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Articles 1 - 30 of 454
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Multiple Insights Into Affective Sentience, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Multiple Insights Into Affective Sentience, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
We discuss some of the many valuable insights into affective sentience from Birch’s The Edge of Sentience, such as its eight criteria for determining which entities have sentience (e.g., emotions) and its insights into the difficulty of testing whether an Artificial Intelligence system has attained sentience. We add our own perspectives on why the eight criteria are valid, on the difficulty of using behavioral trade-offs to determine whether an animal has sentience, and why evolutionary theory says consciousness is not an epiphenomenon.
Could 'Real Existing Ai' Be Sentient?, Tim Crane
Could 'Real Existing Ai' Be Sentient?, Tim Crane
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch is rightly sceptical about the idea that today’s AI machines (e.g. LLMs) are candidates for sentience. Nonetheless, he gives three reasons for taking the future possibility of AI sentience seriously. I dispute them all. Birch fails to distinguish the very idea of an artificial mind from computational AI (what I call ‘Real Existing AI’); he does not adequately distinguish a simulation from a replica or copy; and he fails to acknowledge that the appeal to computational functionalism in this context is straightforwardly question-begging.
Artificial Sentience: From Computational Functionalism To Behaviourism?, Wanja Wiese
Artificial Sentience: From Computational Functionalism To Behaviourism?, Wanja Wiese
Animal Sentience
I critically examine Jonathan Birch’s account of how brain emulations might create artificial sentience candidates, arguing that his account risks collapsing into a behaviourist account, unless the specific computational processes realised by such emulations are carefully considered. Drawing on examples from computational neuroscience, I show that similar behaviours can arise from vastly different computational processes, thereby undermining the suggestion to focus on behaviourial profiles to determine whether a brain emulation of a sentience candidate is itself a sentience candidate.
Navigating The Edge Of Sentience Without A Scientific Meta-Consensus, Daniel West
Navigating The Edge Of Sentience Without A Scientific Meta-Consensus, Daniel West
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience (2024, 2025), Birch develops a precautionary framework for crafting public policies about potentially sentient systems. Underlying this framework is a commitment to the democratic principle that the public should authorize all significant moral judgments that arise during the policymaking process. In this commentary, I suggest that Birch’s framework fails to live up to this commitment by requiring scientists without public accountability to make consequential moral judgments. I suggest a friendly amendment to Birch’s framework by replacing the idea of a scientific meta-consensus with the method of formal expert elicitation, a well-tested method of gathering expert …
From Insect Cognition To Sentience: Exploring The Edge, Catherine Macri, Martin Giurfa
From Insect Cognition To Sentience: Exploring The Edge, Catherine Macri, Martin Giurfa
Animal Sentience
What does The Edge of Sentience tell us about insect sentience and consciousness? In this commentary, we reflect on Jonathan Birch’s framework for defining and scientifically investigating sentience in animals. We discuss the methodological challenges of studying subjective experience in evolutionary distant species, and consider trace conditioning, affective states, and neural architectures as potential windows into consciousness in insects. We argue that uncertainty, whether concerning definitions or methodology, should not prevent experimental investigation; rather it should motivate new approaches and experimental designs for exploring the diversity of conscious experience.
Self-Maintenance And The Evidence For Artificial Sentience, Mads J. Hansen, Christoffer Lundbak Olesen
Self-Maintenance And The Evidence For Artificial Sentience, Mads J. Hansen, Christoffer Lundbak Olesen
Animal Sentience
Birch aims to remain neutral about whether life is necessary for sentience. We argue that life can be given a role while maintaining neutrality. Markers of sentience have been identified in living systems, where some contribute to the system's self-maintenance. When such a marker is reproduced in an artificial system that is not self-maintaining it is not clear that it is as reliable as in living systems.
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Sentience evolved to allow organisms to move through their environment avoiding harms and achieving benefits. Sentience did not evolve from computation. It evolved from valenced feelings. AI (even robots) are not embodied and are not the kind of thing that needs to be sentient. There is no way to get from computations to feelings. They are qualitatively different things. We should avoid being lulled into thinking that an inanimate object designed to engage our propensity for anthropomorphism, like AI, is actually a mind.
