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Full-Text Articles in Business

Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo Aug 2017

Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.


Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo Aug 2017

Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.


Essays On Corporate Finance, Sili Zhou Jun 2017

Essays On Corporate Finance, Sili Zhou

Dissertations and Theses Collection

Economic, Policy uncertainty under political opaqueness imposes great impact in the capital market. I construct ex ante cross-section of firm sensitivity to China Economic Policy Uncertainty (CEPU) index from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013). This measure of policy sensitivity is significantly negatively predictive of a firm’s market value and Tobin’s Q. Cross sectional tests show that the negative effects are stronger in SOEs= for firms with higher agency problems, and for firms operating in market with lower degree of competition or market disciplining. The evidence suggests that high level of policy influence causes significant value destruction in the capital market.