Law Commons^™

British And European Community Regulation Of The British Beer Market: Tapping Into The Tied-House System (Cheers!), David A. Everreste

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Jeffrey L Harrison

Since Judge Hand's pivotal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), the possession of monopoly power has been treated as presumptively legal. The focus of the antitrust laws since then has been on defining when that power is abused. This approach to market power cannot be squared with the prevailing view that antitrust law is grounded in economic theory. To understand why, one must see market power for what it is: the ability of a firm to raise prices above competitive levels and to profitably keep them there. Seen in this light, market power is indistinguishable from …

China's Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law And Beyond, Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng

Wentong Zheng

In August 2007, China adopted the Antimonopoly Law, its first comprehensive antitrust legislation, thirteen years after the drafting of the law began. Such a protracted legislative process is highly unusual in China, and can only be explained by the controversies the law presents. This paper discusses the fundamental issues in China’s economy that give rise to the challenges China faced in the drafting and adoption of the Antimonopoly Law. Those fundamental issues include the role of state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition, mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies, administrative monopolies, and the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. How China will enforce …

Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer

Presentations

This presentation was given at the European China Law Studies 2014 Conference, Making, Enforcing and Accessing the Law, in Hong Kong. The presentation addresses the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the MOFCOMM, NDRC, and SAIC, and litigation before the Supreme People's Court.

Predatory Hiring As Exclusionary Conduct: A New Perspective, Richard J. Braun, Michael A. Williams

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The showing of predatory or exclusionary conduct is a necessary element to prove an attempted monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Predatory hiring as a form of exclusionary conduct has not been extensively analyzed from legal or economic perspectives. Most litigated cases have followed Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., where the court held that unlawful predatory hiring occurs when talent is acquired not for purposes of using that talent, but for purposes of denying it to a competitor. An anticompetitive act by a single firm is an act that is not profit maximizing but for the …

A Comprehensive Economic And Legal Analysis Of Tying Arrangements, Guy Sagi

Seattle University Law Review

The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Therefore, and because tying arrangements are so widely common, the law is expected to change and extensive academic writing is currently attempting to guide its way. In tying arrangements, monopolistic firms coerce consumers to buy additional products or services beyond what they intended to purchase. This pressure can be applied because a consumer in a monopolistic market does not have the alternative to buy the product or service from a competing firm. In the absence of such choice, the monopolistic firm can allegedly force the …

An Overview Of The Draft China Antimonopoly Law, H. Stephen Harris Jr.

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The FTC recently found McWane, Inc. liable for unlawful monopoly maintenance by a 3-1 majority. The dispute among the FTC Commissioners raises important and interesting issues regarding the law and economics of exclusive dealing and the proper evaluation of the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. Commissioner Wright’s Dissent proposes and utilizes a new legal standard that requires the plaintiff to show “clear evidence” of harm to competition before shifting the burden to the defendant to show procompetitive efficiency benefits. This burden of proof and production on the plaintiff is much higher than showing “probable effect” based on a preponderance of …

Foreword: The Profession’S Monopoly And Its Core Values, W. Bradley Wendel

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Protecting The Profession Or The Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, Deborah L. Rhode, Lucy Buford Ricca

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Monopoly Myth And Other Tales About The Superiority Of Lawyers, Leslie C. Levin

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Cracks In The Profession’S Monopoly Armor, Jack P. Sahl

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hemispheres Apart, A Profession Connected, Dana Remus

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations On State Efforts To Provide Access To Justice In Family Courts, Jessica Dixon Weaver

Fordham Law Review

Family law courts in America are overwhelmed with self-represented parties who try their best to navigate an unfamiliar territory laden with procedural and evidentiary rules. Efforts to level the playing field in these courts have resulted in state entities and judges taking on roles that previously belonged to attorneys. State supreme court judges and state agencies draft and promulgate family law forms, such as divorce pleadings and paternity acknowledgments, to provide poor citizens access to justice. While these efforts have resulted in positive outcomes for some families, reliance on the state’s imprimatur has caused significant harm to others. Upon closer …

Access To Justice Requires Access To Attorneys: Restrictions On The Practice Of Law Serve A Societal Purpose, Lisa H. Nicholson

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Anyone Can “Think Like A Lawyer”: How The Lawyers’ Monopoly On Legal Understanding Undermines Democracy And The Rule Of Law In The United States, Bridgette Dunlap

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Legal Information, The Consumer Law Market, And The First Amendment, Renee Newman Knake

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Globalization And The Monopoly Of Aba-Approved Law Schools: Missed Opportunities Or Dodged Bullets?, Carole Silver

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Control?, Anthony J. Sebok

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Compliance And Claim Funding: Testing The Borders Of Lawyers’ Monopoly And The Unauthorized Practice Of Law, Michele Destefano

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Future Of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers To Corporate Clients, John S. Dzienkowski

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform The Role Of Lawyers In The Delivery Of Legal Services, John O. Mcginnis, Russell G. Pearce

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Lawyer’S Monopoly—What Goes And What Stays, Benjamin H. Barton

Fordham Law Review

We live in a time of unprecedented changes for American lawyers, probably the greatest changes since the Great Depression. That period saw the creation of the lawyer’s monopoly through a series of regulatory modifications. Will we see the same following the Great Recession? Formally, no. This Article predicts that formal lawyer regulation in 2023 will look remarkably similar to lawyer regulation in 2013. This is because lawyer regulators will not want to rock the boat in the profession or in law schools during a time of roil.

Informally, yes! We are already seeing a combination of computerization, outsourcing, and nonlawyer …

The Legal Profession’S Monopoly: Failing To Protect Consumers, Laurel A. Rigertas

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Beneficent Monopolist, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In examining Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC), we assess three of the arguments Comcast likely will make to the Department of Justice and FCC. Comcast will likely argue that its acquisition of TWC is unlikely to lessen competition because: (a) the broadband market is becoming more competitive: Google has introduced Google Fiber in a number of markets, and mobile broadband offered by wireless providers like AT&T and Sprint is competitive with fixed broadband; (b) Netflix and traditional media companies have sufficient clout to negotiate with Comcast and the government should not intervene on their behalf; and (c) …

The Beneficent Monopolist, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

In examining Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC), we assess three of the arguments Comcast likely will make to the Department of Justice and FCC. Comcast will likely argue that its acquisition of TWC is unlikely to lessen competition because: (a) the broadband market is becoming more competitive: Google has introduced Google Fiber in a number of markets, and mobile broadband offered by wireless providers like AT&T and Sprint is competitive with fixed broadband; (b) Netflix and traditional media companies have sufficient clout to negotiate with Comcast and the government should not intervene on their behalf; and (c) …

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, …

Apple And Amazon’S Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’T Make A Right, But Maybe They Should, Kerry Gutknecht

CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Technology Policy (1993-2015)

No abstract provided.

Putting The Legal Profession’S Monopoly On The Practice Of Law In A Global Context, Laurel S. Terry

Fordham Law Review

When considering the proper scope of the U.S. legal profession’s monopoly, regulators and commentators may find it useful to compare the scope of the U.S. monopoly with the legal profession monopolies found in other countries. This Article surveys what we know—and do not know—about the scope of the monopoly in countries other than the United States. The Article finds that the state of knowledge on this topic is relatively undeveloped, that the scope of the U.S. legal profession’s monopoly appears to be larger than the scope of the monopoly found in some other countries, but that the “conventional wisdom” may …

A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition …