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Corporate governance

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Articles 91 - 97 of 97

Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management

Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding Feb 2006

Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In an emerging economy, the alternative to government control is often no governance. We investigate the governance structure of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore under the ownership/control structure of Temasek Holdings, the government holding entity, which typically owns substantial cash flow rights but disproportional control rights and exercises no operational control. We compare the financial and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each has a different set of governance structure, the key difference being government ownership. We show that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs. The results hold even when …

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Ceo Succession Processes And Agency Costs, Zeynep Ayca Altintig Jan 2005

Ceo Succession Processes And Agency Costs, Zeynep Ayca Altintig

LSU Doctoral Dissertations

In the 'passing the baton' succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new CEO during a probationary period. The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if he is successful during the probationary period. We argue that this type of succession process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve performance or increase firm value. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes …

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The Persistence Of Earnings And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, H. A. Maretno Jan 2005

The Persistence Of Earnings And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, H. A. Maretno

Faculty Publications

In this study, we investigate the earnings persistence in IPO firms by examining the two components of earnings: accruals and cash flows. We also analyze the impact of corporate governance on earnings and the two earnings components. In our comparison of the top and bottom quartiles based on the firms' earnings at the IPO year, we find that although the top quartile firms have a significantly positive accrual component in the IPO year, they eventually have the same negative accrual component of earnings as the bottom quartile firms in the second year after the IPO. In contrast, we find that …

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Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance Practices?, Sarah Peck Jan 2004

Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance Practices?, Sarah Peck

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

This study investigates whether block acquisitions lead to changes in board and CEO compensation characteristics and finds that block purchasers do not play a significant role in improving the firm’s governance practices. However, the majority of professional investors have sold their block within a year, suggesting that they do not own their stock long enough to alter governance policies nor to benefit from such changes. For the smaller number of firms where a new blockholder maintains their investment for more than a year, the use of equity based CEO compensation increases while the use of cash based compensation decreases.

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Corporate Governance And Dividend Policy In Emerging Markets, Todd Mitton Jan 2004

Corporate Governance And Dividend Policy In Emerging Markets, Todd Mitton

Faculty Publications

In a sample of 365 firms from 19 countries, I show that firms with stronger corporate governance have higher dividend payouts, consistent with agency models of dividends. In addition, the negative relationship between dividend payouts and growth opportunities is stronger among firms with better governance. I also show that firms with stronger governance are more profitable, but that greater profitability explains only part of the higher dividend payouts. The positive relationship between corporate governance and dividend payouts is limited primarily to countries with strong investor protection, suggesting that firm-level corporate governance and country-level investor protection are complements rather than substitutes.

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Monitoring By The Financial Press And Forced Ceo Turnover, Kathleen A. Farrell, David A. Whidbee Dec 2002

Monitoring By The Financial Press And Forced Ceo Turnover, Kathleen A. Farrell, David A. Whidbee

Department of Finance: Faculty Publications

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

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A Cross-Firm Analysis Of The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The East Asian Financial Crisis, Todd Mitton Jan 2002

A Cross-Firm Analysis Of The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The East Asian Financial Crisis, Todd Mitton

Faculty Publications

In a sample of 398 firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, firm-level differences in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance duringthe East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Significantly better stock price performance is associated with firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from Big Six accounting firms), with firms that had higher outside ownership concentration, and with firms that were focused rather than diversified. The results suggest that individual firms have some power to preclude expropriation of minority shareholders if legal protection is inadequate.

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