Corporate Finance Commons^™

Woulda, Shoulda, Coulda? The Impact Of Predictive, Prescriptive, And Prospective Expectations On Stakeholder Reactions, Yuri Mishina, Maxine Yu, David Gomulya

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

When and why might stakeholders react to firm activities in ways that might be different than, or even contradictory to, what we might expect based on the extant research? We draw on expectancy violation theory (EVT) and bring in the notion of heuristics and future-oriented expectations to examine this question, using a sample of investor reactions to earnings surprises from 2013 to 2019. We find that, in addition to comparing earnings to consensus earnings estimates, investors appear to compare the earnings surprises to the firm’s past performance and to its peers. Importantly, their expectations regarding future interactions with the firm …

Institutional Cross-Ownership Of Peer Firms And Revelatory Price Efficiency, Young Jun Cho, Holly I. Yang, Yue Zhao

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We argue that cross-ownership increases the amount of private information in stock price, enhancing the ability of stock price to provide feedback to managers. Consistent with this argument, we find greater cross-ownership heightens a firm’s investment-q sensitivity. This effect is stronger for firms with a lower propensity for voluntary disclosure and for firms whose managers hold less private information. Furthermore, we find that cross-ownership is negatively associated with the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its peers’ stock prices. Additionally, cross-ownership has a stronger impact on the investment-q sensitivity when measured among investors who trade more actively the firm’s shares. …

Institutional Dual-Holders And Corporate Disclosures: A Natural Experiment, Lin Cheng, Qiang Cheng, Liwei Weng, Mark Yuzhi Yan

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines the impact of the presence of institutional dual-holders, whose portfolios hold both loans and equity securities of the same firms, on those firms' voluntary disclosures. Using mergers between institutional shareholders and lenders to the same firms as exogenous shocks to identify firms with institutional dual-holders that have high relative equity ownership, we document that such firms are less likely to provide management forecasts and disclose fewer voluntary 8-K items. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the reduction in voluntary disclosures is more pronounced when institutional dual-holders have higher board representation and when firms have lower litigation risk. …

How Do Institutional Investors Facilitate Reporting Comparability? Evidence From Common Institutional Ownership In The United States, Xuanbo Li, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang, Kaitang Zhou

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine how common institutional investors (CIIs) facilitate the financial reporting comparability (FRC) of US firms. Common ownership increases FRC of firms that are directly owned by CIIs (via a direct effect) and has positive spillover effects on other firms in the same industry. We find spillover effects in two types of firms: (1) those that are commonly owned by different institutional investors but are connected through common firms, and (2) those that do not have any common ownership. These results suggest that the effect of common ownership goes beyond commonly owned firms and extends to non-commonly owned firms. Furthermore, …

Institutional Cross-Ownership Of Peer Firms And Revelatory Price Efficiency, Young Jun Cho, Holly I. Yang, Yue Zhao

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We argue that cross-ownership increases the amount of private information in stock price, enhancing the ability of stock price to provide feedback to managers. Consistent with this argument, we find greater cross-ownership heightens a firm’s investment-q sensitivity. This effect is stronger for firms with a lower propensity for voluntary disclosure and for firms whose managers hold less private information. Furthermore, we find that cross-ownership is negatively associated with the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its peers’ stock prices. Additionally, cross-ownership has a stronger impact on the investment-q sensitivity when measured among investors who trade more actively the …

Solving The Proxy Advisory Problem: Minimum Regulation For Maximum Competition, Dominic P. Keilty

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The proxy advisory industry is often criticized on two primary accounts: the lack of accountability for informational accuracy in the development of voting standards and the conflicts of interest faced by advisors when they make proxy voting recommendations on issuers to which they have previously provided corporate governance consulting services. The industry has also been accused of having “anemic” levels of competition, since only two advisors command a vast majority of the market share. While much has been written about curtailing the prevalence and effects of proxy advisor conflicts of interest through increased regulation, the regulatory route toward increased informational …

Investment Decisions And Trading Behavior Of Institutional And Retail Investors, Antonia Kirilova

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

This dissertation consists of three studies in the areas of empirical asset pricing, market microstructure, and behavioral finance. I study the trading behavior and portfolio choices of institutions and retail investors in the equity and derivatives markets. Examining the ways in which different market participants make investment decisions allows us to understand their role in shaping financial market dynamics. This is important in order to know how to structure markets for enhanced market efficiency, and to protect less sophisticated investors through better policies and regulations. Although there is a considerable amount of literature disputing the ability of retail investors and …

The Giant Shadow Of Corporate Gadflies, Kobi Kastiel, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Modern-day shareholders influence corporate America more than ever before. From demanding greater accountability of executives to lobbying for a variety of social and environmental policies, shareholders today have the power to alter how American companies are run. Amazingly, a small group of individual shareholders wields unprecedented power to set corporate agendas and stands at the epicenter of our contemporary corporate governance ecosystem. In fact, the power of these individuals, known as “corporate gadflies,” continues to rise.

Corporate gadflies present a puzzling reality. Although public corporations in the United States are increasingly owned by large institutional investors, much of their corporate …

The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.

Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of future litigation and experience more negative market reactions upon such litigation filings. These firms exhibit other unfavorable governance outcomes including poorer acquisitions and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find suggestive evidence that ineffective monitoring may be a result of higher operational risk.

The Impact Of Sustainability Reporting On Firm Profitability, Lancee L. Whetman

Undergraduate Economic Review

Using a hand-collected representative sample of 95 publicly traded American firms from various sectors in 2015-2016, I examine how corporate sustainability reporting affects the financial performance of firms. I find a positive and significant effect of sustainability reporting on a firm’s return on equity, return on assets, and profit margin in the subsequent year. However, this relationship is found only for firms with low institutional ownership. These results suggest that sustainability reporting would be a worthwhile use of corporate resources for this subset of firms. Further, corporate sustainability reporting is shown to be an effective substitute for monitoring by institutional …

Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors, Robin Miller

Sustainability and Social Justice

One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the companies in which they invest. This voting right is seen as one of the primary means of exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). Only 28 percent of individual investors vote in corporate elections compared with 91 percent of institutional investors. Informed voting decisions at corporate elections can be very information intensive, and theories of rational apathy and the free rider problem may explain a lack of participation from individual investors.

Many shareholders cannot attend annual corporate meetings, so they …

Local Business Cycles And Local Liquidity, Gennaro Bernile, George Korniotis, Alok Kumar, Qin Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This study examines whether state-level economic conditions affect the liquidity of local firms. We find that liquidity levels of local stocks are higher (lower) when the local economy has performed well (poorly). This relation is stronger when local financing constraints are more binding, the local information environment is more opaque, and local institutional ownership levels and trading intensity are higher. Overall the evidence supports the notion that the geographical segmentation of U.S. capital markets generates predictable patterns in local liquidity.

Institutional Trading During A Wave Of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?, Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006-2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence …

Essays On The Impact Of Institutional Investors On Firms' Liquidity And Payout Policy, Munira Ismail

LSU New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We can find ample evidences in existing literature which show that institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint …

Two Essays In Finance: Analyzing The Value Of Cash To U.S. And Non-U.S. Firms And Institutional Trading In Stock Index Futures, Li Xu

LSU New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

In the first chapter, we analyze the role of market development, risk premium, and transparency as factors influencing the value of cash in firms listed as American Depository Receipts. Based on the method by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002), our primary results are as follows. The market value of cash is greater on average for ADR firms than for U.S. firms, and within the ADR sample the value of cash is greater for firms based in less developed countries after 2007 financial crisis but not before. Together, the results suggest that the market development is especially important during more volatile periods. …

Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with …

Institutional Investors And The Informational Efficiency Of Prices, Ekkehart Boehmer, Eric K. Kelley

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Using a broad panel of NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2004, we study the relation between institutional shareholdings and the relative informational efficiency of prices, measured as deviations from a random walk. Stocks with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently, and we show that variation in liquidity does not drive this result. One mechanism through which prices become more efficient is institutional trading activity, even when institutions trade passively. But efficiency is also directly related to institutional holdings, even after controlling for institutional trading, analyst coverage, short selling, variation in liquidity, and firm characteristics.

The Long-Term Effects Of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, And Ownership Structure On Valuation, Michael R. King, Dan Segal

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We show that investor recognition and bonding associated with a U.S. cross-listing are distinct effects using a sample of Canadian firms. In contrast to the post-listing decline documented in the literature, we find that cross-listed firms with a single class of shares enjoy a permanent increase in valuation if they attract and maintain investor recognition over time. Valuations of firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base return to pre-listing levels within two years. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings, consistent with firm-level bonding.

The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.

Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …

Firm Ownership Structure And Intellectual Capital Disclosures, Stephen Firer, S. M. Williamson

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the association between three ownership structure characteristics and voluntary intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practices. Data for this study is hand collected from the 2000 annual reports of 390 Singapore publicly traded firms. Empirical results indicate Singapore publicly traded firms more closely owned were less likely to voluntarily disclose IC related information than were those where executive directors had smaller holdings in the entity. Finally, findings indicate government linked corporations (GLCs) will likely make more voluntary IC disclosures than non-GLCs. Overall, this study makes several unique contributions to the literature. First, the …

Ownership Structure, Investment Behaviour And Firm Performance In Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Eric Gedajlovic, Toru Yoshikawa, Motomi Hashimoto

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm' s financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the …

How Do Institutional Investors Trade, Paul G. J. O'Connell, Melvyn Teo

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Using a novel and detailed custody trades dataset, this paper analyzes the trading behavior of institutions. Extant studies have examined the effects of past performance on trading by retail investors, day traders, and futures floor traders. Yet very little work has been done on institutions. We find that unlike other investors, institutions take on more risk following an increase in net profit and loss. However, the responses to a gain and loss are highly asymmetric. Institutions aggressively reduce risk in the wake of losses, but only mildly increase risk in the wake of gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced for …

Institutional Investors And Corporate Governance, Jinesh Panchali

IIMB Management Review

The challenge of promoting enterprise and accountability is common to all markets. What degree of freedom is right for corporate boards and how to make them accountable is a major concern in the realm of corporate governance. Even where market forces are expected to take care of the utilisation of available resources, there has to be a system which ensures that owners of these resources are made accountable for their use in the larger interests of the economy. This paper examines the rationale for institutional investors’1 activism in general and for the Indian capital market in particular, discusses empirical evidences …