Law Commons^™

An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Jeffrey L Harrison

Since Judge Hand's pivotal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), the possession of monopoly power has been treated as presumptively legal. The focus of the antitrust laws since then has been on defining when that power is abused. This approach to market power cannot be squared with the prevailing view that antitrust law is grounded in economic theory. To understand why, one must see market power for what it is: the ability of a firm to raise prices above competitive levels and to profitably keep them there. Seen in this light, market power is indistinguishable from …

China's Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law And Beyond, Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng

Wentong Zheng

In August 2007, China adopted the Antimonopoly Law, its first comprehensive antitrust legislation, thirteen years after the drafting of the law began. Such a protracted legislative process is highly unusual in China, and can only be explained by the controversies the law presents. This paper discusses the fundamental issues in China’s economy that give rise to the challenges China faced in the drafting and adoption of the Antimonopoly Law. Those fundamental issues include the role of state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition, mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies, administrative monopolies, and the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. How China will enforce …

Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer

Presentations

This presentation was given at the European China Law Studies 2014 Conference, Making, Enforcing and Accessing the Law, in Hong Kong. The presentation addresses the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the MOFCOMM, NDRC, and SAIC, and litigation before the Supreme People's Court.

Predatory Hiring As Exclusionary Conduct: A New Perspective, Richard J. Braun, Michael A. Williams

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The showing of predatory or exclusionary conduct is a necessary element to prove an attempted monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Predatory hiring as a form of exclusionary conduct has not been extensively analyzed from legal or economic perspectives. Most litigated cases have followed Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., where the court held that unlawful predatory hiring occurs when talent is acquired not for purposes of using that talent, but for purposes of denying it to a competitor. An anticompetitive act by a single firm is an act that is not profit maximizing but for the …

A Comprehensive Economic And Legal Analysis Of Tying Arrangements, Guy Sagi

Seattle University Law Review

The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Therefore, and because tying arrangements are so widely common, the law is expected to change and extensive academic writing is currently attempting to guide its way. In tying arrangements, monopolistic firms coerce consumers to buy additional products or services beyond what they intended to purchase. This pressure can be applied because a consumer in a monopolistic market does not have the alternative to buy the product or service from a competing firm. In the absence of such choice, the monopolistic firm can allegedly force the …

An Overview Of The Draft China Antimonopoly Law, H. Stephen Harris Jr.

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The FTC recently found McWane, Inc. liable for unlawful monopoly maintenance by a 3-1 majority. The dispute among the FTC Commissioners raises important and interesting issues regarding the law and economics of exclusive dealing and the proper evaluation of the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. Commissioner Wright’s Dissent proposes and utilizes a new legal standard that requires the plaintiff to show “clear evidence” of harm to competition before shifting the burden to the defendant to show procompetitive efficiency benefits. This burden of proof and production on the plaintiff is much higher than showing “probable effect” based on a preponderance of …

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, …

Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht

CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Technology Policy (1993-2015)

No abstract provided.

Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a claim for breach of contract, Judge Robart’s opinion regulated monopoly pricing, a task courts try to avoid in other contexts, claiming institutional incapacity. In this instance, however, Judge Robart identified standards that he believed adequately guided him in the task. He recognized that the economic purposes of the RAND commitment were to prevent owners of standards-essential patents …