Law Commons^™

Why Supervise Banks? The Foundations Of The American Monetary Settlement, Lev Menand

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative agencies are generally designed to operate at arm’s length, making rules and adjudicating cases. But the banking agencies are different: they are designed to supervise. They work cooperatively with banks and their remedial powers are so extensive they rarely use them. Oversight proceeds through informal, confidential dialogue.

Today, supervision is under threat: banks oppose it, the banking agencies restrict it, and scholars misconstrue it. Recently, the critique has turned legal. Supervision’s skeptics draw on a uniform, flattened view of administrative law to argue that supervision is inconsistent with norms of due process and transparency. These arguments erode the intellectual …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …

Bank Resolution In The European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective On What It Would Take, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Jeffrey N Gordon

The project of creating a European Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the …

Banking Stability And Optimal Deposit Insurance Design, Yasmine Hamdi Moukhtar

Archived Theses and Dissertations

This thesis focuses on deposit insurance schemes and their relationship to banking crisis. The empirical model used covers 55 developed and developing countries over the period 1970-1989. This study finds that banking crises are closely linked to adverse macroeconomics shocks like economic recessions, financial liberalization, capital account liberalization and short term capital flows, and currency depreciation. External vulnerability (expressed as the ratio of M2 to foreign reserve) is also found to be a key variable. The empirical results also show that deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises, due to induced moral hazard and adverse selection.

The False Promise Of De-Regulation In Banking, Jonathan R. Macey

ExpressO

Jonathan R. Macey

The False Promise of De-Regulation in Banking

Abstract

This Article presents new approach to the concept of "deregulation" in financial services and particularly banking. Generally regulatory policy is thought to involve more or less straightforward choices between regulation and deregulation. Those most concerned with market failure and equality of outcomes favoring regulation and those with faith in markets and concerns about efficient outcomes favoring deregulation.

This Article shows that government regulation, sometimes in heavy doses, is necessary in order for private markets to function effectively. Consequently, government has in important role to play in fostering markets. The …

The New Policy Agenda For Financial Services, Richard S. Carnell

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Leach Keynote Address, James A. Leach

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on …

Nondeposit Deposits And The Future Of Bank Regulation, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller

Michigan Law Review

We argue in this paper that the nation has already entered with a vengeance into the era of nondeposit deposit banking. The traditional bank deposit against which reserves must be held and deposit insurance paid is suffering encroachment from a wide variety of competitive instruments and arrangements, all of which, to one degree or another - often to a substantial degree - serve a function economically similar to that of the checking account at a depository institution.

The legal system may respond to these developments by attempting to bring nondeposit deposits under regulation, as it has done with other banking …

The Eagle Or The Ostrich: A United States Perspective On The Future Of Transnational Banking, Marilyn B. Cane

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

In this Article, Professor Cane discusses the problems of United States banking regulations in the new global financial system. These problems include antiquated legislation, the deposit insurance system, the dual federal-state banking system, and restrictive branching laws. Part II discusses the current deposit insurance system and options for reform. Part III poses the question of whether the United States should have "national" treatment or "reciprocal national" treatment for financial institutions. Part IV discusses the limitations the United States has put on its financial institutions and the disadvantage these limitations have caused globally. Finally, in Part V, Professor Cane discusses a …

The Banking Act Of 1935, Harold James Kress

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is to consider in a non-technical manner the principal changes in federal central and commercial banking law which have been brought about by the enactment of the Banking Act of 1935, and in that connection to take some account of the preexisting law and the announced or ostensible reasons for the changes made.