Law Commons^™

Getting Merger Guidelines Right, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is on the new Merger Guidelines. It makes several arguments. First, that the Guidelines should be understood as existing in a political equilibrium. Second, that the new structural presumption of the Merger Guidelines (HHI = 1,800) is too strict, and that an economically reasonable revision in the structural presumption would have increased rather than decreased the threshold. Whereas the new Guidelines lowers the threshold to HHI 1,800 from HHI 2,500, an economically reasonable revision would have increased the threshold to HHI 3,200. I justify this argument using a bare-bones model of Cournot competition. Third, it seems unlikely, …

The Battle With Big Tech: Analyzing Antitrust Enforcement And Proposed Reforms, Youngjae Lee, Morgan Hagenbuch

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recover a causal effect that could inform the likely competitive effects of a merger. Nonetheless, economic theory is consistent with the legal presumption that a merger is likely to have adverse competitive effects if it occurs in a concentrated market and makes that market more concentrated.

Inflation, Market Failures, And Algorithms, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Inflation is a problem of tremendous scale. But inflation itself is unlikely to cause the greatest economic harm during inflationary periods. Instead, a more likely source of devastation will be policymakers’ response to inflation. Their main anti-inflation tools, most notably increasing interest rates, increase unemployment and the risk of recessions. This Article argues that there is a better approach. Rather than defaulting to interest rate hikes that harm markets, policy makers should prioritize laws that lower prices while improving markets. For decades, businesses have raised prices by manipulating consumers, exercising monopoly power, and lobbying for laws that block competition. Automated …

Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from …

Governing Fintech 4.0: Bigtech, Platform Finance, And Sustainable Development, Douglas Arner, Ross Buckley, Kuzi Charamba, Artem Sergeev, Dirk Zetzsche

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Over the past 150 years, finance has evolved into one of the world’s most globalized, digitized, and regulated industries. Digitalization has transformed finance, but also enabled new entrants over the past decade in the form of technology companies, especially FinTechs and BigTechs. As a highly digitalized industry, incumbents and new entrants alike are increasingly pursuing similar approaches and models, focusing on the economies of scope and scale typical of finance and the network effects typical of data. Predictably, this has resulted in the emergence of large digital finance platforms. We argue that the combination of digitalization, new entrants (especially BigTechs), …

The Progressive Turn: Politics And Policy In The Movement, Zephyr Teachout, Heather Gautney, Todd Melnick

Posters

Maloney Library lecture series, Behind the Book

The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have inte­grated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places domi­nant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that de­pend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.

This Article argues …

Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

“Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market output in the product market is lower and prices higher than they would otherwise be.

Here we consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, identifying the issues that courts are likely to encounter and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. We assume that neither the mutual …

Modifying Merger Consent Decrees To Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes my short proposal for reviewing and modifying merger consent decrees to permit additional relief if the provisions of the initial consent merger are found to fail to preserve or restore competition in a reasonable period of time after the merger was consummated. My proposal also would involve more frequent reviews of consummated mergers that have been cleared without challenge, particularly those that were close calls. While “Don't Look Back” might be the best anthem for artists, economic decision theory would not support that approach to merger policy.

Predicting the impact of proposed mergers and remedies on consumers …

Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion In Derivatives Markets, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel exclusion—multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market entrants—cannot satisfy the current strictures of monopolization, which is understood to prohibit single-firm conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing monopolization. An expansion of monopolization—to cover parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly—is due.

To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion, this Article examines concentration in the markets for financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found ways to retain …

The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …

Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …

An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez

Miguel Martínez

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework governing banking foundations as they have been regulated by Spanish Act 26/2013, of December 27th, on savings banks and banking foundations. Title 2 of this regulation addresses a construct that is groundbreaking for the Spanish legal system, still of paramount importance for the entire financial system insofar as these foundations become the leading players behind certain banking institutions given the high interest that foundations hold in the share capital of such institutions.

Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A widely accepted model of American legal history is that "classical" legal thought, which dominated much of the nineteenth century, was displaced by "progressive" legal thought, which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on a par with Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both progressive liberals who defend this revolution and by classical liberals who lament it.

