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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Other Philosophy
Two Of A Kind: Are Norms Of Honor A Species Of Morality?, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher
Two Of A Kind: Are Norms Of Honor A Species Of Morality?, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Should the norms of honor cultures be classified as a variety of morality? In this paper, we address this question by considering various empirical bases on which norms can be taxonomically organised. This question is of interest both as an exercise in philosophy of social science, and for its potential implications in meta-ethical debates. Using recent data from anthropology and evolutionary game theory, we argue that the most productive classification emphasizes the strategic role that moral norms play in generating assurance and stabilizing cooperation. Because honor norms have a similar functional role, this account entails honor norms are indeed a …
Evaluating Bad Norms, John Thrasher
Evaluating Bad Norms, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Some norms are bad. Norms of revenge, female genital mutilation, honor killings, and other norms strike us as destructive, cruel, and wasteful. The puzzle is why so many people see these norms as authoritative and why these norms often resist change. To answer these questions, we need to look at what “bad” norms are and how we can evaluate them. Here I develop an integrative analysis of norms that aims to avoid parochialism in norm evaluation. After examining and rejecting several evaluative standards, I propose what I call a comparative-functional analysis of norms that is both operationalizable/testable and nonparochial, and …
Honor And Violence: An Account Of Feuds, Duels, And Honor Killings, John Thrasher, Toby Handfield
Honor And Violence: An Account Of Feuds, Duels, And Honor Killings, John Thrasher, Toby Handfield
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
We present a theory of honor violence as a form of costly signaling. Two types of honor violence are identified: revenge and purification. Both types are amenable to a signaling analysis whereby the violent behavior is a signal that can be used by out-groups to draw inferences about the nature of the signaling group, thereby helping to solve perennial problems of social cooperation: deterrence and assurance. The analysis shows that apparently gratuitous acts of violence can be part of a system of norms that are Pareto superior to alternatives without such signals. For societies that lack mechanisms of governance to …
The Price Of Sociality, John Thrasher
The Price Of Sociality, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
A review of Jonathan Birch's The Philosophy of Social Evolution, published by Oxford University Press.
Political Stability In The Open Society, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
Political Stability In The Open Society, John Thrasher, Kevin Vallier
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
We argue that the Rawlsian description of a just liberal society, the well‐ordered society, fails to accommodate deep disagreement and is insufficiently dynamic. In response, we formulate an alternative model that we call the open society, organized around a new account of dynamic stability. In the open society, constitutional rules must be stable enough to preserve social conditions that foster experimentation, while leaving room in legal and institutional rules for innovation and change. Systemic robustness and dynamic stability become important for the open society in a way that they are not in the well‐ordered society. This model of the open …
Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement Of Bad Social Norms, Klaus Abbink, Lata Gangadharan, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher
Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement Of Bad Social Norms, Klaus Abbink, Lata Gangadharan, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours that are harmful to group welfare, and that this phenomenon is mediated by a social norm. In a variation of a public goods game, in which the return to investment is negative for both group and individual, we find that the opportunity to punish led to higher …
When Justice Demands Inequality, John Thrasher, Keith Hankins
When Justice Demands Inequality, John Thrasher, Keith Hankins
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of egalitarianism equality, freedom, and welfare are not always compatible. Justice will require trade-offs between these values. Sometimes, equality will need …
Ordering Anarchy, John Thrasher
Ordering Anarchy, John Thrasher
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Ordered social life requires rules of conduct that help generate and preserve peaceful and cooperative interactions among individuals. The problem is that these social rules impose costs. They prohibit us from doing some things we might see as important and they require us to do other things that we might otherwise not do. The question for the contractarian is whether the costs of these social rules can be rationally justified. I argue that traditional contract theories have tended to underestimate the importance of evaluating the cost of enforcement and compliance in the contract procedure. In addition, the social contract has …