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Full-Text Articles in Business
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae Bum Kim
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the level of stock-based compensation and the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque information environment, where the marginal benefits of additional disclosures are …
The Role Of Deferred Pay In Retaining Managerial Talent, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Sheng Huang, Johan Maharjan
The Role Of Deferred Pay In Retaining Managerial Talent, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Sheng Huang, Johan Maharjan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect …