Business Commons^™

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on proposed changes to how the energy clearing price is calculated. For ISO New England.

Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.

Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Peter Cramton

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …

Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.

Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Review Of The Reserves And Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience In The First Four Months, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I review the performance of the operating reserves and the operable capability markets in New England. The review covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to August 31, 1999. The review is based on my knowledge of the market rules and their implementation by the ISO, and the market data during this period, including bidding, operating, and settlement information. In the review, I (1) identify the potential market flaws with these markets, (2) look at the performance of the markets to see if the potential problems have materialized, (3) evaluate the ISO's short-term remedies for these market …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Summary of review of reserves and operable capability markets. For ISO New England.

The Role Of The Iso In U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review Of Restructuring In California And Pjm, Peter Cramton, Lisa Cameron

Peter Cramton

Several regions of the U.S. have sought to restructure the electric power industry by separating the potentially competitive generation sector from the natural monopoly functions of electricity transmission and distribution. Under this restructuring scheme, a central authority, which we will refer to as the independent system operator (ISO), is given control over both the transmission system and the spot market for electricity. The ISO's role in managing the spot market is relatively uncontroversial. This is because the spot market takes place in real time and requires continuous physical adjustments to electricity supply and demand subject to complex constraints, such as …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Reply to comments on review of rules. For ISO New England.

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

For ISO New England.

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major recommendations:

* Switch to a multi-settlement system.

* Introduce demand-side bidding.

* Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export interfaces.

* Fix the pricing …

Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.

Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.