parliament consists of the member nations and the movement to defeat the Directive was led by Germany, which had just suffered a brutal hostile takeover of its largest company by British raiders.

The “harmonization” efforts within the EU (i.e., establishing uniform laws among the member nations) mirrors the federalism movement …

The Supreme Court's Labor And Employment Decisions: 2002-2003 Term, Maria O'Brien

Faculty Scholarship

This article summarizes U.S. Supreme Court cases from the October 2002 term that related directly or indirectly to labor or employment law or have implications for labor and employment practitioners. Of particular interest are the University of Michigan affirmative action cases' and the Texas criminal sodomy case. ² Although not nominally "labor and employment" cases, these cases will profoundly affect labor and employment issues. Lawrence v. Texas has already altered the lenses through which society views homosexuality and altered public discourse related to homosexuality and same-sex relationships. ³ The reasoning of the Court shows how far issues of sexuality have …

Lawyers In The Perfect Storm, Mark A. Sargent

Working Paper Series

The multiple corporate collapses and scandals of recent years, for which "Enron" is a convenient shorthand, resulted from a perfect storm in which regulatory oversight, the law of fiduciary duty, gatekeepers, market discipline, and contractual incentives all failed to prevent gross self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and deception, or themselves produced perverse consequences. The story of this simultaneous failure of the structures in place since the New Deal and before, has received considerable attention in both the popular and scholarly literature, but is summarized here to provide a context for consideration of the contributions that lawyers made to the perfect storm. …

The Ethical Obligation Of Transactional Lawyer To Act As Gatekeepers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Eugene R. Gaetke

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Recent examples of managerial misconduct at major corporations have called into question the adequacy of the gatekeeper role provided by transactional lawyers representing corporations. That role is governed by Model Rule 1.13(b), which obligates the lawyer for a corporation to take remedial action if the lawyer knows that corporate managers are engaged in actions that amount to a "violation of a legal obligation" to the corporation or that are unlawful and likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation. In addition, Model Rule 1.2(d) forbids a lawyer from lending assistance to any action by corporate managers "that the lawyer …

The Petrochina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets In The Anti-Globalization Era, Stephen F. Diamond

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

An Issue Of Absolution: Section 391 Of The Companies Act, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

There is an obvious tension in the imposition of directors’ duties. Whilst directors being the management, and therefore the eyes, ears and brain of the corporate person, must be given sufficient discretion to take on entrepreneurial (and hence risky) ventures with a view to profit maximisation, there is also the need to curb excesses, as the potential or opportunity for mismanagement, negligence and fraud is omnipresent. [T]his short article considers section 391 of the Companies Act (Cap 50), arguably the statutory nemesis of directors’ duties. Section 391 gives jurisdiction to the court hearing the case to relieve an officer from …

Building Sector-Based Consensus: A Review Of The Epa's Common Sense Initiative, Cary Coglianese, Laurie K. Allen

All Faculty Scholarship

In the late 1990s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted what the agency considered to be a "bold experiment" in regulatory reinvention, bringing representatives from six industrial sectors together with government officials and NGO representatives to forge a consensus on innovations in public policy and business practices. This paper assesses the impact of the agency's "experiment" - called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI) - in terms of the agency's goals of improving regulatory performance and technological innovation. Based on a review of CSI projects across all six sectors, the paper shows how EPA achieved, at best, quite modest accomplishments. …

Once A Director, Always A Fiduciary?, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The corporate director is subject to duties of good faith and loyalty. As he stands in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the company on whose board he sits, he is subject to strict obligations of self-denial. Indeed, ensuring adherence to an absolute rule in this regard is justified by the need to control, albeit in a necessarily imperfect and arguably ineffective manner, the exercise of discretion by the director who stands in an undoubted position of power with respect to the company. A director therefore is obliged to avoid a conflict of interests and is prohibited from profiting from his office. …

Enron At The Margin, William H. Widen

Articles

No abstract provided.

