Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Malaysia: Government Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 16, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and regional expansions of deposit insurance, Malaysia announced its Government Deposit Guarantee (GDG), an unlimited guarantee of deposits held at eligible institutions. Given the “soundness and strong capitalization” of the banking sector, the preemptive program was meant “to maintain the stability of the Malaysian financial system.” Prior to the crisis, the Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM), Malaysia’s deposit-insurance agency, guaranteed up to MYR 60,000 (USD 17,291) per depositor per insured institution. The PIDM was tasked with administering the GDG. Under the GDG, the PIDM insured all ringgit and foreign-currency deposits. …

New Zealand: Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a global financial crisis. Leaders of the G-7 countries agreed on October 10, 2008, to five principles for addressing the crisis, including the need for sound deposit insurance. On October 12, Australia’s prime minister announced a deposit insurance program that his government had first publicly vetted in June. Anticipating Australia’s announcement, New Zealand’s prime minister announced its own deposit guarantee scheme on the same afternoon. The government launched the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the Scheme) “to ensure ongoing retail depositor confidence in New Zealand’s financial system, given turbulence in the …

Association For The Guarantee Of Deposits Luxembourg, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Luxembourgish officials in October 2008 announced plans to raise the country’s deposit-insurance cap to EUR 100,000 (USD 134,000) and eliminate co-insurance. Prior to the GFC, Luxembourg’s deposit-insurance system covered 90% of deposits in eligible accounts up to EUR 22,222, with depositors responsible for the remaining 10%. On December 19, 2008, the legislature increased the cap to EUR 100,000 and removed the co-insurance, effective January 1, 2009. The Association Pour la Garantie des Dépôts Luxembourg (AGDL), a private deposit-insurance body, administered these changes. All deposit-taking institutions and approved investment firms, except branches of foreign banks, …

Latvia: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Latvian authorities raised the country’s deposit-insurance cap from EUR 20,000 to EUR 50,000 (USD 26,800 to USD 67,000) in response to international calls to bolster deposit-insurance systems. They passed the measure on October 16, 2008, and it came into effect two days later. The Financial and Capital Market Commission (FCMC), Latvia’s prudential supervisor and existing deposit administrator, oversaw the guarantee. The FCMC covered most types of deposit accounts and insured all Latvian-registered deposit-taking institutions, including some foreign-bank branches operating in Latvia. The FCMC charged quarterly premiums on insured accounts and could levy additional fees …

Kuwait: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

On October 26, 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) announced that it would support Gulf Bank, the country’s third-largest bank, which had sustained losses on clients’ derivatives trades. In the same announcement, it said it would ask the government to guarantee all banking deposits to shore up confidence in banks and to keep Kuwait’s banking system competitive with those of other countries, including neighboring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had already announced unlimited deposit guarantees. The legislature passed an unlimited deposit guarantee bill eight days later. Kuwait did …

Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

To address the risk of capital flight to neighboring countries during the Global Financial Crisis, the Indonesian government raised the limit on insured deposits 20-fold from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion per account (about USD 200,000). The President issued two government regulations on October 13, 2008. The first was an emergency decree that authorized the government, in consultation with the Indonesian Parliament, to alter the limit in times of systemic financial distress. The second was a government regulation enacting the actual increase, which has remained in effect since the crisis. All banks operating within Indonesia, including branches of …

Iceland: Depositors’ And Investors’ Guarantee Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, Iceland’s three largest banks accumulated assets totaling several times the size of Iceland’s GDP and financed their growth through foreign borrowing. As wholesale funding dried up in 2007, they replaced this borrowing by rapidly gathering deposits through foreign branches and subsidiaries located in the European Union, primarily in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the summer and fall of 2008, international credit markets froze and the Icelandic banks were unable to roll over their maturing liabilities. On October 6, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced a full guarantee of domestic deposits. …

Hungary: National Deposit Insurance Fund, Zijin (Phoebe) Lei, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Hungary announced changes to its deposit-insurance system on October 8, 2008. The government said that it would increase the deposit-insurance cap from HUF 6 million to HUF 13 million (about USD 31,000 to about USD 68,000), the equivalent of roughly EUR 50,000 (about USD 68,000), in line with a European Union (EU) recommendation. Hungary’s finance minister also announced that the state would temporarily provide an unlimited deposit guarantee, following the actions of several European countries. The unlimited guarantee was political, meaning it was not implemented through official legislation. It was effective …

Hong Kong Sar: Full Deposit Guarantee, Ezekiel Vergara, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a run on Hong Kong’s fifth-biggest bank in September 2008, the Hong Kong government announced that it would use its Exchange Fund to extend full insurance temporarily to depositors at approved banks. The existing Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS) would continue to insure the first 100,000 Hong Kong dollars (HKD; about USD 13,000) per depositor at each bank; the new program would cover the rest. It also covered a broader set of institutions. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) administered the program, overseen by the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board (HKDPB); the HKMA was also responsible for managing the Exchange …

Greece: Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Responding to general financial and economic volatility during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Greek government in November 2008 sought to shore up public confidence in the banking system by raising the deposit-insurance limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (127,000 USD) per depositor for three years. The Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund (HDGF) was responsible for administering this adjustment, which was accompanied by a fivefold increase in the percentages used for calculating member institutions’ annual contributions. All credit institutions that were authorized to operate in Greece, including branches of foreign banks without their own coverage, were required to participate in …

France: Deposit Guarantee Fund, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European Union (EU) officials urged member states to raise their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to at least EUR 50,000 (USD 68,000) to promote confidence in banks. France did not need to increase its deposit-insurance cap to meet this target, as it already guaranteed EUR 70,000. The following year, EU officials passed a directive that required all member states to permanently increase their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010. French authorities complied with the EU’s directive on September 29, 2010. The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD), a private …

Belgium: Protection Fund/Special Protection Fund, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in fall 2008, the Belgian government increased the coverage limits of its deposit guarantee to restore faith in its banking system, protect savers and depositors, and safeguard financial stability. Belgium joined the European Union’s (EU) efforts to strengthen deposit guarantee systems. The measures complemented the Belgian government’s other efforts to secure domestic banks. The government implemented the emergency measures in October and November 2008 through royal decrees, which Parliament later incorporated into law. In a five-week span, Belgian authorities increased the deposit guarantee from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 26,820 …

Brazil: Time Deposits With Special Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

Uncertainty from the Global Financial Crisis spread to the Brazilian financial system in 2008, triggering a flight to quality toward assets with explicit or implicit government guarantees. In the Brazilian context, this meant depositors pulled funds from small and medium-size banks and parked them in larger banks that investors believed the government was more likely to backstop. The National Monetary Council (CMN) created the Time Deposits with Special Guarantee program (DPGE) in March 2009 to bolster liquidity in small and medium-size banks. The CMN put the country’s existing deposit insurer, the Credit Guarantee Fund (FGC), in charge of administering the …

Austria: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

After Germany and Ireland implemented unlimited deposit guarantees, Austrian officials passed a law on October 26, 2008, that removed deposit-insurance limits for individual depositors, fearing that Austrians would move their money to countries with higher deposit coverage. The government established the program using the country’s existing, mandatory deposit-insurance system (DIS), which was private, ex post funded, and segmented into sectoral schemes that covered different kinds of financial institutions. During payouts, the schemes covered the first EUR 50,000 (USD 67,000) of guaranteed funds to a given depositor, and the government the government covered the rest. The government required all financial institutions …

Broad-Based Emergency Liquidity Programs, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Sean Fulmer, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In this paper, we analyze broad-based emergency liquidity (BBEL) programs. Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who are considering establishing a BBEL program in designing the most effective program possible as efficiently as possible. Our insights are derived from 33 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

Liquidity provision is a long-established mandate of central banks and was a function that private entities performed even before the establishment of central banks. We survey a sampling of cases from the 19th through 21st centuries, drawn from 10 countries and regions, to distill …

Australia: Financial Claims Scheme, Ezekiel Vergara

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Australian government intervened in its own banking system, both to support domestic depositors and to keep its banking system competitive with those in countries whose regulators had already intervened. On October 12, 2008, the Australian government announced the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) to insure bank depositors. The deposit guarantee automatically insured depositors at all authorized deposit-taking institutions and covered a range of deposit accounts. As initially announced, the FCS would provide a blanket guarantee to all depositors with no fee for participation. This blanket guarantee, however, prompted a migration …

Market Support Programs: Covid-19 Crisis, June Rhee, Lily S. Engbith, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish a market support program (MSP). Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have already made the decision to use an MSP in designing the most effective program possible. Our insights derive from 23 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic.

