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Articles 1 - 30 of 80
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
United States: Reserve Primary Fund Suspension, 2008, Anmol Makhija
United States: Reserve Primary Fund Suspension, 2008, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund was the world’s third-largest money market fund with $62.5 billion in assets. Following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on September 15, the Primary Fund’s $785 million position in Lehman debt securities was underwater, and the fund faced severe redemption pressures from investors. In just two days, redemption requests surpassed $40 billion. Owing to the fund’s inability to liquidate assets at or above par value in the frozen markets and the inability of its sponsor, the Reserve Management Company, Inc. (RMCI), to support investors, the Reserve announced on September 16 that the Primary Fund had “broken …
United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold
United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
By November 21, 2008, against the backdrop of heavy losses during the Global Financial Crisis, Citigroup counterparties were substantially pulling back from the firm. On November 23, the US Department of the Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve announced a support package for Citi composed of a capital injection and a loss-sharing arrangement on $300.8 billion of assets. Under the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), Citi would absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses on a mutually agreed upon pool of risky assets; the Treasury and FDIC provided $15 billion in loss protection after that, combined with Citi’s …
United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008, Vincient Arnold
United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
On Thursday, March 13, 2008, the US investment bank Bear Stearns Companies approached the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), saying it expected many of its repurchase agreement (repo) counterparties would not “roll,” or renew, their repo agreements the next day. As a result, the firm would be obligated to repay many of its repo liabilities. Without an emergency loan, Bear would be forced to file for bankruptcy on Friday morning, March 14. Before the market opened on Friday, the FRBNY made an overnight loan for $12.9 billion through JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) on a nonrecourse basis, which on-lent …
United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009, Vincient Arnold
United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
On December 31, 2008, Bank of America (BofA) finalized its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, absorbing losses of $15.5 billion as a result. Regulators were concerned about BofA’s short-term liquidity position and ability to post more collateral if its credit rating was downgraded. On January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Department of the Treasury announced an interagency support package to BofA, which included an asset guarantee wherein all three agencies shared losses with BofA on a “ring-fenced” $118 billion pool of assets. Under the ring-fencing arrangement, known as the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), BofA would …
Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Journal of Financial Crises
Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …
Iceland: Kaupthing Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Léo Brougher
Iceland: Kaupthing Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Léo Brougher
Journal of Financial Crises
Following the privatization of Iceland’s state-owned banks between 1998 and 2003, the three largest banks in Iceland—Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing—grew rapidly, with consolidated assets increasing from 100% of Iceland’s GDP in 2004 to nearly 900% by the end of 2007. Initially, this growth was funded by debt issuances in the European medium-term note market; however, as cracks in the international financial system appeared in 2006, the banks turned to offering high-interest savings accounts through their foreign subsidiaries. Beginning in October 2006, Kaupthing launched “Kaupthing Edge,” an online savings and deposit platform operating in markets outside Iceland. When the United States …
Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden
Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden
Journal of Financial Crises
In the summer of 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) faced heavy losses owing to the liquidity support it had provided on commercial paper issued by Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation, its off-balance-sheet vehicle, which held distressed collateralized debt obligations backed by US subprime mortgages. In July 2007, authorities became aware that IKB itself had lost access to liquidity from Deutsche Bank and other funding partners. Publicly owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) held a 38% stake in IKB, exposing it to potentially heavy losses in the event of an IKB failure. KfW, German financial authorities, and German banks pursued a …
Lessons Learned: Daniela Klingebiel, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Lessons Learned: Daniela Klingebiel, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Daniela Klingebiel was principal portfolio manager with the World Bank’s Pension and Endowment Department, Hedge Funds, during the Global Financial Crisis. Throughout her career, she has written many papers on financial crises, comparing various governments’ attempts to manage them and dissecting what has worked and why. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Klingebiel held on February 4 and March 3, 2021.
