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Epistemology Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Epistemology

Logos-Sophia, Elliott Norman, Donald Wayne Viney, Keith Elliott Perkins, Addyson Kay Campbell, Hunter Hinds, Scott Squires Jan 2024

Logos-Sophia, Elliott Norman, Donald Wayne Viney, Keith Elliott Perkins, Addyson Kay Campbell, Hunter Hinds, Scott Squires

LOGOS-SOPHIA: The Journal of the PSU Philosophical Society

Logos-Sophia, Volume 17, Spring 2024. The Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society has largely been a student publication with occasional faculty contribution


Plurality And Epistemic Injustice: A Neo-Arendtian Reading Of Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice, David Casciola Jan 2023

Plurality And Epistemic Injustice: A Neo-Arendtian Reading Of Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice, David Casciola

West Chester University Master’s Theses

In this thesis I bring the philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Miranda Fricker into conversation. Specifically, I argue that through Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice (EI) we are able to see more clearly the importance of testimony—lexis as an aspect of Action for Arendt—in Arendt’s socio-political framework. Arendt divides the world into the Private, Social, and Public as separate realms of human activity (Labor, Work, and Action respectively); it is in the Public where we are able to appear and express our plurality. According to Arendt this is the only space where equality must be ensured. However, in using …


Epistemic Priors, Social Justice, And The Ethics Of Humor, Paul Butterfield Sep 2022

Epistemic Priors, Social Justice, And The Ethics Of Humor, Paul Butterfield

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

In this dissertation I set out a theory of humor ethics and, in particular, I establish what difference humorousness makes to an instance of speech’s moral value. I set out by making the case for this approach to the topic, demonstrating that focusing on how humorous speech differs, morally, from non-humorous speech allows us to avoid getting caught up in prior ethical debates that are not strictly about humor itself – a shortcoming that is common to many treatments of humor ethics in the existing literature. I show that, in cases of humorous speech, we typically do not assert the …


Researcher-Participant Privilege: Confidentiality And Qualitative Criminology, Eric Michael May 2022

Researcher-Participant Privilege: Confidentiality And Qualitative Criminology, Eric Michael

UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones

Research institutions have the responsibility to comply with laws that govern the oversight of all research including research with human subjects. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) review research protocols and approve research based on the rights and safety of research subjects. When conducting qualitative criminological research, researchers must weigh ethical considerations around their methods. These methodological considerations are coupled with guiding ethical principles that are fundamental to human subject research. One major consideration regards breaking confidentiality which can bring about great risk to participants. The following thesis focuses on the ethics of researcher-participant privilege and issues that qualitative researchers have in …


Reconsidering Moral Perception: The Dialectical Emergence Of Moral Perceptual Contents During Experience Via Cognitive Penetration And Oppressive Socialization’S Suppression Of Our Ability To ‘See’ Moral Reasons For Humanization And Liberation, James William Lincoln Jan 2020

Reconsidering Moral Perception: The Dialectical Emergence Of Moral Perceptual Contents During Experience Via Cognitive Penetration And Oppressive Socialization’S Suppression Of Our Ability To ‘See’ Moral Reasons For Humanization And Liberation, James William Lincoln

Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy

Moral perceptions occur when a subject makes an immediate discernment about the moral features of an occurrent experience. This project taxonomizes theories of moral perception into the following two camps: experientialism and judgementalism. I defend a version of experientialism, Moral Perceptual Orientation, by arguing that we, in addition to making moral judgments, have genuine perceptions with moral content during occurrent experience. I then go on to advance a framework for understanding how these perceptions are curated by our background beliefs by developing a view of dialectical consciousness. I do this by synthesizing Herbert Marcuse’s perspective on the epistemic subject with …


In Defense Of Non-Anthropocentrism—A Relational Account Of Value And How It Can Be Integrated, Ian I. Weckler Jan 2020

In Defense Of Non-Anthropocentrism—A Relational Account Of Value And How It Can Be Integrated, Ian I. Weckler

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers

Climate change has been show to be caused by humans. Human-centric behaviors have affected the world to the extent that many believe we have entered a new geologic epoch. This epoch— the Anthropocene—has prompted exploration into the ethical relationship between humans and the rest of the world. We know that a purely anthropocentric ethical system of values has lead ecological imbalance and environmental destruction, and that a non-anthropocentric (or humancentric) ethical system of value would be better suited for maintaining and regaining a habitable environment. However, past conceptions of non anthropocentrism have relied on abstract conceptions of value that fail …


Epistemic Justice And Epistemic Participation, Kate C.S. Schmidt May 2019

Epistemic Justice And Epistemic Participation, Kate C.S. Schmidt

Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations

I advance a new theory of epistemic injustice, with important implications for pursuing epistemic justice. This project develops a positive account of epistemic justice, broadens the scope of the phenomenon, and motivates new interventions. This dissertations works towards a better understanding of what it means to be an epistemic subject and to be treated as such.

