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Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
William & Mary Law Review
Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives (principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels, agency cost theory could provide some insights as to how to destabilize them from within. Agency costs exist when a faithless agent pursues her own interests instead of those of the principal. Although agency costs are generally considered inefficient, when the principal's goals are undesirable, the acts of a faithless agent can be beneficial. Because one traditional approach to reducing agency costs is to align the …