Look Out For Our Kind, Christof Koch
Look Out For Our Kind, Christof Koch
Animal Sentience
Strongly supportive overall of Birch’s broad tent Sentience Project, I offer an alternative dyadic, single-class, two-stage process based on estimating the probability for sentience, and the associated confidence, for any individual or taxonomic group. I criticize Birch’s narrow computational framework when addressing the question of algorithmic sentience; there are alternative approaches.
Walking The Tightrope: The Precautionary Dilemma Of Neutrality And Guidance, Farhan Lakhany
Walking The Tightrope: The Precautionary Dilemma Of Neutrality And Guidance, Farhan Lakhany
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch’s The Edge of Sentience promises a precautionary framework that guides ethical action without taking sides in the disputed metaphysics of consciousness. I argue that it cannot do both. Birch admits “biopsychism” (that all living organisms are conscious) into his "zone of reasonable disagreement," yet his operational criteria exclude plants and unicellular organisms by requiring evidence that biopsychism holds to be irrelevant. This leaves a dilemma. Keeping the “broad” standard preserves neutrality but extends candidacy to all life, guiding nothing; restricting to scientific evidence guides action but is itself the theoretical commitment the framework was meant to avoid.
Animal Ethics And The Lowest Common Denominator, John O. Adenitire
Animal Ethics And The Lowest Common Denominator, John O. Adenitire
Animal Sentience
This commentary assesses the pragmatic framework proposed in Jonathan Birch’s The Edge of Sentience (2024). Celebrating the book's exceptional clarity, scientific rigor, and profound real-world impact on UK legislation, I nevertheless have some questions about the method by which Birch arrives at his policy recommendations for animal protection. In seeking an overlapping consensus between deeply divergent ethical and credal viewpoints, the framework risks defaulting to a minimalist, lowest-common-denominator standard of protection for animals. Birch also risks drawing the standard even lower by including serious academic positions in animal ethics that deny moral status for animals altogether. A rights-based approach offers …
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience, Jonathan Birch (2024) provides a thought-provoking synthesis of current perspectives on animal (and artificial) sentience. He addresses the question from conceptual, ethical, regulatory and empirical viewpoints. Here we focus on some of the scientific issues raised, including defining and operationalising the concept of sentience and the implications for policy and regulation. Despite unresolved conceptual challenges, the book makes a compelling case for the continued scientific investigation of animal sentience.
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
Animal Sentience
Birch’s book is a remarkable exploration of the nature of sentience, its moral salience, evidence for its presence, and how to arrive at humane policies regarding our treatment of human beings, animals, brain organoids, and AI systems of uncertain sentience. Although Birch endorses the view that sentience is of fundamental moral importance, he endeavors to remain neutral among reasonable moral views and work out how to navigate through uncertainty—both ethical and epistemological—to arrive at defensible policies. While making common cause with Birch’s project, my own recent book advances a developed case in favor of the “sentientism” Birch endorses.
Artificial Sentience: The Other Side Of The Story, Amanda Sharkey
Artificial Sentience: The Other Side Of The Story, Amanda Sharkey
Animal Sentience
There is another side to the story of the account of artificial sentience — one that makes the possibility of artificial sentience unlikely: the fundamental difference between living bodies and artificial systems. Sentience occurs in strongly embodied, living entities, and not in disembodied artificial systems, nor in robots. The appearance of sentience is exacerbated by deceptive behaviour and anthropomorphism. The risks of keeping an open mind about the required underlying substrate are in wasted efforts to protect systems that cannot suffer, and in placing inappropriate trust in their abilities.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
Animal Sentience
Who is conscious and how do we know? Complexity in behavior and cognition is certainly a clue that cannot be ignored in identifying this trait, and as Mather’s target article shows, it is hard not to imagine consciousness arising in cephalopods. But how complex is complex? An alternative may be gleaned from the fact that all living things rely on negative feedback to navigate their worlds, and this requires all sentient beings knowing what is to be stabilized in reflection to themselves. If so, consciousness is a universal trait.
