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Full-Text Articles in Law

Conditional Pricing And Monopolization: A Reflection On The State Of Play, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2015

Conditional Pricing And Monopolization: A Reflection On The State Of Play, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Conditional pricing practices--including bundled discounting, loyalty rebating, and market share discounts--are not new phenomena in the U.S. market. Their potentially exclusionary consequences were raised in antitrust cases decades ago. But unlike trying or exlcusive dealing--which have a rich hsitory of case law and scholarly converage--conditioanl pricing practices did not emerge as salient to the antitrust community until a little over a decade ago. Two federal appellate decisions in the early 2000s--Concord Boar on market share rebates adn LePage's on bundled discounting--sparked a period of intensive interest and activity on these topics in teh antitrust agencies, courts, bench, and legal …


Bargaining Over Loyalty, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2013

Bargaining Over Loyalty, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain provisions rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller. For example, suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for buying a specified percentage of their requirements from the supplier or buying minimum numbers of products across multiple product lines. Such loyalty-inducing contracts have come under attack on antitrust grounds because of their potential to foreclose competitors or soften competition by enabling tacit collusion among suppliers. This Article defends loyalty inducement as a commercial practice. Although it can be anticompetitive under some circumstances, rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and price reducing. The two …


The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Feb 2010

The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The FTC’s wide ranging complaint against Intel Corporation indicates that the FTC intends to rely on the “unfair methods of competition” language in §5 of the FTC Act to reach beyond the proscriptions on unilateral conduct contained in §2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has expressly authorized such expansion, and statutory text, legislative history and legal policy all support it. While §2 reaches only conduct that threatens to “monopolize” a market, the “unfair methods of competition” language can reach improper abuses of a dominant position that fall short of creating monopoly. Further, the FTC has expertise that courts …


The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2010

The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.

This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …


Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright Jan 2009

Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright

Articles

Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …


Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande Sep 2007

Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece explains how the first unit discounts or rebates allegedly given by Intel on their X86 chips could harm competition, innovation, and PC purchasers in this crucial $33 billion/year market. For these reasons, their discounts or rebates could violate European Competition law and U.S. Antitrust law.


Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity, predictability, and an …


Discounts And Exclusions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Aug 2005

Discounts And Exclusions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The discounting practices of dominant firms has emerged as one of the most problematic areas of private antitrust enforcement against single-firm conduct. The most difficult discount practices to assess are bundled, or multi-product discounts in situations where no significant rival produces every product that is included in the bundle. A debate has emerged over whether such discounts are properly assessed under a legal test that analogizes them to predatory pricing or to tying. Defendants typically prefer predatory pricing analogies, requiring a showing that the price of the assembled bundle was below a relevant measure of cost, such as marginal cost …


The Patman Act In Practice, Blackwell Smith Mar 1937

The Patman Act In Practice, Blackwell Smith

Michigan Law Review

A recent act of Congress directed against price discrimination and related phases of buying and selling has already become famous as the Robinson-Patman Act, so named for its two principal sponsors in Congress. This act has been much written about, and yet those whose law practice confronts them with daily problems in its application to the actuality of the business world find daily new aspects. The act has something to say with reference to every business transaction (in or related sufficiently to interstate commerce) which involves a price or a service or a facility in connection with the sale of …