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The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The FTC’s wide ranging complaint against Intel Corporation indicates that the FTC intends to rely on the “unfair methods of competition” language in §5 of the FTC Act to reach beyond the proscriptions on unilateral conduct contained in §2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has expressly authorized such expansion, and statutory text, legislative history and legal policy all support it. While §2 reaches only conduct that threatens to “monopolize” a market, the “unfair methods of competition” language can reach improper abuses of a dominant position that fall short of creating monopoly. Further, the FTC has expertise that courts …
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.
This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …
Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande
Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande
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This short piece explains how the first unit discounts or rebates allegedly given by Intel on their X86 chips could harm competition, innovation, and PC purchasers in this crucial $33 billion/year market. For these reasons, their discounts or rebates could violate European Competition law and U.S. Antitrust law.
Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande
Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande
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The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity, predictability, and an …
Discounts And Exclusions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Discounts And Exclusions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The discounting practices of dominant firms has emerged as one of the most problematic areas of private antitrust enforcement against single-firm conduct. The most difficult discount practices to assess are bundled, or multi-product discounts in situations where no significant rival produces every product that is included in the bundle. A debate has emerged over whether such discounts are properly assessed under a legal test that analogizes them to predatory pricing or to tying. Defendants typically prefer predatory pricing analogies, requiring a showing that the price of the assembled bundle was below a relevant measure of cost, such as marginal cost …