Law Commons^™

Conspiracy As Contract, Laurent Sacharoff

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the central concept of criminal conspiracy — the agreement. It shows how both courts and scholars have almost entirely failed to define it. Even more surprisingly, neither discusses how “agreement” in criminal conspiracy compares with the agreement in contract law. Instead, courts have diluted the agreement requirement by substituting “mutual understanding” or “slight connection,” leading to uncertainty, unfairness, and a profusion of conspiracy convictions for mere presence or association.

This article argues courts should define agreement, and do so as an exchange of promises between the conspirators to commit a crime. An exchange of promises meets the …

The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca H. Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law Review

Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In fact, competition-whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets-is multifaceted. What are offered in antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate "net" competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to …

A Single Call: The Need To Amend The Parent-Subsidiary Relationship Under The Ftaia In View Of Motorola Mobility, Catherine E. Cognetti

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corporation, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Motorola’s Sherman Act claims under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act. In doing so, they held that Motorola’s American parent corporation was a separate entity from their foreign subsidiaries, and thus barred from bringing suit under the indirect purchaser doctrine. The effect of the Seventh Circuit’s decision precluded injured purchasers from recovering damages under the Sherman Act—Motorola’s subsidiaries could not sue because their injuries occurred abroad, while Motorola could not sue because it did not make direct purchases from the antitrust violators.

Courts have often considered a parent …

Closing Fireside Chat With The Assistant Attorney General For The U.S. Department Of Justice Antitrust Division, William Baer, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

This Closing Fireside Chat was the final session of the 16th annual Silicon Flatirons Center conference, The Digital Broadband Migration: The Evolving Industry Structure of the Digital Broadband Landscape, held on Feb. 1, 2016 in the Wittemyer Courtroom of the University of Colorado Law School.

"At the time this conference was held, William J. Baer was Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the United States Department of Justice. On April 17, 2016, President Obama asked Mr. Baer to become Acting Associate Attorney General of the United States. Video of this interview with Assistant Attorney General Baer is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C351xEX0h4g …

Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

As is well known among financial economists but not previously recognized within the antitrust community, large and diversified institutional investors such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard collectively own roughly two-thirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in 1980. Recent economic research involving airlines and banking raises the possibility that overlapping ownership of horizontal rivals by diversified financial institutions facilitates anticompetitive conduct throughout the economy, and that the problem has been growing for decades, unnoticed until now. This response to an article by Professor Einer Elhauge, explains why it may be more …

Antitrust And Regulating Big Data, D. Daniel Sokol, Roisin E. Comerford

UF Law Faculty Publications

The collection of user data online has seen enormous growth in recent years. Consumers have benefited from this growth through an increase in free or heavily subsidized services, better quality offerings, and rapid innovation. At the same time, the debate about Big Data, and what it really means for consumers and competition, has grown louder. Many have focused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat lagged behind the policy debate, and a closer inspection …

A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article demonstrates the relationship between socio-economics and antitrust law. It uses socio-economics to both deconstruct the current economic foundation of antitrust policy and to suggest ways to improve that policy. There are four steps in this presentation. Part II examines the core elements of the economic approach to antitrust and its shortcomings, if any. For those even moderately versed in economics, it will note that the analysis begins at the most basic level. Obviously, antitrust is designed to make markets more competitive. But that goal is merely a means to the end of greater consumer surplus and allocative efficiency. …

Facilitating Competition By Remedial Regulation, Kristelia A. García

Publications

In music licensing, powerful music publishers have begun—for the first time ever— to withdraw their digital copyrights from the collectives that license those rights, in order to negotiate considerably higher rates in private deals. At the beginning of the year, two of these publishers commanded a private royalty rate nearly twice that of the going collective rate. This result could be seen as a coup for the free market: Constrained by consent decrees and conflicting interests, collectives are simply not able to establish and enforce a true market rate in the new, digital age. This could also be seen as …

Telecommunications: Competition Policy In The Telecommunications Space, Gene Kimmelman, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Michael O’Rielly, Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen F. Williams

All Faculty Scholarship

In today’s rapidly evolving telecommunications landscape, the development of new technologies and distribution platforms are driving innovation and growth at a breakneck speed across the Internet ecosystem. Broadband connectivity is increasingly important to our civil discourse, our economy, and our future. What is the proper role of government in facilitating robust investment and competition in this critical sector? When technology companies constantly have to reinvent themselves and adapt to survive – what role should government play? This panel of experts at the Federalist Society’s 2014 National Lawyers Convention discussed the current regulatory environment and how government policies – particularly regarding …

