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Full-Text Articles in History of Philosophy
Berkeley On Infinite Divisibility, David Mwakima
Berkeley On Infinite Divisibility, David Mwakima
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
Berkeley, arguing against Barrow, claims that the infinite divisibility of finite lines is neither an axiom nor a theorem in Euclid The Thirteen Books of The Elements. Instead, he suggests that it is rooted in ancient prejudice. In this paper, I attempt to substantiate Berkeley’s claims by looking carefully at the history and practice of ancient geometry as a first step towards understanding Berkeley’s mathematical atomism.
Cancelled - Berkeley's A Priori Argument For God's Exstence, Stephen H. Daniel, Alberto Luis Lopez
Cancelled - Berkeley's A Priori Argument For God's Exstence, Stephen H. Daniel, Alberto Luis Lopez
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
Berkeley’s appeal to a posteriori arguments for God’s existence supports belief only in a God who is finite. But by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. In this latter argument, God is not the efficient cause of particular finite things in the world, for such an explanation does not provide a justification or rationale for why the totality of finite things would exist in the first place. Instead, God is understood as the creator of the total unity of all there is, the whole of creation. In this a priori argument, we should …
Cavendish And Berkeley On Inconceivability And Impossibility, Peter West, Colin Chamberlain
Cavendish And Berkeley On Inconceivability And Impossibility, Peter West, Colin Chamberlain
Western Ontario Early Modern Philosophy (WOEMP) Online Events
In this paper, I compare Margaret Cavendish’s argument for the view that colours of objects are inseparable from their ‘physical’ qualities (such as size and shape) with George Berkeley’s argument for the view that secondary qualities of objects (such as colours, tastes, and sounds) are inseparable from their primary qualities (such as size and shape). By reconstructing their respective arguments, I show that both thinkers rely on the ‘inconceivability principle’: the claim that inconceivability entails impossibility. That is, both premise their arguments on the claim that it is impossible to conceive of an object that has size and shape but …