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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in History of Philosophy
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are …
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Andreas Stoke, Jonathan Webber and Clea Rees
Secrets Vs. Lies: Is There A Moral Asymmetry?, James E. Mahon
Secrets Vs. Lies: Is There A Moral Asymmetry?, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are …