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Reasons for action

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Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi Dec 2010

Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the …

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Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi Dec 2010

Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged …

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Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi Dec 2009

Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal …

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Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi Dec 2008

Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi

Attila Tanyi

The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case they can …

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