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Full-Text Articles in Labor Relations
Conceptual Foundations: Walton And Mckersie's Subprocesses Of Negotiations, Thomas A. Kochan, David B. Lipsky
Conceptual Foundations: Walton And Mckersie's Subprocesses Of Negotiations, Thomas A. Kochan, David B. Lipsky
David B Lipsky
[Excerpt] Walton and McKersie's 1965 book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, provides much of the conceptual underpinnings of what grew into the modern-day teaching of negotiations in business, public policy, law, and other professional schools. We therefore believe that it is useful to outline the basic concepts and ideas introduced by these authors. We do so, however, with a word of caution. There is no substitute for the original. Every student should have the pleasure of struggling (as we did the first time it was assigned to us as students) with the tongue twisters like "attitudinal structuring" and the …
Level-Of-Aspiration Theory And Initial Stance In Bargaining, Bruce K. Macmurray, Edward J. Lawler
Level-Of-Aspiration Theory And Initial Stance In Bargaining, Bruce K. Macmurray, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This research focuses on the effect of initial stance in bargaining. Following level-of-aspiration theory, the research examines whether the pattern of early concession making modifies the impact of tough vs. soft initial stance. The experiment manipulated opponent's concession pattern (decreasing, constant, increasing) in the early phase of bargaining within an overall tough or soft initial stance. Results indicated that a decreasing concession pattern within the early bargaining extracted larger initial concessions than a constant or increasing concession pattern. Implications for Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) level-of-aspiration theory are discussed.
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the selection of tactics in bargaining. Using a variant of power-dependence theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tactics. To test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments that portrayed an employee-employer conflict over a pay raise, manipulating four dimensions of dependence: employee's outcome alternatives, employee's outcome value, employer's outcome alternatives, and employer's outcome value. Within this context, respondents estimated the likelihood …