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Technology Transfer In Spatial Competition When Licensees Are Asymmetric, Sougata Poddar, Swapnendu Banerjee, Monalisa Ghosh
Technology Transfer In Spatial Competition When Licensees Are Asymmetric, Sougata Poddar, Swapnendu Banerjee, Monalisa Ghosh
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study technology transfer in a spatial competition with two asymmetric licensees (firms) with an outside innovator who decides how many licenses to offer and the optimal licensing contract. We show the optimal licensing policy is pure royalty contract to both licensees leading to a complete diffusion of the new technology. The result holds irrespective of the cost differentials between the licensees and for innovation of all sizes, that is, drastic or non‐drastic. This robust finding although supports the dominance of royalty licensing in practice; however, consumers may not be necessarily better off. We also throw light on the situation …
Technology Licensing And Innovation – A Correction On Two-Part Tariff Analysis, Yuanzhu Lu, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
Technology Licensing And Innovation – A Correction On Two-Part Tariff Analysis, Yuanzhu Lu, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The main purpose of this note is two-fold: (i) Correcting an error in the two-part tariff licensing contract, and (ii) Altering one of the main results following the two-part tariff analysis in Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013). This also strengthens the primary conclusion of Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013).
Firing Threats: Incentive Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Stephen J. Rassenti
Firing Threats: Incentive Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Stephen J. Rassenti
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job …