Labor Relations Commons^™

Invisible Hand Or Collective Command: Unionized Effect On State Wages, Michael Felix

Business and Economics Presentations

No abstract provided.

Income Disparities Between Levels Of Management Within The Workplace In The Us, Cerlyn K. Ellis

Publications and Research

The continuous rise of inequality particularly in the growing concentration of income at the top level of distribution in the United States has become a great focus of assessment for economists and policy makers. Skilled workers struggle to improve their income compensation by integrating higher level of schooling with on-the-job experience to boost their opportunity and gain the edge in this competitive labor market. Understanding the factors behind this phenomenon is essential to determine whether policy action is needed to reduce income inequality while taking into account other policy objectives. Since the problem won’t be solved without understanding the origin …

Boom & Bust: The Perils Of Guaranteed Long Term Contracts. Evidence From Ops100 Performance Over The Contract Cycle, Heather M. O'Neill

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

This study focuses on panel data of 256 MLB free agent hitters under the 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to demonstrate that hitters, on average, increase their offensive production, measured by OPS100, during the last year of their contract and subsequently underperform the first year of the newly signed long term contract. The contract year phenomenon arises from the incentive to land a lucrative guaranteed contract for players not intending to retire. Signing a long term guaranteed contract creates an incentive to shirk (underperform) the first year of the new contract because performance and pay become unlinked and the need …

Do Mlb Hitters Boost Performance In Their Contract Year?, Heather M. O'Neill

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

This study focuses on 256 MLB free agent hitters playing under the 2006-2011 CBA to determine whether they boost their offensive performance in their contract year. Prior studies’ results are mixed, depending on the econometric technique used and the choice of the offensive performance measure.

Having multiple year observations per player, one can incorporate the unobserved traits of the players (ability, risk aversion, work ethic, etc.) by using Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. Since these unmeasured player traits are likely to be correlated with observed predictors of performance (games played, playoff contention, age, etc.), traditionally used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and …