Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

The Resolution And Collection Corporation Of Japan, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

Though the Japanese real estate and stock market bubble burst in the early 1990s, the ensuing financial crisis in Japan did not reach a systemic level until 1997, when four large financial institutions failed in a single month. Because of their heavy exposure to real estate and equity markets, Japanese banks had a nonperforming loan (NPL) problem, which was prolonged, and private sector estimates of the scale of the NPL problem differed significantly from the official estimates. In response, the Japanese government created multiple asset management companies; the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was the result of the merger of …

Kyrgyz Republic’S Debt Resolution Agency, Debra, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

In the mid-1990s, the largest state-owned banks in the Kyrgyz Republic faced insolvency and a concomitant large stock of nonperforming loans, a problem stemming from the former Soviet Union’s policy of directed credit to loss-making institutions. The government established DEBRA, a debt resolution agency and asset management company. DEBRA could liquidate or restructure a bank and take on its assets in the process, or just take on a bank’s nonperforming assets. DEBRA received the assets in exchange for government securities. Staff attempted to resolve the debt by collection, restructuring, writing off, or liquidating the assets. Officials initially established DEBRA with …

Kazakhstan’S Rehabilitation Bank, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan officials made market-oriented stabilization reforms to its previously Soviet-planned economy, including removing most price constraints, privatizing various state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and taking steps to prevent the collapse of its banking system. As part of its efforts, Kazakhstan created the Rehabilitation Bank (RB) in 1995 to absorb the large number of non-performing assets from state-owned banks while also assuming a corresponding amount of the institutions’ liabilities, essentially “shrinking their portfolios” (Implementation Completion Report 1998). The RB, established with a four-year mandate, either liquidated the debtors or required the firms to restructure. …

Swedish Amcs: Securum And Retriva, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

With the liberalization of the Swedish banking system in the 1980s, there was a rapid credit expansion, and real estate prices soared. When the Swedish economy began to weaken, real estate prices began to decline, and finance companies faced difficulties. Swedish banks were not insulated from financial pressures, and Nordbanken, a majority state-owned bank, declared large credit losses in 1990. The Swedish government’s response was initially ad hoc and targeted to specific banks, but in 1992, the government announced an open-ended guarantee of all bank liabilities. The crisis response also included a bank restructuring program and the establishment of targeted …

Czech And Slovak Federative Republic: Consolidation Bank (Kob), Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent Velvet Revolution in 1989, the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began the complex transition from a centrally controlled command economy to a market-based economy. The transition necessitated the removal of non-performing loans from state-owned banks’ balance sheets, a task assigned by the Ministry of Finance to the newly formed Consolidation Bank (Konsolidační Banka, hereafter “KOB”). Established on February 25, 1991, the KOB was specifically mandated to acquire and restructure what were known as “TOZ” loans, unsecured debt with no amortization schedules and unsustainably high interest rates. The …

Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …

Senegal Société Nationale De Recouvrement (Snr), Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

In the late 1980s, Senegal embarked on a comprehensive set of reforms to its banking sector. The reforms comprised changes to management, supervision, and lending standards after loose central bank refinancing standards had let the nonperforming loans (NPLs) caused by drought and public enterprise mismanagement linger on bank balance sheets. In the process, the country attempted to recover NPLs worth hundreds of billions of francs. Senegal closed several state-controlled banks, transferring bad assets and certain liabilities to a new asset management company, the Société Nationale de Recouvrement (SNR). The SNR’s debt recoveries would reimburse depositors in the liquidated banks and …

Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. …

Spain: Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management, Manuel León Hoyos

Journal of Financial Crises

The global oil shock in 1973-74 occurred at a time when Spain was embarking on a liberalization of its financial system that resulted in many new entrants, particularly small- and medium-sized institutions. The banking crisis that followed from 1977-85 affected 52 of the country’s 110 banks, most of them of small- and medium-sized, that comprised over 20% of bank deposits. Spain established the Deposit Guarantee Fund in November 1977 to provide limited deposit insurance, and, in March 1978, established a Banking Corporation to take control of and reorganize troubled banks. However, because the Banking Corporation lacked the legal authority to …