Re-Imagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work Of Richard S. Markovits, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This review discusses Richard Markovits’ two volume book "Economics and the Interpretation" and "Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law" (2014), focusing mainly on Markovits’ approaches to antitrust tests of illegality, pricing offenses, market definition and the assessment of market power, and his important work anticipating unilateral effects theory in merger cases. Markovits argues forcefully that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were intended to employ different tests of illegality. As a result, even when they cover the same practices, such as mergers, exclusive dealing, or tying, they address them under different tests. He then shows how he would analyze various …

Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion In Derivatives Markets, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel exclusion—multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market entrants—cannot satisfy the current strictures of monopolization, which is understood to prohibit single-firm conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing monopolization. An expansion of monopolization—to cover parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly—is due.

To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion, this Article examines concentration in the markets for financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found ways to retain …

Do Not Pass Go And Do Not Collect $200: Nike's Monopoly On Usatf Violates Antitrust Laws And Prevents Athletes From Living At Park Place, Jill K. Ingels

Marquette Sports Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Enforcement Against Pharmaceutical Product Hopping: Protecting Consumers Or Reaching Too Far?, Tyler J. Klein

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

Pharmaceutical drugs are the backbone of modern medicine, which makes the continued development of new drugs essential and puts many lives in the hands of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies that develop these new treatments. Currently, antitrust litigation is being used to strike a balance between the innovator’s right to earn a profit and the need for generic drug companies to make these drugs available to the masses that need them. Antitrust law stops brand-name companies from taking over the market and excluding generics, but it should not be used to impose harsh remedies that restrict the thing that we all …

Evaluating Appropriability Defenses For The Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms In Innovative Industries, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

In response to antitrust cases challenging the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms, some dominant firms offer an “appropriability defense.” This defense is the claim that prohibiting the challenged conduct would lessen the dominant firm’s return to investment in research and development (R&D), undermine that firm’s incentive to innovate, and harm the prospects for industry innovation. An appropriability defense should be questioned, and often rejected, if the dominant firm would be expected to increase its own R&D effort in response to increased R&D by its rivals after liability on a dominant firm is imposed. An analytical framework for determining whether a …

Introduction: Big Data And Competition Policy, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Big Data and Big Analytics are a big deal today. Big Data is playing a pivotal role in many companies' strategic decision-making. Companies are striving to acquire a 'data advantage' over rivals. Data-driven mergers are increasing. These data-driven business strategies and mergers raise significant implications for privacy, consumer protection and competition law. At the same time, European and United States' competition authorities are beginning to consider the implications of a data-driven economy on competition policy. In 2015, the European Commission launched a competition inquiry into the e-commerce sector and issued a statement of objections in its Google investigation. The implications …

When Competition Fails To Optimize Quality: A Look At Search Engines, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

Scholarly Works

The European Commission’s Statement of Objections forms the latest addition to the ongoing debate on the possible misuse of Google’s position in the search engine market. The scholarly debate, however, has largely been over the exclusionary effects of search degradation. Less attention has been attributed to the dimension of quality – whether and how a search engine, faced with rivals, could degrade quality on the free side.

We set out to address this fundamental issue: With the proliferation of numerous web search engines and their free usage and availability, could any search engine degrade quality?

We begin our analysis with …

Competition Law For A Post-Scarcity World, Salil K. Mehra

Texas A&M Law Review

Writers, economists and IP scholars have hailed signs of an incipient shift to a post-scarcity world. Driving this change are rapid decreases not only in marginal cost, but also in the fixed or first-unit costs of production. Whether these changes become economy-wide, or remain confined to a subset of industries, they have dramatic implications for competition law and policy. This Article is the first to address these implications. In particular, because of the incentive for incumbent firms to engage in what may be termed “anti-disruption” – as examples such as the Apple/e-books antitrust case and the regulatory responses to Uber …

Empirical Evidence Of Drug Pricing Games - A Citizen's Pathway Gone Astray, Robin C. Feldman, Evan Frondorf, Andrew Cordova

Robin C Feldman

Conspiracy As Contract, Laurent Sacharoff

Laurent Sacharoff

Antitrust Or Industrial Protectionism? Emerging International Issues In China's Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts, Thomas J. Horton

Thomas J. Horton