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Articles 31 - 60 of 68
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Taxonomy Of Discretion: Refining The Legality Debate About Obama’S Executive Actions On Immigration, Michael Kagan
A Taxonomy Of Discretion: Refining The Legality Debate About Obama’S Executive Actions On Immigration, Michael Kagan
Scholarly Works
Broad executive action has been the Obama Administration’s signature contribution to American immigration policy, setting off a furious debate about whether the President has acted outside his constitutional powers. But the legal debate about the scope of the President’s authority to change immigration policy has not fully recognized what is actually innovative about the Obama policies, and thus has not focused on those areas where he has taken executive discretion into uncharted territory. This essay aims to add new focus to the debate about Pres. Obama’s executive actions by defining five different types of presidential discretion: Congressionally-authorized discretion, non-enforcement discretion, …
Delegation, Accommodation, And The Permeability Of Constitutional And Ordinary Law, Gillian E. Metzger
Delegation, Accommodation, And The Permeability Of Constitutional And Ordinary Law, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
To some, the very idea of the constitutional law of the administrative state is an oxymoron. On this view, core features of the national administrative state — broad delegations and the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial power within administrative agencies, particularly agencies that are headed by unelected executive officials only removable on narrow grounds — are fundamentally at odds with both constitutional separation of powers principles and due process. To others, no such conflict between contemporary administrative governance and the Constitution exists, and assertions of the administrative state’s unconstitutionality rest on basic misunderstandings of what separation of powers and …
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
To The Victor Goes The Toil -- Remedies For Regulated Parties In Separation-Of-Powers Litigation, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed, the extent of their independence from the President, and the range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these safeguards through implied private rights of action under the Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been successfully challenging agency structure with increased frequency. At the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely ignored the practical question of “structural …
Agency Enforcement Of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense Of The Funding Cut-Off, Eloise Pasachoff
Agency Enforcement Of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense Of The Funding Cut-Off, Eloise Pasachoff
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article contends that federal agencies ought more frequently to use the threat of cutting off funds to state and local grantees that are not adequately complying with the terms of a grant statute. Scholars tend to offer four arguments to explain—and often to justify—agencies’ longstanding reluctance to engage in funding cut-offs: first, that funding cut-offs will hurt the grant program’s beneficiaries and so will undermine the agency’s ultimate goals; second, that federalism concerns counsel against federal agencies’ taking funds away from state and local grantees; third, that agencies are neither designed nor motivated to pursue funding cut-offs; and fourth, …
From Sovereignty And Process To Administration And Politics: The Afterlife Of American Federalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
From Sovereignty And Process To Administration And Politics: The Afterlife Of American Federalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Announcing the death of dual federalism, Edward Corwin asked whether the states could be “saved as the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse, and action.” The federalism literature has largely answered in the affirmative. Unwilling to abandon dual federalism’s commitment to state autonomy and distinctive interests, scholars have proposed new channels for protecting these forms of state-federal separation. Yet today state and federal governance are more integrated than separate. States act as co-administrators and co-legislatures in federal statutory schemes; they carry out federal law alongside the executive branch and draft the law together with Congress. …
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent H. Barnett
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …
Between Seminole Rock And A Hard Place: A New Approach To Agency Deference, Kevin O. Leske
Between Seminole Rock And A Hard Place: A New Approach To Agency Deference, Kevin O. Leske
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Appointment With Trouble, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
This article considers whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director’s appointment of the Bureau’s Deputy Director comports with the Appointments Clause. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established the Bureau in July 2010, as well as the offices of the Bureau’s Director and Deputy Director, to coordinate the regulation and enforcement of federal consumer-financial-protection laws. Under that act, the Director appoints the Deputy Director. The Appointments Clause permits “Heads of Departments” to appoint inferior officers like the Deputy Director. But it is unclear if the Bureau is a “department” and thus if the Director is a department …
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
All Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a new form of independent agency – in effect, a “non-agency” agency residing in the no-man’s land between Articles I and II of the Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) and endowed it with massive governmental powers while insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency, rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the embattled Securities and Exchange Commission – not the President …
Preemption And Theories Of Federalism, Robert R. M. Verchick, Nina A. Mendelson
Preemption And Theories Of Federalism, Robert R. M. Verchick, Nina A. Mendelson
Book Chapters
American government is an experiment in redundancy, with powers and duties shared among federal, state, and local decision makers. The arrangement is designed to divide power, maximize self-rule, and foster innovation, but it also can breed confusion. In the areas of public safety and environmental protection, state and federal leaders (to name the two most active players in these disputes) are often seen jockeying for the inside track, hoping to secure the resources or authority needed to promote their views of the public good or gain politically. To outside observers, the best outcomes are not obvious. For example, should the …
Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional And State Authority?: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary,, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of Viet D. Dinh, Geo. U. L. Center), Viet D. Dinh
Testimony Before Congress
No abstract provided.