Lessons Learned: Zachary Taylor, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Zachary Taylor joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in January 2009 to lead the team responsible for managing and unwinding the central bank’s Maiden Lane II and III portfolios, which were acquired in connection with the intervention to assist American International Group (AIG). Taylor later took over responsibility for the Maiden Lane portfolio consisting of former Bear Stearns assets as well as the unwinding of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), another crisis-era program. All told, those portfolios amounted to more than $140 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), credit default …

Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Robert Hoyt was General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Treasury between 2006 and 2009. He oversaw legal aspects of policies implemented to manage the crisis, including the rescues of Bear Stearns, AIG, and the U.S. Auto industry, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the failure of Lehman Brothers, as well as the creation and implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP.) This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with Mr. Hoyt.

Lessons Learned: Alejandro Latorre, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

At the time of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, Alejandro Latorre was an assistant vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). He was active in the bailout of American International Group (AIG) from its inception to the end, when AIG repaid its outstanding obligations to both the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. This Lessons Learned summary is based on a Feb. 26, 2020, interview. He emphasized that the views discussed here are his own, not the views of anyone else currently or previously within the Federal Reserve System or the views of his current employer.

Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren, Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Sarah Dahlgren was the Executive Vice President and head of the Financial Institution Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the crisis and instrumental in the rescue of American International Group (AIG). This Lessons Learned summary is drawn from a March 22, 2018, interview in which she gave her take on how central bankers can prepare for future crises.

Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The trust was established in early 2009 to hold the equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock, ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.

When he was named as a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …

Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.

Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced by the commission and why its report is important. This "Lessons Learned" is based on an interview with Mr. Feldberg.

Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Gary Cohen joined the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in December 2009 to serve as its general counsel at the request of commission chairman Phil Angelides. The FCIC was a 10-member bipartisan group convened by Congress to investigate the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Cohen had a wide-ranging and ad hoc position that included advising commissioners and staffers on administrative matters and protocols. In addition, he assisted in document requests and compelling witnesses to testify and, on occasion, in conducting interviews and public hearings. He played an instrumental role in editing the commission’s final report. This “Lessons …

Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.

Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Phil Angelides chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) established by Congress in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with the purpose of understanding what precipitated the crisis so that any future crises might be averted. The 10-member bipartisan commission, known as the “Angelides Commission” after its chair, convened in September 2010. Meeting in a span of 15 months and holding 19 public hearings and interviewing more than 700 people, the commission submitted its findings in January 2011. The commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the “result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments.” The report included …

The Debt Guarantee Program Of The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (U.S. Gfc), Justin Katz

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, banks faced extreme difficulty in issuing new debt and finding affordable sources of funds due to heightened fears over counterparty solvency and liquidity risk. By the end of September, the TED spread had spiked to 464 basis points, and issuance of commercial paper fell 88%. On October 14th, to boost confidence and lower short-term financing costs, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) as part of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). Under the DGP, the FDIC guaranteed in full a limited amount of senior unsecured …

The Federal Reserve’S Financial Crisis Response E: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Securitization is a process that allows banks and other lenders to package loans and sell them as bonds called asset-backed securities (ABS), removing them from their balance sheets and immediately generating cash for new loans. ABS are an important component of the financing cycle for many types of loans to households and small businesses, including mortgages. In the fall of 2008, financial markets began experiencing disturbances as the effects of the U.S. subprime market meltdown spread. The ABS market froze decreasing the volume of new loans to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve became very concerned about the potential …

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.

Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

One of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30-day stress scenario. One area in which this incentive has already resulted in changed practices is in the market for commercial paper. Banks often provide backup liquidity facilities to the issuers of commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a maturing issue of commercial paper if they are unable to sell a new issue to …

Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …

Review Of The Promise And Peril Of Credit: What A Forgotten Legend About Jews And Finance Tells Us About The Making Of European Commercial Society, Jared Rubin

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A review of The Promise and Peril of Credit: What a Forgotten Legend about Jews and Finance Tells Us about the Making of European Commercial Society, by Francesca Trivellato, published by Princeton University Press.

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …