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- 523; 523(a)(2)(A); Bankruptcy Code; Debtors; Discharge Debt; Debt; Fraud; False Pretenses; False Representation; 523(a)(2)(B); Lamar (1)
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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Market For Corporate Control In The Zone Of Insolvency: Symposium Introduction, Edward J. Janger
The Market For Corporate Control In The Zone Of Insolvency: Symposium Introduction, Edward J. Janger
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
No abstract provided.
Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, And Defaults: Information And Traditional, Contingent, And Empty Creditors, Henry T. C. Hu
Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, And Defaults: Information And Traditional, Contingent, And Empty Creditors, Henry T. C. Hu
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Federal securities law seeks to ensure the quality and quantity of information that corporations make publicly available. Informational asymmetries associated with companies in financial distress, but not in bankruptcy, have received little attention. This Article explores some important asymmetries in this context that are curious in their origin, nature, and impact. The asymmetries are especially curious because of the impact of a world with credit default swaps (CDS) and CDS-driven debt “decoupling.” The Article explores two categories of asymmetries. The first relates to information on the company itself. Here, the Article suggests there is fresh evidence for the belief that …
Transparency In Corporate Groups, Jay Lawrence Westbrook
Transparency In Corporate Groups, Jay Lawrence Westbrook
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Article addresses a remarkable blind spot in American law: the failure to apply the well-established principles of secured credit to prevent inefficiency, confusion, and fraud in the manipulation of the webs of subsidiaries within corporate groups. In particular, “asset partitioning” has been a fashionable subject in which the central problem of non-transparency has been often mentioned but little addressed. This Article offers a concept for a new system of corporate disclosure for the benefit of creditors and other stakeholders. It would require disclosure of corporate structures and allocations of assets among affiliates to the extent the affiliates are to …
Insider Trading: Are Insolvent Firms Different?, Andrew Verstein
Insider Trading: Are Insolvent Firms Different?, Andrew Verstein
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Federal law restricts insider trading. Yet these restrictions operate differently on insolvent or bankrupt firms. The law is more constraining in some respects: federal law extensively regulates the trading of residual claims in solvent firms but not insolvent firms. However, the law is more constraining in other respects: insider trading law does little to limit debt-trading at solvent firms, but a bankruptcy enmeshes all creditors in a web of insider trading rules. This Article identifies insolvency’s economic and legal influence on insider trading law and then normatively evaluates this transformation.
Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties In The World Of Claims Trading, John A. E. Pottow
Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties In The World Of Claims Trading, John A. E. Pottow
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
In earlier work, I explored the role of fiduciary duties in the bankruptcy trustee’s administration of a debtor’s estate, noting the absence of any explicit demarcation of those duties in the Bankruptcy Code. In this piece, I report the highlights of that analysis and see to what extent (if any) fiduciary duties can inform policy prescriptions for the issue of bankruptcy claims trading, colorfully referred to by some as the world of “bankruptcy M&A.” My initial take is pessimistic. Fiduciary duties, at least as traditionally conceived in bankruptcy, are unlikely to provide much help. But there is still a source …
Corporate Governance And Bankruptcy, Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Corporate Governance And Bankruptcy, Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Ordinary corporate law invests enormous authority in corporate leaders, largely without accountability either to those they govern or to the judiciary, in defiance of much of what we know about effective governance procedure. Instead, we rely on the markets in which the corporation participates as the primary check on incumbent officials. Regardless of whether relying on markets is sufficient in the ordinary course, corporate insolvency is the markets’ verdict that incumbent management has failed. Accordingly, in bankruptcy and insolvency more generally, the law ought to abandon its ordinary deference to the corporate powers that be and instead impose standard good …
Private Benefits Without Control? Modern Chapter 11 And The Market For Corporate Control, Oscar Couwenberg, Stephen J. Lubben
Private Benefits Without Control? Modern Chapter 11 And The Market For Corporate Control, Oscar Couwenberg, Stephen J. Lubben
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Outside of bankruptcy, a board of directors’ decision to take control rights away from existing shareholders and grant them to another is subject to heightened fiduciary duties. As the sale of control represents a kind of end game, shareholders have one last chance to realize the full value for their investment. In such a context, their interests warrant special protection. A similar sale of control can happen in a chapter 11 procedure when a bankruptcy plan revamps the capital structure of the firm. In such a restructuring of the firm, control rights can be newly created, redefined and redistributed to …
Badges Of Opportunism: Principles For Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, Edward J. Janger, Adam J. Levitin
Badges Of Opportunism: Principles For Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, Edward J. Janger, Adam J. Levitin
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Bankruptcy is a market for corporate control. Current bankruptcy practice offers two alternative mechanisms for effectuating changes in control of a firm: (1) a pre-plan all-asset sale under section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (2) an asset sale or recapitalization pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section 1129 of the Code. Pre-plan sales under section 363(b) are fast, but lack the procedural protections associated with a restructuring or sale pursuant to a plan. Plan confirmation can be costly and uncertain, however. Restructuring support agreements (“RSAs”)—contractual agreements to support a future restructuring that has certain agreed-upon characteristics—appear to offer …
The Devious Debtor: 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(B) And The Need For A More Equitable Outcome, Torie Levine
The Devious Debtor: 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(B) And The Need For A More Equitable Outcome, Torie Levine
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharging debts for money, property, services, or credit obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud other than a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition. Under § 523(a)(2)(B), if those debts are obtained by a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, then the statement must be in writing for the debt to be discharged. A conflict among the circuit courts arose as to whether a statement about a single asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition. The majority of the courts applied a narrow interpretation to …
Backstop, Not Bailout: The Case For Preserving The Orderly Liquidation Authority Under Dodd-Frank, Mark R. Maciuch
Backstop, Not Bailout: The Case For Preserving The Orderly Liquidation Authority Under Dodd-Frank, Mark R. Maciuch
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The Trump Administration and Republicans have initiated efforts to repeal certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), one of which is the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) under Title II of Dodd-Frank. Critics of the OLA argue that it enables, rather than prevents, future bailouts funded by taxpayers. These critics are concerned with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) discretion to decide when and how to resolve distressed financial firms, as well as the FDIC’s access to large amounts of funds from the U.S. Department of the Treasury to carry out these functions. Proponents of …
The Husky Case: Fraud, Bankruptcy, And Veil Piercing, Harvey Gelb
The Husky Case: Fraud, Bankruptcy, And Veil Piercing, Harvey Gelb
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
A recent Supreme Court decision, Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, explores the meaning of the word “fraud” under a federal bankruptcy statutory section. That section uses the term “actual fraud,” and bears upon the question of whether a particular debt should be denied a discharge. The Court’s approach in defining fraud affords guidance to the question of defining fraud under other statutes. The Husky case also raised a veil piercing issue to be dealt with on remand. That issue involved the application of Texas statutory law precluding veil piercing in cases brought by contract creditors unless they were victims …
Tracing Equity: Realizing And Allocating Value In Chapter 11, Edward J. Janger, Melissa B. Jacoby
Tracing Equity: Realizing And Allocating Value In Chapter 11, Edward J. Janger, Melissa B. Jacoby
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.