A Challenge To The Rationale For General Economic Crime Sentence Increases Following Sarbanes-Oxley, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

I am writing in response to the Commission's request for comment published in the Federal Register on January 17, 2003. I will address the question of whether the base offense level and/or the loss table of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 should be further modified to provide across-the-board sentence increases for economic crime offenders at virtually all loss levels. In my view, no case for doing so has yet been made.

Editor's Observations: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And What Came After, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

On December 2, 2001, the Enron Corporation filed the largest bankruptcy petition in U.S. history. Losses to investors, creditors, employees, and pensioners were in the billions. Criminal investigations are ongoing. On May 1, 2003, the U.S. Sentencing Commission passed a set of amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that will, among other things, prevent a federal district judge from awarding a sentence of straight probation to a defendant convicted at trial of an $11,000 mail fraud. This Issue of FSR tells the story of how the first of these apparently unrelated events led to the second. Put another way, this …

Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance In Chapter 11, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many observers believed that the American corporate bankruptcy laws were desperately inefficient. The managers of the debtor stayed in control as "debtor in possession" after filing for bankruptcy, and they had the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan for at least the first four months of the case, and often far longer. The result was lengthy cases, deteriorating value and numerous academic proposals to replace Chapter 11 with an alternative regime. In the early years of the new millennium, bankruptcy could not look more different. Cases proceed much more quickly, and they are …

The Director's Fiduciary Obligations: A Fresh Look?, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

It is a pillar of equity that a person in a fiduciary position must not make a profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict (per Lord Upjohn in Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 123). The House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 demonstrated the unrelenting nature, and some have argued inequitable severity (see, e.g., Jones, (1968) 84 L.Q.R. 472), of the director-fiduciary’s obligations to his company. Such absolutism (Lowry …

High Drama And Hindsight: The Llp Shield Post-Anderson, Susan Saab Fortney

Faculty Scholarship

This article explores several disadvantages associated with limited liability partnerships (LLPs) in the wake of the Anderson-Enron debacle. The article explains how conversion to LLP from a traditional partnership may undercut the incentive for partners to devote time and resources to monitoring and risk management activities. Additionally, the article notes that conflicts may arise regarding the payment of debts when a firm, without sufficient malpractice insurance, converts to an LLP. The article delves into the exodus problem caused by the lack of partners’ commitment to the firm. The article also describes the tension between partners over malpractice insurance decisions that …

Regulating Corporations: Who's Making The Rules, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

Allocation And Reallocation In Accordance With The Partners' Interests In The Partnership, Stephen Utz

Faculty Articles and Papers

If a partnership agreement either fails to allocate an item of partnership income, gain, deduction, credit, or loss, or does so invalidly, section 704(b) requires the item to be allocated in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership (PIP). A brief portion of the section 704(b) regulations interpret this reallocation standard, providing guidelines of varying specificity. Commentators agree that the guidelines are vague and puzzling. The courts have not often had to apply this portion of the regulation. However, in the event that the courts do employ section 704(b), they have assigned an implicit priority to the different guidelines, …

Red Owl's Legacy, Gregory M. Duhl

Faculty Scholarship

In the early 1960s, Joseph Hoffman, a high school graduate, baker and father of seven, sought to obtain a Red Owl grocery store franchise in Wisconsin. He entered into negotiations with Red Owl Stores, Inc. after the franchisor assured him that the $18,000 he had to invest in the franchise was sufficient. Over the course of the negotiations, Red Owl encouraged Hoffman to sell his bakery, buy a small grocery store to gain experience in the grocery business, sell his grocery store three months later, and move his family to the desired location for his Red Owl franchise. The negotiations …

So, You Want To Be A Partner At Sidley & Austin?, Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman

Faculty Publications

One of the effects of the “industrialization” of professional organizations has been a shift in the business forms that these organizations adopt. Some organizations have shifted from partnership associations into professional corporations. Other organizations have remained partnerships in form, but have significantly restructured the roles of partners.