Cephalopod Consciousness: Asking The Right Questions, Gordon Burghardt
Cephalopod Consciousness: Asking The Right Questions, Gordon Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Jennifer Mather has provided a comprehensive and fascinating overview of the various cognitive accomplishments of cephalopods and their sensory, behavioral, and neurophysiological attributes. The advances in our understanding of a clade that has been separated from vertebrate evolution by well over half a billion years is a testament to advances in both methodology and the questions we now feel free to address. Mather embeds her review in the issue of consciousness, which is certainly a perennial issue in mental evolution, going back to Romanes and earlier. I argue that the term “consciousness” has such a checkered history and is used …
Donald Griffin, Cognitive Ethology, And Animal Life Histories, Walter Veit
Donald Griffin, Cognitive Ethology, And Animal Life Histories, Walter Veit
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau offers a stellar investigative biography of Donald Redfield Griffin and his influence on the science and philosophy of animal minds. This commentary focuses on his aim to study animal minds through an ethological lens—that is, by examining the evolved, adaptive functions of mental capacities and consciousness in natural environments, rather than confining research to controlled laboratory settings. I argue that, far from being romantic, this approach can be firmly grounded in modern life history theory.
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We often face grave practical decisions that seem to hinge on whether a system is sentient. This family of cases includes invertebrate animals, people who are unresponsive after brain injury, fetuses, neural organoids, and now AI technologies. We must decide what to do despite ongoing disagreement about the nature of sentience. In our state of uncertainty, we should pragmatically transform the question from “Is it sentient?” to “Is it a sentience candidate, an investigation priority, or neither?”. When a system is a sentience candidate, it is negligent to fail to consider precautions. We should instead evaluate precautions for their proportionality …
Griffin's Slow Burn Revolution In Philosophy And Comparative Cognition, Kristin Andrews
Griffin's Slow Burn Revolution In Philosophy And Comparative Cognition, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
Ristau presents Griffin as launching a scientific revolution supported by philosophical insights. This commentary focuses on two points: Griffin as a scientific revolutionary, although the cognitive ethology revolution is not yet complete; and on the immense influence Griffin had, and continues to have, on philosophy.
What Is It Like To Be A Diplomat? Reflections On Donald Griffin And Emotion, Oliver H. Turnbull
What Is It Like To Be A Diplomat? Reflections On Donald Griffin And Emotion, Oliver H. Turnbull
Animal Sentience
This commentary addresses three aspects of Donald Griffin’s work: (1) his thoughts beyond cognition, on emotion; (2) his views on the earliest origins of mind, including primitive forms of consciousness; and (3) his diplomatic use of memorable phrases to facilitate change.
Can Animal Consciousness Be Resolved Scientifically?, Yoram Gutfreund
Can Animal Consciousness Be Resolved Scientifically?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau's biography of Donald Griffin is a comprehensive work that sheds light on a seminal chapter in the history of ethology—the ambitious attempt to establish a research field dedicated to animal consciousness. Although Donald Griffin's endeavor ultimately fell short of its revolutionary goals, it catalyzed significant progress in understanding evolution and mechanisms of animal cognition.
Beyond Human Perception: The Remarkable Science Of Donald R. Griffin, Gareth Jones
Beyond Human Perception: The Remarkable Science Of Donald R. Griffin, Gareth Jones
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau shows how Donald Griffin’s revolutionary science sometimes progressed from ridicule, to opposition, to being self-evident. Griffin’s work involved phenomena beyond human perception, making it sometimes difficult for others to fathom. His work on ultrasonic echolocation, navigation and animal cognition has shifted established paradigms. His ‘zoomorphic’ approach provides a realistic framework for understanding how other animals perceive the world.
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Brock Fenton
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Brock Fenton
Animal Sentience
I share some reflections on a sabbatical with Donald Griffin a half-century ago, with fieldwork on bats and echolocating swiftlets in Australia and our discussions of animal behavior and consciousness. Griffin's influence has been vast, from recent advances in bat research, including learning, navigation, and longevity, to his enduring legacy as a pioneer in animal cognition.
Objective Bat Phenomenology, Thomas Nagel
Objective Bat Phenomenology, Thomas Nagel
Animal Sentience
Our discussions prompted Donald Griffin to campaign for the recognition of animal consciousness as a subject for scientific investigation. Ristau shows how much has since been discovered about the experiences of bats and other creatures, by Griffin and others, in spite of the limits to full knowledge imposed by our biological differences. But Ristau seriously misrepresents me as holding that we can know nothing about what it is like to be a bat, whereas these results are precisely of the kind I envisioned in proposing an “objective phenomenology.”
To Be Conscious Or Not To Be, Bjørn Grinde
To Be Conscious Or Not To Be, Bjørn Grinde
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau has done a fine job summarizing the work and life of the zoologist Donald Griffin. Most scientists now accept the existence of animal sentience, but identifying which species possess consciousness remains controversial. Griffin defined consciousness as "the subjective state of feeling or thinking about objects and events.” Nonconscious processes are faster and more energy-efficient, however, and often drive behavior. Consciousness probably evolved for complex decision-making, shaped by evolutionary continuity, with feelings as a common currency for evaluating outcomes. Its survival advantage may be limited, and its presence across species varies depending on evolutionary trajectories.
Communication In Noise Is The Window On Cognition, R. Haven Wiley
Communication In Noise Is The Window On Cognition, R. Haven Wiley
Animal Sentience
As Griffin surmised, communication is the window on cognition, but as shown here, only if it is noisy. This commentary is an invitation to consider the full implications of the evolution of noisy communication. A combination of Information Theory, Signal Detection Theory, and Natural Selection, in a unified theory of the evolution of communication, reveals that noise is inevitable. All organisms are thus decision makers. Perception, thought, freedom of decision, self-awareness, metabolism, and natural selection all share the consequences of signals in noise. A full understanding of each requires attention to the errors of receivers. Griffin’s hunch is correct with …
Attempting To Answer The Question Of Animal Awareness, Alexandra Horowitz
Attempting To Answer The Question Of Animal Awareness, Alexandra Horowitz
Animal Sentience
It was as a graduate student that I first encountered the work of both Donald Griffin and Carolyn Ristau. Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness (1976) and Animal Minds (2001) helped a budding animal-minds researcher appreciate both the possibilities of studying non-human animal consciousness and the struggle that such an undertaking would face. Now Ristau's (2024a,b) timely biography helps explain how Griffin became the figure in animal cognition that he is.
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his arguments and supporting evidence for animal consciousness as well as his later research. Griffin considered the inhibiting assumptions made by scientists, including Cartesian views, the misunderstanding of innate behaviors, prejudice against lower animals, concern with violations of parsimony, and the assertions of the …
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Animal Sentience
Research on the behaviour of animals in zoos has been conducted for decades, and observations have provided information that has improved the psychological and social well-being of animals. However, research on fishes in zoos and aquariums seems to be lacking. Here, we assess the current state of research on fishes in zoos and aquariums by surveying the peer-reviewed literature. Our assessment differs from previous surveys in that we examine the taxonomic classes Chondrichthyes (sharks and rays) and Osteichthyes (bony fishes) separately. Our survey finds that bony fishes have been drastically underrepresented in zoo journals, more drastically than chondrichthyans, revealing an …
Precommentary: Animal Personality Needs Animal Sentience, Ralph Adolphs, Yue Xu
Precommentary: Animal Personality Needs Animal Sentience, Ralph Adolphs, Yue Xu
Animal Sentience
We are grateful to Owens, Bryja & Bekoff (2024) for their important discussion of individual differences in animals, emphasizing the role of personality in conservation, wildlife research, and wellbeing. But their emphasis also raises new challenges: How should we conceive of personality in nonhuman species? what modern tools could be leveraged to best measure it? and, perhaps most important of all: how can we ensure that the conscious experience of animals — their capacity for wellbeing and for suffering — is not forgotten along the way? We touch on each of these challenges in this invited Precommentary in the hope …
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Sentience
Owens et al (2024) discuss how knowledge of both animal personality and sentience in target populations can be leveraged to enhance wildlife conservation programmes. In this commentary I expand on the distinction between these two concepts. Behavioural differences should be considered broadly across conservation programmes, not just those involving species deemed sentient.