Regulatory Preemption: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck
Regulatory Preemption: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck
Testimony Before Congress
No abstract provided.
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
6 pages.
"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda
Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance Or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I And Part Ii: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On Science And Technology, 110th Cong., Feb. 13, 2007 (Statement Of Professor David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck
Testimony Before Congress
No abstract provided.
The First Word, Elizabeth Magill
The First Word, Elizabeth Magill
All Faculty Scholarship
Does the President get the last word in the legislative process when he issues a signing statement? Those angry about President Bush's December 2005 signing statement on the Detainee Treatment Act thought he did just that. Implying that the statute's prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment would not apply in certain circumstances, President Bush's statement provoked an outcry. Critics claimed that the President did not have the political muscle to defeat the statute, so he instead announced that he would sometimes ignore it. Having the last word has its advantages.
But so does having the first word. Signing statements …
Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann
Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …
Prolegomenon To Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation Of Powers And The Transcendental Deduction, Gary S. Lawson
Prolegomenon To Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation Of Powers And The Transcendental Deduction, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Federal constitutional law has a way of worming itself into just about every crevice of the law school curriculum. Civil Procedure students grapple with the Due Process Clauses, Property students ponder the Takings Clause, and Torts students must reckon with issues of federal preemption and legislative power. But few courses outside the mainstream Constitutional Law curriculum require as much sustained attention to constitutional issues as does Administrative Law.' Administrative Law courses typically involve an extensive study of procedural due process.2 They also engage, at least peripherally, in some of the most fundamental and long-lived constitutional controversies in the law of …
Dual Constitutions And Constitutional Duels: Separation Of Powers And State Implementation Of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs And Standards, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Frequently, state-wide executive agencies and localities attempt to implement federally-inspired programs. Two predominant examples are cooperative federalism programs and incorporation of federal standards in state-specific law. Federally-inspired programs can bump into state constitutional restrictions on the allocation of powers, especially in states whose constitutional systems embrace stronger prohibitions on legislative delegation than the weak restrictions at the federal level, where national goals and standards are made. This Article addresses this tension between dual federal/state normative accounts of the constitutional allocation of powers in state implementation of federally-inspired programs. To the extent the predominant ways of resolving the tension come from …
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …
Institutional Design And The Lingering Legacy Of Antifederalist Separation Of Powers Ideals In The States, Jim Rossi
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article applies comparative institutional analysis to separation of powers under state constitutions, with a particular focus on the nondelegation doctrine and states' acceptance of Chadha-like restrictions on legislative oversight. The Article begins by contrasting state and federal doctrine and enforcement levels in each of these separation of powers contexts. Most state courts, unlike their federal counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine. In addition, many states accept (de facto if not de jure) even more explicit and sweeping legislative vetoes than the federal system. The Article highlights the contrast of federal and state approaches by identifying their similarity with …
Presidential Rulemaking, Peter L. Strauss
Presidential Rulemaking, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
One of the prominent issues during the 1992 presidential campaign was abortion, in particular the federal government's role in financing counseling activities that might promote it. In the Bush Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services had adopted a controversial regulation to withhold federal funds from any family planning or other medical service that included counseling about abortion in its activities; the Clinton campaign promised to rescind that regulation if Clinton were elected President. Shortly after his election, in a prominent White House ceremony, President Clinton announced that he had directed the rescission of the prior rule and the …
That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff
That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Fifth Amendment And The Retained Sovereignty Doctrine: A Study Of The Endangered Species Act And The Central Valley Project Improvement Act As Applied To Central Valley Project Water Service Contracts, Brian E. Gray
Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)
12 pages.
Administrative Agencies, Joseph Vining
Administrative Agencies, Joseph Vining
Book Chapters
Administrative agencies, often called the ‘‘fourth branch,’’ are entities of government that make decisions within particular substantive fields. Although these fields range over the full spectrum of public concern, the specificity of agencies’ focus distinguishes them from other decision making entities in the constitutional structure—the judiciary, the presidency, the Congress, indeed the individual citizen—each of which can be taken to have a scope of interest as broad as imagination will allow.
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
How Separation Of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, Cynthia R. Farina
How Separation Of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, Cynthia R. Farina
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.