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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science
Early Continental Philosophy Of Science, Babette Babich
Early Continental Philosophy Of Science, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
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Continental Philosophy Of Science: Mach, Duhem, And Bachelard, Babette Babich
Continental Philosophy Of Science: Mach, Duhem, And Bachelard, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
As representatives of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century empiricism and positivism, the particular names Ernst Mach (1838–1916), Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) have of course and as already noted much more than a merely historical significance. In analytic philosophy of science, an ongoing tradition of reinterpretations of their work continues to influence the current linguistic or theoretical crisis in analytic philosophy and semiotics - semantics of scientific theory (Duhem not only as represented by W.V.O.Quine but also Stanley Jaki) as well as, on the other hand, the current emphasis on experiment representing the counter-absolutist turn to the history (and …
Heidegger Circle Conference 2001 - Proceedings, Babette Babich
Heidegger Circle Conference 2001 - Proceedings, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
Heidegger on Science and Technology. Proceedings of the 35th annual meeting of the North American Heidegger Conference at Fordham University: May, 2001. Convenor: Babette Babich
Hermeneutics Of Experimental Science In The Context Of The Life-World, Patrick A. Heelan
Hermeneutics Of Experimental Science In The Context Of The Life-World, Patrick A. Heelan
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
Science is distinguished as an element of our total contemporary culture, or “historical science,” from science as the professional business of natural scientists, or “experimental science.” Phenomenology has always taken a very critical stance against certain defects or biases -- objectivism, scientism, technicism -- it has found in historical science. It is my purpose to show that these defects and biases, associated historically with physical science, are not necessary parts of physical science, and consequently, that physics, especially experimental physics, has all of those hermeneutical, ontological, historical and dialectical dimensions negated by historical science. The notion of dialectic is given …