Classical legal thought is generally identified with efforts to systematize legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural sciences. This methodology involved not …

Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen

D. Bruce Johnsen

As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …

Rise Of The Intercontinentalexchange And Implications Of Its Merger With Nyse Euronext, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

This paper examines the impending merger between the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) and NYSE Euronext against the backdrop of the current structure of the global financial services industry. The paper concludes that the merger embodies what the financial services industry is becoming and captures the model that will allow exchanges to remain competitive in today’s marketplace: mega-exchanges with broader asset classes and electronic platforms. As technology and globalization threaten their vitality, exchanges will need to continue reinventing and adapting. Increasingly over the last decade they have done so by merging and by moving, at least a part of, their operations on screen. …

The Regulation Of U.S. Money Market Funds: Lessons From Europe, Latoya C. Brown

Latoya C. Brown, Esq.

The recent financial crisis challenged long held perceptions of money market funds (“MMFs”) as stable and highly liquid instruments. Regulators in the US and in Europe now seek to impose additional rules on MMFs to avoid another significant failure as happened to the Reserve Fund. In the US, the debate is drawing even more media attention as question of which regulatory body - such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council – should lead the way has taken interesting twists and turns. This paper examines primary reform options being proposed in the …

Too Libor, Too Late: Time To Move To A Market Rate, Michael S. Barr

Articles

Barclays has been fined, the British have issued their report, and now the market is anxious for everything to go on as usual with the London Interbank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”). I think that would be a serious mistake. The U.S. and British investigations into rate-fixing by Barclays revealed a widespread culture of pervasive, deceitful conduct in the setting of the most important private sector benchmark for over $300 trillion in derivative contracts and $10 trillion in adjustable-rate loans. It is highly unlikely that Barclays was the only major bank engaging in this conduct, and public investigations and private lawsuits against …

Competition Law And Sector Regulation In The European Energy Market After The Third Energy Package: Hierarchy And Efficiency, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

The aim of this research is to provide the basic parameters for a model for the definition of the relation between the general competition and sector specific frameworks and rules regarding the regulation of the Internal Energy Market, especially after the Third Energy Package. The research considers the recent sector specific framework in relation to a series of recent competition law cases of the Energy Market where structural remedies were applied under the commitments procedure. Essential facilities doctrine and generally competition law tools do not seem to provide a suitable framework for effectively addressing the dynamic competition concept, treating the …

From Energy Sector Inquiry To Recent Antitrust Decisions In European Energy Markets: Competition Law As A Means To Implement Energy Sector Regulation In Eu, Michael Diathesopoulos

Michael Diathesopoulos

This paper presents the conceptual path followed by European Union, European Commission and European Competition Network, after the Energy Sector Inquiry (2007) towards the realisation of the objective of an Energy Internal Market, fully functional and open to competition. Firstly, we examine the findings of Sector Inquiry and then we describe how the Third Energy Package - that followed - tried to address the issues highlighted by the Inquiry and how Third Energy Package introduces a promising but complex system, in order to develop sector rules. Following the above, we proceed to a brief but close examination of 10 recent …

In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Reasonable Certainty Requirement In Lost Profits Litigation: What It Really Means, Robert M. Lloyd

Robert M Lloyd

This article explains the factors courts consider when determining whether to award damages for lost profits. It contains an extensive review of the case law.

Lessons For Competition Law From The Economic Crisis: The Prospect For Antitrust Responses To The 'Too-Big-To-Fail' Phenomenon, Jesse Markham

Jesse Markham

This article explores the failure of antitrust law to prevent or intercede to remedy the catastrophic failures of large enterprises. Given the historic focus of antitrust on problems relating to the dangers of out-sized business enterprise, the failure of antitrust in this regard raises interesting questons about whether its mission has drifted from the law's original intent. The article explores the current relationship between antitrust rules and "bigness" and offers a modest proposal for reviving antitrust as a public policy tool that might help to address the too-big-to-fail phenomenon.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …