Law Commons^™

A Fair Stream: Recommendations For The Future Of Fair Trade Music, Ricardo Hernandez

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Allied Business Intelligence research suggests that, by 2019, the music streaming industry will reach $46 billion in premium subscription revenues. As the music streaming industry grows, the creators of the musical content appear to be getting left behind. While there are a number of suggestions for why creators of musical content are not receiving their share of the pie, one thing is certain: a new business model is needed. This Note suggests that one possible way to ensure fairness in the music streaming supply chain is through applying the fair trade concept to the music streaming model. As such, this …

Justice Scalia And Class Actions, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

I have been asked to write an essay on Justice Scalia's class action jurisprudence and although I suspect many readers will find this surprising because the Justice is so often linked to constitutional law, I actually think that his class action jurisprudence may be where his opinions leave some of the biggest marks. To be as blunt about it as the Justice himself would have been: for better or for worse, I am not sure any other Justice of the Supreme Court in American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit than Justice Scalia did.

The Justice …

Foxes At The Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The dark side of occupational licensing-its tendency to raise prices to consumers with dubious effects on service quality, its enormous payout to licensees, and its ability to shut many willing workers out of the workforce-has begun to receive significant attention. But little has been said about the legal institutions that create and administer this web of professional entry and practice rules. State-level licensing boards regulate nearly one-third of American workers, yet, until now, there has been no systematic attempt to understand who serves on these boards and how they operate. This Article undertakes an ambitious and comprehensive study of all …

Ceo Side Payments In Mergers And Acquisitions, Brian Broughman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side payments in connection with the sale of their firms. Side payments differ from golden parachutes in that they are negotiated ex post in connection with a specific acquisition proposal, whereas golden parachutes are part of the executive’s employment agreement negotiated when she is hired. While side payments may benefit shareholders by countering managerial resistance to an efficient sale, they can also be used to redistribute merger proceeds to management. This Article highlights an overlooked distinction between pre-merger golden parachutes and merger side payments. Similar to a legislative rider attached …

The Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker And Customer Welfare In Antitrust Law, Clayton J. Masterman

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Note analyzes how courts' leniency affects a particular category of anticompetitive buyer conduct: agreements between employers that restrict competition in labor markets. If, as courts and commentators generally agree, the goal of antitrust law is to promote the welfare of consumers, how should courts balance the welfare of workers and customers under antitrust analysis? Arguably, worker welfare should be included in consumer welfare. If so, anticompetitive agreements between employers benefit one subset of consumers (customers), while hurting another subset (workers). The persistent procustomer and antiworker effect of such complicates a court's choice to find conduct per se unreasonable or …

The Failure Of Liability In Modern Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In April 2015, the Department of Justice charged Navinder Sarao for his role in causing the Flash Crash-the near-1,000-point drop-and- rebound in the Dow Jones Index that roiled markets in May 2010. Sarao, a small-time British trader operating out of his parents' suburban basement, stood accused of putting together a string of illusory, fake orders that fooled markets enough to spark the largest single-day drop in the index's history. Commentators rightly contest whether a bit-player like Sarao could have unleashed a near-catastrophe on U.S. securities markets single-handedly. Yet, the complaint-and its causal account- point to a troubling dilemma facing scholars …

Antitrust Scrutiny For The Occupations: "North Carolina Dental" And Its Impact On U.S. Licensing Boards, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The American system of occupational licensing is under attack. The current regime – which allows for almost total self-regulation – has weathered sustained criticism from consumer advocate groups, academics, politicians, and even the White House itself. But the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,1 portends a sea change in how almost a third of American workers are regulated. The case has made it possible for aggrieved individuals and government enforcers to bring suits against most state licensing boards, challenging their restrictions as violating federal competition law. The case has prompted two responses: …

The New Antitrust Federalism, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

"Antitrust federalism, " or the rule that state regulation is not subject to federal antitrust law, does as much as-and perhaps more than-its constitutional cousin to insulate state regulation from wholesale invalidation by the federal government. For most of the last century, the Court quietly tinkered away with the contours of this federalism, struggling to draw a formal boundary between state action (immune from antitrust suits) and private cartels (not). But with the Court's last three antitrust cases, the tinkering has given way to reformation. What used to be a doctrine with deep roots in constitutional federalism is now a …

The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca H. Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law Review

Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In fact, competition-whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets-is multifaceted. What are offered in antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate "net" competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to …

The Commensurability Myth In Antitrust, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Modern antitrust law pursues a seemingly unitary goal: competition. In fact, competition—whether defined as a process or as a set of outcomes associated with competitive markets—is multifaceted. What are offered in antitrust cases as procompetitive and anticompetitive effects are typically qualitatively different, and trading them off is as much an exercise in judgment as mathematics. But despite the inevitability of value judgments in antitrust cases, courts have perpetuated a commensurability myth, claiming to evaluate “net” competitive effect as if the pros and cons of a restraint of trade are in the same unit of measure. The myth is attractive to …

Regulation 2.0: The Marriage Of New Governance And "Lex Informatica", Abbey Stemler

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Throughout history, disruptive technologies have transformed industry and signaled the destruction or creation of regulatory structures. When crafting regulations, governments often utilize Regulation 1.0 approaches, characterized by top-down design standards that dictate exactly how the regulated must act in order to prevent market failures. Regulation 1.0 increases barriers to entry and decreases the room for business experimentation. Regulation 2.0, by contrast, is a theoretical approach for regulating companies that rely on platform-mediated networks. It marries New Governance theory and the concept of lex informatica. This marriage allows for the collaborative creation of design standards that are then enforced through mediating …

A Laboratory Of Regulation: The Untapped Potential Of The Hhs Advisory Opinion Power, Christopher J. Climo

Vanderbilt Law Review

Of late, the federal government's approach to regulation of hospitals and other healthcare providers asks them to do more with less. Both the government and private insurers have increasingly assigned hospitals and other providers with financial responsibility for the quality of the care they provide to federal beneficiaries.' At the same time, experts predict that reimbursement rates by both the government and private insurers will fall as a result of the Affordable Care Act's recent efforts to increase access to healthcare. Facing a widening gap between expectations of quality and availability of financial resources, healthcare providers will need to pursue …

Capturing The Transplant: U.S. Antitrust Law In The European Union, Silvia Beltrametti

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The scholarly literature on the movement of legal norms focuses almost exclusively on transfers from one jurisdiction to another. It largely ignores transfers into new regulatory regimes. Drawing on a case study of the transplantation of U.S. antitrust law into the nascent entity that was to become the European Community, and analyzing its evolution from a public choice perspective, this Article suggests that transfers into new regulatory regimes are more likely to be effective when the lack of established institutions creates opportunities for stakeholders. The endorsement of a new law will enable stakeholders to influence its application and to capture …

Insider Trading In Derivatives Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The prohibition against insider trading is becoming increasingly anachronistic in markets where derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS) operate. Lenders use these instruments to trade the credit risk of the loans they extend. By design, CDS appear to subvert insider trading laws, insofar as lenders rely on what looks like insider information to transfer or externalize the risk of a loan to another institution. At the same time, the harm caused by using insider information in CDS markets can depart radically from the harms envisioned under existing case law. In the traditional account of insider trading, shareholders systematically lose against …

Entering The Innovation Twilight Zone: How Patent And Antitrust Law Must Work Together, Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Maggie Wittlin

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Patent law and antitrust law have traded ascendancy over the last century, as courts and other institutions have tended to favor one at the expense of the other. In this Article, we take several steps toward stabilizing the doctrine surrounding these two branches of law. First, we argue that an optimal balance between patent rights and antitrust enforcement exists that will maximize consumer welfare, including promoting innovation and economic growth. Further, as Congress is the best institution to find this optimum, courts should enforce both statutes according to their literal text, which grants absolute patent rights but allows for more …

The Influence Of The Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise In The Lower Courts And What It Means For Institutional Reform In Antitrust, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

It is often pointed out that while the United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter in setting antitrust policy and promulgating antitrust rules, it does so too infrequently to be an efficient regulator. And since the antitrust agencies, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), rarely issue guidelines, and even more rarely issue rules or regulations, very little antitrust law is handed down from on high. Instead, circuits split, and lower courts must muddle through new antitrust problems by finding analogies in technologically and socially obsolete precedents. When faced with this …

Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s increasing use of science and social science in its decision-making has a rationalizing effect on law that helps ensure that a rule will have its desired effect. But resting doctrine on the shifting sands of scientific and social scientific opinion endangers legal stability. The Court must be be responsive, but not reactive, to new scientific findings and theories, a difficult balance for lay justices to strike. This Article argues that the Court uses delay — defined as refusing to make or change a rule in light of new scientific arguments at time one, and then making or …

Cartels By Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

It has been over a hundred years since George Bernard Shaw wrote that “[a]ll professions are a conspiracy against the laity.” Since then, the number of occupations and the percentage of workers subject to occupational licensing have exploded; nearly one-third of the U.S. workforce is now licensed, up from five percent in the 1950s. Through occupational licensing boards, states endow cosmetologists, veterinary doctors, medical doctors, and florists with the authority to decide who may practice their art. It cannot surprise when licensing boards comprised of competitors regulate in ways designed to raise their profits. The result for consumers is higher …

Identifying A Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect A Low-Cost Competitor, Taylor M. Owings

Vanderbilt Law Review

Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama announced that his Administration would pursue a policy of vigorous antitrust enforcement in order to ensure healthy competition in the economy.' In two of the highest-profile antitrust cases that have followed, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") sought to block two proposed mergers in which the target companies were low-cost competitors in their industries. The DOJ won a judgment in November 2011 that blocked retail-tax giant H&R Block from acquiring 2nd Story Software, maker of the low-cost digital tax- preparation program TaxACT. A month later, the DOJ scored another "victory" when AT&T …

Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons From The Nfl And Nba Lockouts Of 2011, Nathaniel Grow

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This Article analyzes the National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball Association (NBA) lockouts of 2011, focusing in particular on the role union dissolution played in each work stoppage. Although the existing academic literature had generally concluded that players unions in the four major US professional sports leagues were unlikely to disband during a labor dispute, the unions in both the NFL and NBA elected to dissolve in response to lockouts by ownership. This Article provides an explanation for why the prior literature misjudged the role that union dissolution would play during the 2011 work stoppages. It argues that previous …

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law ” Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi ” involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …

Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need A Federal Right Of Publicity, Talor Bearman

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The right of publicity is the right of an individual to control the commercial use of her name, image, likeness, or other identifiable aspects of her persona. In the United States, the right of publicity is a state-law right, not federal, and recognition of the right varies significantly from state to state. The lack of uniformity among states poses significant problems for individuals who are recognizable throughout the United States. Specifically, student athletes, who would lose the ability to play college athletics if they were reimbursed for the use of their images, are among the individuals most at risk of …

Train Wreck (Of The I-Aa), John R. Maney

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

In 2009, the Knight Commission, which addresses major problems facing intercollegiate athletics, polled the presidents of the Football Bowl Subdivision schools (I-A schools) about their views on the state of financial affairs in college athletics. Less than 25 percent of those polled thought intercollegiate athletics was sustainable in its present form. As a result, the Commission recommended a series of reforms to help maintain the health of collegiate athletics. Unfortunately, the Commission did not poll the presidents of Football Championship Subdivision schools (I-AA schools). They should have polled those presidents because the I-AA schools' fiscal health is worse. In 2010, …

Trolling For Standards: How Courts And The Administrative State Can Help Deter Patent Holdup And Promote Innovation, Niels J. Melius

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Antitrust law and patent law share the common goal of improving economic welfare by facilitating competition and innovation. But these legal fields conflict when baseless claims of patent infringement disrupt the competitive process. In its eBay decision, the Supreme Court muddied the precedential waters by promulgating a vague doctrine of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. In the years since, a split has emerged in the district courts on the question of which entities generally qualify for injunctive relief as an additional remedy to damages. This uncertainty has failed to mitigate an antitrust phenomenon known as "patent holdup," whereby an …

Adversarial Economics In Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus In The Battle Of The Experts, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The adversarial presentation of expert scientific evidence tends to obscure academic consensus. In the context of litigation, small, marginal disagreements can be made to seem important and settled issues can be made to appear hopelessly deadlocked. This Article explores this dynamic's effect on antitrust litigation. Modem antitrust law is steeped in microeconomics, and suits rely heavily on economic expert witnesses. Indeed, expert testimony is often the "whole game" in an antitrust dispute because experts testify about dispositive issues such as the competitive effect of a business practice or the relevant boundaries of a market. And the Supreme Court has encouraged-even …

The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie

Vanderbilt Law Review

Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act. Section One condemns only concerted action between separate entities, not unilateral conduct by a single entity. Firms that engage in price fixing may try to reduce the risk of antitrust liability by structuring their actions to appear to be those of a unified single entity that is beyond the reach of Section One.

In this Article, Professors Hovenkamp and Leslie examine how price-fixing cartels govern themselves and maximize their profits by cooperating and colluding, instead of competing. They then use …

Silence Of The Spam: Improving The Can-Spam Act By Including An Expanded Private Cause Of Action, David J. Rutenberg

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

In the last decade, email spam has become more than just an annoyance for email users. Unsolicited messages now comprise more than 95 percent of all email sent worldwide. This costs US businesses billions of dollars in lost productivity each year. The US Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 to regulate the spam industry. Unfortunately, data show that spam only increased since the Act's passage. Part of the reason for this failure is that the Act only authorizes the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, and Internet Service Providers to bring action under its provisions. Each of these authorized …

The Landscape Of Collective Management Schemes, Daniel J. Gervais

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Collective management comes in many shapes and sizes. There is, however, an interesting definition proposed by WIPO: [T]he term “collective management” only refers to those forms of joint exercise of rights where there are truly “collectivized” aspects (such as tariffs, licensing conditions and distribution rules); where there is an organized community behind it; where the management is carried out on behalf of such a community; and where the organization serves collective objectives beyond merely carrying out the tasks of rights management . . . . In contrast, “rights clearance organizations” are those which perform joint exercise of rights without any …

Amicus Briefs And The Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs A New Deal, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Power to interpret the Sherman Act, and thus power to make broad changes to antitrust policy, is currently vested in the Supreme Court. But reevaluation of existing competition rules requires economic evidence, which the Court cannot gather on its own, and technical economic savvy, which it lacks. To compensate for these deficiencies, the Court has turned to amicus briefs to supply the economic information and reasoning behind its recent changes to antitrust policy. This Article argues that such reliance on amicus briefs makes Supreme Court antitrust adjudication analogous to administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking. When the Court pays careful attention to economic …

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Vanderbilt Law Review

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …