Corporate Finance Commons^™

The Quality Of Corporate Governance And The Length It Takes To Remove Apoor Performing Ceo. Does Performance Of The Former Firm Affect A Ceo's Ability To Find An Identical With A Subsequent Firm?, Huong Nguyen

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

Abstract 1:

In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.

Abstract 2:

Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job …

Two Essays In Financial Economics, Jatin Ravikant Malhotra

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between hedging and diversification effects on CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. The REIT industry is suitable for this investigation for various reasons; primarily being that the REIT sample represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and hedging on compensations. I find a positive and significant relationship between the interaction variable which reflects the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. This is consistent with the notion that managers are in a better position to manage firm risk …

Corporate Governance, Performance And Risk-Taking In The U.S. Banking Industry, Jennifer Osullivan

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin’s Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net charge-offs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive …

Two Essays In Islamic Finance And Investment, Hesham J. Merdad

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

The main purpose of this dissertation is to lessen the gap in the Islamic finance and investment literature by providing new answers to the most vital question raised in that literature: Is the adherence to the Shariah law associated with at any cost?

The first chapter provides a primer on Islamic finance. It discusses several restrictions and necessary adaptations that must be made to have a Shariah-compliant product. The takeaway is that Shariah law mandates is related to fundamentals and, thus has a direct effect on the risk-return profile of all sorts of different products. This is referred to as …

Two Essays: “Does Corporate Governance Affect The Adjustment Speed Towards Target Capital Structure?” And “Do Option Traders On Reits And Non-Reits React Differently To New Information?”, Li-Kai Liao

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

The first chapter investigates how corporate governance influences firms’ capital structure behavior. Based on the premise that costs associated with deviations from the target capital structure are positively correlated to the extent of deviation, we hypothesize that the initial deviation from the target will be shorter for a firm with good corporate governance than for a firm with poor corporate governance. We also hypothesize that the former group will employ a higher speed of adjustment towards target than the latter group due primarily to the following reasons. First, a firm with well-placed governance system will adjust at a faster rate …

Analyzing Earnings Management For Cross-Listed Firms And Interaction Between Two Futures Exchanges, Chia-Sheng Chen

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

The first essay examines the impact of investor protection, market monitoring, and liquidity on the firm-level and country-level earnings management using a sample of 432 firms from 34 countries cross-listed in the U.S. The major findings are as follows: First, cross-listed firms from countries with strong legal system, strong outside investor rights, more institutional investors, and higher financial transparency are less likely to engage in earnings management. In addition, in countries with strong investor protection or market monitoring, the level of earnings management is more pronounced for illiquid firms as compared to liquid firms. Second, cross-listed firms following IFRS have …