Lessons Learned: Bo Lundgren, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Bo Lundgren, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Bo Lundgren was Sweden’s cabinet minister for fiscal and financial affairs from 1991 to 1994, making him a key leader in managing the nation’s severe financial crisis during those years. Lundgren had a decades-long political career as a member of the Swedish Parliament from 1975 to 2004, was leader of the Moderate Party (1999–2003), and vice president of the European People’s Party in the European Union. He also served from 2004 to 2013 as director general of the Swedish National Debt Office, the country’s central financial agency. Drawing on his experiences in the Swedish crisis, Lundgren has shared his views …
Lessons Learned: Deborah Perelmuter, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Deborah Perelmuter, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Deborah Perelmuter has spent more than three decades with the Federal Reserve System. In 2008, as senior vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and co-head of Capital Markets Analysis and Trading (CMAT) within the Markets Group, she was tasked with setting up the operational details of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The TSLF auctioned Treasury securities to primary dealers in exchange for less liquid collateral to provide liquidity to those firms during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. Perelmuter became senior financial stability adviser within the office of the director in the FRBNY’s Research …
Lessons Learned: Patrick Honohan, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Patrick Honohan, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Patrick Honohan, an economist, was governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) from September 2009 until November 2015. Early in his tenure, he led a team that investigated the causes of the Irish banking crisis that broke out in 2008 during the Global Financial Crisis. Resolving the problems of bank failure and over-indebtedness that emerged in that crisis dominated his term of office. In late 2010, Ireland had to request financial assistance from the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, and the European …
Lessons Learned: Andrew Gray, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Andrew Gray, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Andrew Gray joined the FDIC in 2007, after having been majority director of communications for the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and press secretary for US Senator Richard C. Shelby (R–AL). Gray’s initial project was a campaign to mark the 75th anniversary of the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); his role evolved into running crisis communications as the FDIC stepped in during several bank failures triggered by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and conducted 489 bank resolutions during 2008–2013. After the crisis, the FDIC also assumed new responsibilities over the winding down of …
Peru: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer, Bailey Decker
Peru: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
Peru experienced the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC) in two distinct phases. First, starting in the summer of 2007, record capital inflows to the Peru banking sector contributed to an overheating economy. The Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) responded in September 2007 by removing reserve requirements on long-term external credit to promote long-term, rather than short-term, capital inflows. In February 2008, for similar reasons, it began to raise the ordinary minimum reserve requirement on bank liabilities and implemented new marginal reserve requirements on increases in those liabilities. Second, when the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman …
Jamaica: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel
Jamaica: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
In October 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and liquidity shortages rocked American and European markets, causing investors to exit liquid Jamaican-dollar assets. The Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) feared a “disorderly depreciation” in the Jamaican-dollar (JMD) exchange rate to the US dollar (BOJ 2009, 44). In response, the BOJ raised required reserve ratios for cash and other liquid assets, the first increases since 2002. The BOJ raised reserve ratios three times—in December 2008, January 2009, and February 2009—because the central bank could not change its requirements by more than 200 basis points per month. The BOJ raised the requirement for …
Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …
Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner
Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner
Journal of Financial Crises
As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …
Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
David Wilcox was the deputy director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-¬09. He assisted in developing the Federal Reserve policy response that ultimately stabilized the economy by providing insight into the economic and financial outlook to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) prior to each of its policy-setting meetings. Wilcox became director of the division in 2011 and served in that role through 2018, acting as the division’s chief economist, manager, and the senior adviser to three Fed chairs. After leaving the Fed, he joined …
Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly
Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly
Journal of Financial Crises
Scott G. Alvarez was general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). He met with the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) to discuss a litany of legal aspects related to the Fed’s interventions under its emergency liquidity provision authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. We summarize some highlights from our interview with Mr. Alvarez. The transcript of this interview, conducted in April 2022, and one from an earlier Lessons Learned interview, in December 2018
Norway: Covered Bond Swap Program, Sean Fulmer
Norway: Covered Bond Swap Program, Sean Fulmer
Journal of Financial Crises
As the Global Financial Crisis spread, liquidity strains appeared in Norwegian money markets, limiting banks from accessing high-quality and long-term financing. In response, on October 24, 2008, the Norwegian government authorized a Norwegian krone (NOK) 350 billion (USD 50 billion) covered bond swap program to be operated by Norges Bank, the central bank, on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Under this program, Norwegian commercial banks, savings banks, and, later, mortgage companies could exchange certain covered bonds, known in Norwegian as obligasjoner med fortrinnrett (OMFs), for treasury bills. Pricing was determined in an auction. In each auction, Norges Bank set …
European Central Bank: Term Refinancing Operations, Corey N. Runkel
European Central Bank: Term Refinancing Operations, Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the European Central Bank (ECB) expanded the frequency, maturities, size, and set of eligible collateral for several of its standing term refinancing operations (TROs). Changes started in August 2007, when the European interbank market tightened, and the ECB supplemented its monthly longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with another three-month-maturity tender each month. Another encounter with market turbulence in March 2008 brought six-month LTROs. The largest expansion came after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008: the ECB enlarged its set of eligible collateral, added 12-month LTROs, and added special-term refinancing operations (STROs) that matured …
Greece: Emergency Liquidity Assistance, Corey N. Runkel
Greece: Emergency Liquidity Assistance, Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 triggered a deep recession in Greece, leading investors to withdraw one third of Greek bank deposits between 2008 and 2011. As banks’ nonperforming assets rose and rating agencies downgraded Greek sovereign debt, Greek banks’ capital fell below levels required for Eurosystem refinancing operations. In response, the Bank of Greece (BOG) provided Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to all Greek banks. ELA was a revolving credit line open to solvent institutions at a premium rate, so long as that support did not interfere with the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. European Central Bank (ECB) rules required the BOG …
European Central Bank: Fine-Tuning Operations, Corey N. Runkel
European Central Bank: Fine-Tuning Operations, Corey N. Runkel
Journal of Financial Crises
Credit in the European interbank market tightened in August 2007 as banks sustained losses in mortgage-backed securities markets. On August 9, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a EUR 95 billion fine-tuning operation (FTO). The Eurosystem continued providing FTOs carrying overnight maturities through the next three business days. Two more bouts of interbank funding stress—in March and September 2008—caused the ECB to deploy more FTOs. The ECB provided liquidity through 12 emergency, overnight FTOs, all but one at least EUR 25 billion in size. All operations, except the first and last, used variable-rate, fixed-allotment auctions. The first and last operations …
United States: Transaction Account Guarantee Program, Ezekiel Vergara
United States: Transaction Account Guarantee Program, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led many uninsured depositors to withdraw their funds from US banks that they perceived as troubled. To reassure depositors, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), on October 14, 2008, guaranteed certain debt and deposits through its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). The Temporary Account Guarantee Program (TAGP) was one component of the TLGP. Through the TAGP, the FDIC provided unlimited insurance to noninterest-bearing transaction accounts (NIBTAs) and other low-interest-bearing accounts. On October 3, 2008, the US Congress had increased the limit on insured deposits to $250,000. By guaranteeing these accounts in full, …
United States: Temporary Guarantee Program For Money Market Funds, Ezekiel Vergara
United States: Temporary Guarantee Program For Money Market Funds, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
On September 16, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” meaning that its net asset value (NAV) fell more than 0.5% below the $1 per share target value maintained by money-market funds (MMFs). When the Reserve Primary Fund could not restore the NAV, investors began withdrawing funds from MMFs, leading to a $439 billion run on the MMF market. To stop this run, the US Department of the Treasury established the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (the Guarantee Program), which insured investors’ holdings in participating MMFs. The Guarantee Program was designed …
United Kingdom: Financial Services Compensation Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara
United Kingdom: Financial Services Compensation Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
In mid-September 2007, as credit markets froze, Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest mortgage bank, struggled to secure short-term funding and sought emergency liquidity assistance from the Bank of England (BoE). As word of that support leaked to the public, the bank suffered a run by its retail depositors. On September 17, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) announced it would guarantee all of Northern Rock’s deposits. On October 1, 2007, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), then the UK’s lead financial regulator, announced that the UK’s deposit insurer would abolish co-insurance and cover 100% of eligible accounts, up to GBP 35,000 (USD …
Taiwan (Roc): Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith
Taiwan (Roc): Central Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, the failure of a large Taiwanese bank led depositors to shift billions of dollars from private banks to state-owned banks. To stem the runs, the government on October 7 invoked its authority under Articles 28 and 29 of the Deposit Insurance Act to announce a temporary, unlimited guarantee on all deposit accounts of institutions covered by the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). In addition to removing the previous TWD 3 million (USD 90,000) cap per depositor, the expanded coverage included several types of deposit accounts that had not been previously insured by the CDIC. As the CDIC’s …
Spain: Deposit Guarantee Funds, Ezekiel Vergara
Spain: Deposit Guarantee Funds, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
On October 10, 2008, Spanish authorities increased the amount insured under its three Fondos de Garantía de Depósitos (FGDs), Spain’s deposit-insurance schemes, from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 27,200 to USD 136,000). By raising this limit, which was meant to be a permanent change to the banking system, Spanish authorities intended to bolster depositor confidence while exceeding a recent European Union (EU) recommendation to expand such coverage to at least EUR 50,000. Membership in one of the FGDs was compulsory for banks, cajas (savings banks), and cooperatives, each of which had a separate fund. These institutions paid a 0.2% …
Swiss Banks’ And Securities Dealers’ Depositor Protection Association, Ezekiel Vergara
Swiss Banks’ And Securities Dealers’ Depositor Protection Association, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Swiss authorities adopted changes to their deposit-insurance system, partly in response to similar measures by neighboring countries. On November 5, 2008, the Swiss finance minister announced that Switzerland would propose legislation to increase depositor coverage from CHF 30,000 to CHF 100,000 (USD 85,400). Swiss authorities also increased the maximum amount of ex-post contributions they could levy from CHF 4 billion to CHF 6 billion. The Swiss Banks’ and Securities Dealers’ Depositor Protection Association (ESI), Switzerland’s standing deposit-insurance body, administered its federal deposit-insurance system. The ESI was privately administered, was compulsory for nearly all deposit-taking …
Slovenia: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara
Slovenia: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
On October 7, 2008, as the European Union (EU) coordinated its members’ response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), its Economic and Financial Council (ECOFIN) recommended that member states raise their deposit-insurance coverage to at least EUR 50,000 (USD 67,000). Germany and Austria went further and adopted an unlimited guarantee of deposits. In response, Slovenia announced its Unlimited Deposit Guarantee on October 8, 2008. Slovenia’s national assembly adopted the program on November 11, 2008, effective November 20. The Bank of Slovenia (BoS) administered the program, as it had Slovenia’s existing deposit-insurance scheme. When an insured bank failed, fees were imposed …
Singapore: Government Guarantee On Deposits, Ezekiel Vergara
Singapore: Government Guarantee On Deposits, Ezekiel Vergara
Journal of Financial Crises
On October 16, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15 and the introduction of Hong Kong’s unlimited deposit guarantee on October 14, Singapore announced its Government Guarantee on Deposits (GGD). The GGD was meant “to avoid an erosion of banks’ deposit base and ensure a level international playing field for banks in Singapore.” It was administered by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Singapore’s central bank and financial regulatory body, and was backed by government reserves totaling SGD 150 billion (about USD 100 billion). The program expanded upon Singapore’s pre-crisis guarantee of SGD 20,000, which was administered …