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Unity And Logos: A Reading Of Theaetetus 201c-210a, Mitchell Miller

Mitchell Miller

Abstract for “Unity and Logos” (Anc Phil 12.1:87-111):

A close reading of Socrates' refutation of the final proposed definition of knowledge, "true opinion with an account." I examine the provocations to further thinking Socrates poses with his dilemma of simplicity and complexity and then by his rejections of the three senses of "account," and I argue that these provocations guide the responsive reader to that rich and determinate understanding of the sort of 'object' which knowledge requires that the Parmenides and the Eleatic dialogues will go on to explicate.

This paper is available at http://pages.vassar.edu/mitchellmiller/.

Antisthenes' Theory Of Unique Enunciation: Similarities, Differences, And Possible Influences, Fouad Kalouche

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I will focus on Antisthenes’ theory of unique enunciation, and will then discuss its similarities and differences with, and/or possible influences on, other theories on language that flourished around the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE. I showed elsewhere that Antisthenes’ theory of language is a practical application or a strategy that has direct implication for his ethical project. My aim here is merely to highlight the originality and relevance of Antisthenes’ theory by presenting it and contextualizing it, before assessing relevant similarities and differences between certain positions of Antisthenes and those of some Skeptics, Sophists, Cyrenaics, and …

Unity And Logos: A Reading Of Theaetetus 201c-210a, Mitchell Miller

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Abstract for “Unity and Logos” (Anc Phil 12.1:87-111):

A close reading of Socrates' refutation of the final proposed definition of knowledge, "true opinion with an account." I examine the provocations to further thinking Socrates poses with his dilemma of simplicity and complexity and then by his rejections of the three senses of "account," and I argue that these provocations guide the responsive reader to that rich and determinate understanding of the sort of 'object' which knowledge requires that the Parmenides and the Eleatic dialogues will go on to explicate.

This paper is available at http://pages.vassar.edu/mitchellmiller/.

Episteme And Logos In Plato's Later Thought, Alexander Nehamas

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

"What is knowledge?" Plato does try to answer this question, asked at the beginning of the Theaetetus, but the answer is not in the dialogue itself, either negatively (as Cornford argued) or positively (as Fine suggested). His answer is partially given in the Sophist and Statesman: the project of definition has been shown to involve the mastery of the whole field to which the object of definition belongs, and hence a science of the field in question. The dramatic sequels to the Theaetetus are also its doctrinal complements. By making knowledge the object of knowledge, Plato was able to …

"Nothing" As "Not-Being": Some Literary Contexts That Bear On Plato And On Parmenides, Alexander P.D. Mourelatos

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In the main Section of this paper I examine a certain "characterizing" use of meden/ouden and medeis/oudeis in pre-Platonic non-philosophical contexts. The passages discussed and analyzed offer cle.ar and suggestive illustrations of the assimilation of "nothing" or "nobody" to "not-being." In the concluding Section I explore connections between that use and philosophical concepts,with particular reference to Plato's doctrine of degrees of reality.

The dialectic of being in classical Greek speculation focuses not on 'What there is' but on 'what it is' or 'how it is'; not on existence but on physis, constitution, or form.

Aristotle's Treatment Of Phantasia, D. A. Rees

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Review of the relevant passages in Aristotle, and (briefly) the scholarship on Aristotle's concept of phantasia. Aristotle's treatment of phantasia is contrasted with Plato's discussions of eikasia, mimesis, the receptacle in the Timaeus, the Sophist as maker of phantasmata, the treatment of memory in the Philebus, and eidola in several places. De Anima 3.3 concerns mental images; further discussion involves passages in EN, MA, and the Parva Naturalia.