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Full-Text Articles in Law
Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
William & Mary Law Review
Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives (principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels, agency cost theory could provide some insights as to how to destabilize them from within. Agency costs exist when a faithless agent pursues her own interests instead of those of the principal. Although agency costs are generally considered inefficient, when the principal's goals are undesirable, the acts of a faithless agent can be beneficial. Because one traditional approach to reducing agency costs is to align the …
Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard
Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, Steven N. Bulloch
Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, Steven N. Bulloch
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Agency - Assault In The Course Of Employment (Baskett V. Banks, 1947), Ira B. Dworkin
Agency - Assault In The Course Of Employment (Baskett V. Banks, 1947), Ira B. Dworkin
William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
No abstract provided.