Law Commons^™

Forces Of Federalism, Safety Nets, And Waivers, Edward H. Stiglitz

Jed Stiglitz

Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue it calls for a policy response, yet the most obvious policy responses require legislative action. And if inequality is the defining feature of our times, partisan acrimony and gridlock are the defining features of the legislature. So being, it is worth considering what role administrative agencies, and administrative law, might play in ameliorating or exacerbating economic inequality. Here, I focus on American safety net programs, many of which are joint operations between federal administrative agencies and state governments. In this context, a central mode of bureaucratic policy innovation comes in …

Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, Jennifer Nou, Edward H. Stiglitz

Jed Stiglitz

Congressional enactments and executive orders instruct agencies to publish their anticipated rules in what is known as the Unified Agenda. The Agenda’s stated purpose is to ensure that political actors can monitor regulatory development. Agencies have come under fire in recent years, however, for conspicuous omissions and irregularities. Critics allege that agencies hide their regulations from the public strategically, that is, to thwart potential political opposition. Others contend that such behavior is benign, perhaps the inevitable result of changing internal priorities or unforeseen events. To examine these competing hypotheses, this Article uses a new dataset spanning over thirty years of …

Executive Opportunism, Jed Stiglitz

Jed Stiglitz

Unitary Innovations And Political Accountability, Edward H. Stiglitz

Jed Stiglitz

An important trend in administrative and constitutional law is to attempt to concentrate ever-greater control over the administrative state in the hands of the President. As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, one foundation for this doctrinal trend is a fear that diffusing power diffuses accountability. Here, I study whether institutional innovations resulting from such judicial decisions support this functionalist constitutional value of political accountability, emphasizing under-appreciated complications arising out of interbranch relations. For most of the Article, I conduct an indepth empirical case study of the legislative veto, one …

Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, Edward H. Stiglitz

Jed Stiglitz

Under a common view, the administrative state inherits democratic legitimacy from the President, an individual who is envisioned both to control administrative agencies and to be electorally accountable. Presidents' administrations continue issuing rules, however, even after Presidents lose elections. Conventional wisdom holds that Presidents use the "midnight" period of their administrations-the period between the election and the inauguration of the next President-to issue unpopular and controversial rules. Many regard this midnight regulatory activity as democratically illegitimate. Yet we have scant evidence that presidential administrations in fact issue controversial or unpopular rules during the midnight period. In this Article, I examine …