Business Intelligence Commons^™

Corporations’ First Amendment Rights And Algorithmic Cocoons, Sol Murgui Orsucci

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Note examines how corporate First Amendment doctrine applies to algorithmic systems that curate commercial information and public discourse across online platforms. Courts have increasingly treated ranking, recommendation, and moderation practices as exercises of protected editorial judgment. At the same time, the Court has justified protection for corporate speech in part by reference to listener-centered interests in access to information and competitive comparison. This Note argues that the interaction between these doctrinal strands and contemporary algorithmic intermediation reveals a structural tension. Data-driven optimization can generate individualized informational environments—what this Note terms “algorithmic cocoons”—in which users encounter content, offers, and prices …

The Federal Reserve’S Fight Against Covid-19: A Study Of The Corporate Bond Intervention, Noah Seilgson

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Reserve (Fed) embarked on an unprecedented mission to stabilize the U.S. economy as businesses shut down. One emergency Fed facility, the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF), was used to purchase corporate bonds and corporate bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the secondary market. This extraordinary measure, which injected liquidity into the corporate bond market, aimed to mitigate economic fallout for large companies. Purchasing corporate bonds marked a departure from previous Federal Reserve interventions, but the statutory authority was the same as had been used in past crises: Section 13(3) of the Federal …

Company Districts, C.J. Suglia

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Special districts that are owned or controlled by private entities and act almost uniformly like a company town can be dubbed a “company district.” These special districts, similar to historical company towns, have autonomy over the districts, control the local government, and only have to answer to the state government. Historical company towns like Pullman, Illinois and Hershey, Pennsylvania had almost canonical command over the land within their boundaries. Company districts operate their business similar to a company town—in a city that the private entity controls, but do not have employees living on-site. Company districts benefit by being immune to …

Algorithms In Finance: Balancing First Amendment Protections And Regulation, Yusraa Tadj

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

As algorithms become a function of decision-making in the financial sector, policymakers, the judiciary, and academics grapple with regulatory questions. With the increased reliance on algorithms in finance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a rule to mitigate potential conflicts of interest that can arise out of financial firms using algorithms. Algorithm users, including financial firms, are finding novel ways to protect algorithm use, such as by offering them First Amendment protections.

This Note considers to what extent algorithms can be considered protected speech amidst the complexity of algorithms and relationship within the financial sector. The Note argues that …

Consumer Financial Data And Non-Horizontal Mergers, Linda Jeng, Jon Frost, Elisabeth Noble, Chris Brummer

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Article explores the potential competitive implications of non-horizontal mergers where they involve extensive consumer data, including consumer financial data. As data become increasingly central to firm strategy, mergers between data-rich firms, while potentially leading to positive outcomes, can also create market power in ways not entirely accounted for by traditional antitrust theory. The Article considers some of these implications. It introduces new metrics for valuing data sets held by merging firms that could help competition authorities evaluate market impacts more effectively. The Article then suggests potential tools to mitigate anti-competitive effects of data-rich mergers. It advocates for further research …

Is A Ban On Non-Competes Supported By Empirical Evidence?, Sarah Oh Lam, Thomas Lenard, Scott Wallsten

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed a rule to declare virtually all non-compete agreements unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act and therefore, illegal. However, the empirical literature on non-compete agreements cited by the FTC in its Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) shows mixed results on earnings, job creation, firm formation, entrepreneurship, training, investment, and firm value. Evidence in other current studies also does not support an economy-wide ban. The FTC concludes that the proposed rule would yield net benefits even though by its own admission it lacks the information necessary to conduct a …

Outsourcing Voting To Ai: Can Chatgpt Advise Index Funds On Proxy Voting Decisions?, Chen Wang

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Released in November 2022, Chat Generative Pre-training Transformer (“ChatGPT”), has risen rapidly to prominence, and its versatile capabilities have already been shown in a variety of fields. Due to ChatGPT’s advanced features, such as extensive pre-training on diverse data, strong generalization ability, fine-tuning capabilities, and improved reasoning, the use of AI in the legal industry could experience a significant transformation. Since small passive funds with low-cost business models generally lack the financial resources to make informed proxy voting decisions that align with their shareholders’ interests, this Article considers the use of ChatGPT to assist small investment funds, particularly small passive …

Loophole Entrepreneurship, Brian M. Sirman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

All entrepreneurs seek favorable legal or regulatory treatment for their businesses. Sometimes this leads an entrepreneur to build a business within a gap in the law—a loophole. In so doing, these “loophole entrepreneurs” may avoid steep regulatory compliance costs that otherwise would beset (or perhaps prohibit) their businesses, thereby gaining advantages over competitors. Despite these benefits, loophole entrepreneurship is fraught with risks. Loopholes, by nature, are fragile, and their contours are often uncertain. Moreover, the stigma of “exploiting a loophole” (which connotes unfairness or deception) can provoke ill will among competitors, policymakers, and the public.

The ranks of loophole entrepreneurs …

Gamestopped: How Robinhood’S Gamestop Trading Halt Reveals The Complexities Of Retail Investor Protection, Neal F. Newman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Should brokers have the unfettered right to restrict investor trading? GameStop, a brick-and-mortar video game retailer, had been experiencing declining revenues since 2016. However, GameStop saw its share price climb almost 1000 percent in the span of a one- week period from January 21, 2021 to January 27, 2021 due to retail investors buying significant amounts of GameStop shares during that period. Melvin Capital, a hedge fund, ended up losing billions as they were betting that GameStop shares would lose value instead of increase—a practice referred to as short selling. On January 28, 2021, brokers inexplicably halted trading on GameStop …

The Solution To Shadow Trading Is Not Found In Current Insider Trading Law: A Proposed Amendment To Rule 10b5-2, Jamel Gross-Cassel

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Shadow trading is a lucrative way to exploit a loophole in insider trading law. Insiders abuse this loophole to make six-figure profits and escape liability when done at the right companies. Those who shadow trade use material, nonpublic information to trade not in the securities of their own company, which would be illegal, but in the securities of a closely related company where the information is just as impactful. Efforts to close this loophole rely on the individual insider trading policies of the involved companies. These policies vary in language, making liability for shadow trading dependent on specific language or …

Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Are equity markets vulnerable to a sudden collapse if the traders who account for about half of the volume have no regulatory obligations to stabilize prices? After the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, policymakers have resoundingly answered this question in the affirmative. During the worst of the crash, some of the so-called high-frequency trading firms that dominate equity markets stopped trading and prices collapsed, momentarily wiping out almost $1 trillion in market value. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering whether high-frequency trading firms should be required to act as the traders of last resort. This …