Law Commons^™

Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

The U.S. Supreme Court—thanks to various statutes passed by Congress beginning in 1891 and culminating in 1988—currently enjoys nearly unfettered discretion to set its docket using the writ of certiorari. Over the past few decades, concerns have mounted that the Court has been taking the wrong mix of cases, hearing too few cases, and relying too heavily on law clerks in the certiorari process.

Scholars, in turn, have proposed fairly sweeping reforms, such as the creation of a certiorari division to handle certiorari petitions. This Article argues that before the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is taken away, …

Should Mass Comments Count?, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

I am grateful to the Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law for the opportunity to reply to “Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts,” a terrific article by Professor Cynthia Farina, Mary Newhart, and Josiah Heidt of the Cornell eRulemaking Institute (“CeRI”). Farina, Newhart, and Heidt’s continuing commitment to structuring public engagement in e-rulemaking, both through scholarship and CeRI’s Regulation Room project, is one of the most hopeful signs for the future of that process. In their Article, the authors are concerned with agency treatment of large volumes of public comments in rulemaking, an increasingly common …

Enforcement Without Foundation? Insider Trading And China's Administrative Law Crisis, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

China's securities regulator enforces insider trading prohibitions pursuant to non-legal and non-regulatory internal "guidance." Reported agency decisions indicate that enforcement against insider trading is often possible only pursuant to this guidance, as the behavior identified is far outside of the scope of insider trading liability provided for in statute or regulation. I argue that the agency guidance is itself unlawful and unenforceable, because: (i) the guidance is not the regulatory norm required by the statutory delegation of power; and (ii) the guidance is ultra vires because (a) it addresses something substantively different from what is authorized under the statutory delegation, …

Regulatory Moratoria, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

Despite significant scholarly attention given to tools that the political branches use to exert control over the administrative state, one emerging tool has gone largely unnoticed: regulatory moratoria. Regulatory moratoria, which stem from legislative or executive action, aim to freeze rulemaking activity for a period of time.

As this Article demonstrates, regulatory moratoria have worked their way into the political toolbox at both the federal and state levels. For example, at least fifteen federal bills proposing generalized regulatory moratoria were introduced in the first session of the 112th Congress, and from 2008 to 2011 alone, no fewer than nine states …

In Defense Of The Short Cut, Stephen M. Johnson

Articles

Congress frequently gives administrative agencies a choice of several different tools—including legislative rulemaking, nonlegislative rulemaking, and adjudication—to interpret and apply the statutes that they administer. When Congress gives agencies a choice, courts rarely second-guess the agencies’ choice of policymaking tool. Rarely, that is, unless the agency chooses to interpret a statute through nonlegislative rulemaking. ...

Part II of this Article explores the variety of policymaking tools that are available to agencies, the deference generally accorded an agency’s choice of tool, and the reluctance of courts to defer when agencies choose to make policy through nonlegislative rulemaking. Part III explores Franklin’s …

The Impact Of The Rise And Fall Of Chevron On The Executive's Power To Make And Interpret Law, Linda Jellum

Articles

The Supreme Court's willingness to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes has vacillated over the past seventy years. The Court's vacillation has dramatically impacted the executive 's power to make and interpret law. This Article examines how the Court augmented then constricted executive lawmaking power and ceded then reclaimed executive interpretive power with a single case and its legal progeny. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and its aftermath dramatically altered the executive's power to make and interpret law. Prior to Chevron, Congress had the primary responsibility for lawmaking, while agencies made policy choices primarily when …