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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Defending Honor And Beyond: Reconsidering The Relationship Between Seemingly Futile Defense And Permissible Harming, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Defending Honor And Beyond: Reconsidering The Relationship Between Seemingly Futile Defense And Permissible Harming, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
All Faculty Scholarship
In Helen Frowe's book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile self-defense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim's honor. This paper explores Frowe's claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive reasons. From there, the paper examines Frowe's understanding of "defense of honor," ultimately suggesting that Frowe's conception is best construed as action that has expressive, but not defensive, value. From there, I turn to two more general puzzles. First, what if the defender mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, …
Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman
Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that.
Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a …
Defense And Desert: When Reasons Don’T Share, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Defense And Desert: When Reasons Don’T Share, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
All Faculty Scholarship
Many retributivists maintain that when a defendant commits an offense, (1) the defendant forfeits rights against punishment and (2) it is intrinsically good for the defendant to get the punishment he deserves. Self-defense theorists often maintain that when certain conditions are met, (1) an aggressor forfeits his rights against defensive force and (2) the aggressor may be harmed instrumentally to prevent his attack. In the context of a symposium on Uwe Steinhoff’s "Just War Theory," this paper examines the intersection of defense and desert. First, may desert and defense be aggregated when, for instance, the amount of harm that is …
Patty Hearst Reconsidered: Personal Identity In The Criminal Law, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Patty Hearst Reconsidered: Personal Identity In The Criminal Law, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
All Faculty Scholarship
In this contribution to a symposium celebrating Joshua Dressler, I revisit the Dressler/Delgado debate over Patty Hearst through the prism of personal identity. After reviewing why personal identity presents a problem for punishment, I discuss how a "personal identity" defense would fit within the criminal law, including when it would undermine status responsibility, when it would undermine a voluntary act, and when it would serve as an excuse.
In Defense Of Penalizing (But Not Punishing) Civil Disobedience, David Lefkowitz
In Defense Of Penalizing (But Not Punishing) Civil Disobedience, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
While many contemporary political philosophers agree that citizens of a legitimate state enjoy a moral right to civil disobedience, they differ over both the grounds of that right and its content. This essay defends the view that the moral right to civil disobedience derives from (or is a facet of) a general right to political participation, and the characterization of that right as precluding the state from punishing, but not from penalizing, those who exercise it. The argument proceeds by way of rebuttals to criticisms of both claims recently advanced by Kimberley Brownlee. While in some cases those criticisms fail …
On Waldron's Critique Of Raz On Human Rights, Joseph Raz
On Waldron's Critique Of Raz On Human Rights, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
This commentary responds to Waldron’s “Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach”. It points out that some supposed criticisms are nothing more than observations on conditions that any account of rights must meet, and that Waldron’s objections to Raz are due to misunderstanding his thesis and its theoretical goal. The short comment tries to clarify that goal.