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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Other Business
Law Library Blog (May 2018): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Law Library Blog (May 2018): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law
Law Library Newsletters/Blog
No abstract provided.
2nd Place Contest Entry: Piracy, Policy, And Pandora: Outdated Copyright In A Digital World, Stephanie Caress
2nd Place Contest Entry: Piracy, Policy, And Pandora: Outdated Copyright In A Digital World, Stephanie Caress
Kevin and Tam Ross Undergraduate Research Prize
This is Stephanie Caress' submission for the 2018 Kevin and Tam Ross Undergraduate Research Prize, which won second place. She wrote about current copyright laws and digital distribution practices and how they can be improved for creators and consumers of music.
Stephanie is a senior at Chapman University, majoring in Music and Strategic & Corporate Communication. Her faculty mentor is Dr. Jessica Sternfeld.
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas
All Faculty Scholarship
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award.
We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …
Bankruptcy’S Uneasy Shift To A Contract Paradigm, David A. Skeel Jr., George Triantis
Bankruptcy’S Uneasy Shift To A Contract Paradigm, David A. Skeel Jr., George Triantis
All Faculty Scholarship
The most dramatic development in twenty-first century bankruptcy practice has been the increasing use of contracts to shape the bankruptcy process. To explain the new contract paradigm—our principal objective in this Article-- we begin by examining the structure of current bankruptcy law. Although the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 has long been viewed as mandatory, its voting and cramdown rules, among others, invite considerable contracting. The emerging paradigm is asymmetric, however. While the Code and bankruptcy practice allow for ex post contracting, ex ante contracts are viewed with suspicion.
We next use contract theory to assess the two modes of contracting. …
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
Governance By Contract: The Implications For Corporate Bylaws, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Boards and shareholders are increasing using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws and advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual conception of the corporation, Delaware courts have accorded substantial deference to board-adopted bylaw provisions, even those that limit shareholder rights.
This Article challenges the rationale for deference under the contractual approach. With respect to corporate bylaws, the Article demonstrates that shareholder power to adopt and amend the bylaws is, under Delaware law, more limited than the board’s power to do so. As a result, shareholders cannot effectively constrain …