By the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional banking systems were significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance threatened to spread quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response, …

Dividends And Bank Capital In The Global Financial Crisis Of 2007–2009, Viral V. Acharya, Irvind Gujral, Nirupama Kulkarni, Hyun Song Shin

Journal of Financial Crises

The headline numbers appear to show that even as banks and financial intermediaries suffered large credit losses in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, they raised substantial amounts of new capital, both from private investors and from government-funded capital injections. However, on closer inspection, the composition of bank capital shifted radically from one based on common equity to that based on debt-like hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt. The erosion of common equity was exacerbated by large-scale payments of dividends, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses. Dividend payments represent a transfer from creditors (and potentially taxpayers) …

Account Guarantee Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Adam Kulam, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises.

Altering Overdraft Fee Policies To Promote Consumer Financial Health, Nadia Barbarawi

Finance Undergraduate Honors Theses

The objective of this study is to describe the traditional overdraft practices, explain the reaction of the banking industry from the pressure coming from consumers, regulators, and innovative companies to reduce or eliminate overdraft fees to promote consumer financial health.

American Rescue Plan Act (Arpa): City And County Budget Allocations In The Mountain West, Katie M. Gilbertson, Caitlin J. Saladino, William E. Brown Jr.

Economic Development & Workforce

This fact sheet details how city and county governments within the Mountain West states of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah allocated funds from the State and Local Fiscal Recovery Fund (SLFRF) portion of the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). Brookings Metro in partnership with the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties created the “Local Government ARPA Investment Tracker” to display how communities across the country allocate this financial resource. This interactive site allows budget information from cities and counties to be added as such decisions are made.

Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Harry Wilson was one of four senior advisers to the US Department of the Treasury during the Obama administration and served on the President’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to General Motors and Chrysler, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a …

Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Steven Rattner, an investment banker and private equity professional, joined the Obama administration as counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury and head of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensely throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path …

Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Mara McNeill was senior counsel to the US Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Automotive Investment Financing Program (AIFP) during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09. As senior counsel, McNeill was responsible for the department’s $80 billon financing of General Motors, Chrysler, Ally Financial, and Chrysler Financial. She worked with the Auto Team Task Force, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) legal team, and the Department of Treasury. The bipartisan AIFP team was charged with overseeing the government’s efforts to assist the companies toward a “new lease on life,” while exercising strong financial principles to protect the …

Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Sadiq Malik was a member of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers, to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Malik, working for the Auto Task Force, helped take General Motors through …

Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Matthew Feldman was the chief legal advisor to the Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors (GM), and later other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recognized …

Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Bloom served as senior adviser to Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on the Automotive Industry and as assistant to the president for manufacturing policy (2009–2011). As senior adviser on the Auto Task Force team, Bloom helped lead the restructuring of General Motors and Chrysler LLC. Subsequently, he advised the Obama administration with policy development and strategic planning to revitalize the manufacturing sector. Bloom brought to Treasury his unique experience working with organized labor (including the United Steelworkers Union, United Auto Workers, the Teamsters, the Air Line Pilots Association), and in the investment …

Lessons Learned: Brian Stoker, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Brian Stoker served in Merrill Lynch’s structured credit division for seven years, producing and trading asset-backed securities (ABS). In 2005, Stoker moved to Citigroup as a director of ABS CDO (collateralized debt obligation) and CLO (collateralized loan obligation) structuring. After the financial crisis, Stoker was an analyst at Carlson Capital for three years. In 2011, he joined StormHarbour Securities, serving as a managing director until 2018. From 2019 to 2021, he was director of securitization at Korth Direct Mortgage. Presently, Stoker is a licensed real estate agent in Miami. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Stoker.

Lessons Learned: Chris Ricciardi, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Chris Ricciardi was a CDO pioneer who built the structured products units at CS First Boston and Merrill Lynch before moving to the asset management side. Ricciardi began his career structuring novel fixed-income securities at Prudential. At CS First Boston and Merrill, he catapulted each investment bank’s lagging unit into the top of the league tables for CDO (collateralized debt obligation) issuance. He was CEO of Cohen & Co. from 2006 to 2011, when he left to co-found investment management firm Mead Park Management. A graduate of the University of Richmond with an MBA from the Wharton School of the …

Lessons Learned: Eric Kolchinsky, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Eric Kolchinsky served as managing director of ratings for ABS CDOs (asset-backed security collateralized debt obligations) at Moody’s Investor Services from 2005 to 2007. Kolchinsky started his career in structured finance with stints at Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. He joined Moody’s in 2000 as vice president for credit. In 2007, after Kolchinsky raised questions concerning the ratings of new deals in light of subprime downgrades, Moody’s removed him from his client-facing position. Kolchinsky supervised methodology for structured finance valuations at Moody’s Analytics for two years, before Moody’s suspended him altogether in 2009. Separated from Moody’s, Kolchinsky testified before Congress …