I argue that epistemic injustice can be understood through a lens of participation in inquiry, rather than using the received view that focuses on testimony. On my account, victims are marginalized when disrespected and devalued as potential participants in inquiry due to prejudice. This …


The Contradiction Of Representation In Levinas's Command Of The Other And The Possibility Of Responding Through The Dialogicality Of The Self, Robert Claflin May 2019

The Contradiction Of Representation In Levinas's Command Of The Other And The Possibility Of Responding Through The Dialogicality Of The Self, Robert Claflin

Undergraduate Honors Theses

Emmanuel Levinas views the phenomenological tradition as being predicated on an asymmetrical relationship between the self and the other in which the self possesses the power to dominate and represent the other. This leads to the reduction of the other to the same. Instead, he wants to flip this relationship in favor of the other by showing how the very qualities of alterity and infinity enable the other to resist the self’s attempts at representation. Furthermore, he conceives of an ethics in which the self is compelled to listen to the other’s command and respond accordingly. The inherent issue in …


Sheila Lintott, “Friendship And Bias: Ethical And Epistemic Considerations,”, Sheila Lintott Oct 2015

Sheila Lintott, “Friendship And Bias: Ethical And Epistemic Considerations,”, Sheila Lintott

Faculty Journal Articles

No abstract provided.


Moral Disagreement And Audi's Account Of Moral Intuitionism, Dustin Michael Sigsbee Jan 2015

Moral Disagreement And Audi's Account Of Moral Intuitionism, Dustin Michael Sigsbee

The Hilltop Review

In Moral Perception Robert Audi advocates for an intuitionist account of moral perception in which a moral agent of the proper disposition can use emotion and intuition as a means of supporting or justifying knowledge claims concerning certain moral truths or propositions. Since emotion and intuition can vary from agent to agent and neither agent would be better disposed to claim priority for their emotion or intuition over that of the other agent this opens Audi’s account up to possible instances of problematic disagreement. For this reason, I argue that agents in this intuitionist picture ought to remain epistemically agnostic …


Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations, Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, Daniel Howard-Snyder Jan 2015

Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations, Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, Daniel Howard-Snyder

Philosophy Faculty Works

What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, developing our own account, offering two reasons for our account, and meeting two objections and solving one puzzle


Prison Through A Philosophic Prism, Raam P. Gokhale Aug 2012

Prison Through A Philosophic Prism, Raam P. Gokhale

Raam P Gokhale

A Dialogue Between Prisoners Past, Present and Future


The Persistence Of Casuistry: A Neo-Premodernist Approach To Moral Reasoning, Richard Arthur Mercadante Jan 2011

The Persistence Of Casuistry: A Neo-Premodernist Approach To Moral Reasoning, Richard Arthur Mercadante

USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations

The general purpose of this dissertation is to explore casuistry--case-based reasoning--as a discredited, rehabilitated, and, most importantly, persistent form of moral reasoning. Casuistry offers a much needed corrective to principle-based approaches. I offer a defense of a "principle-modest" casuistry and explore the epistemology of casuistry, describing the prerequisite knowledge required for casuistry. I conclude by arguing that casuistry is best understood as a neo-premodernist approach to moral reasoning.


On Skepticism About Case-Specific Intuitions, James Mcbain Oct 2004

On Skepticism About Case-Specific Intuitions, James Mcbain

Faculty Submissions

Moral theorizing is often characterized as beginning from our intuitions about ethical cases. Yet, while many applaud, and even demand, this methodology, there are those who reject such a methodology on the grounds that we cannot treat people’s intuitions about ethical cases as evidence for or against moral theories. Recently, Shelly Kagan has argued that the reliance upon case-specific intuitions in moral theorizing is problematic. Specifically, he maintains that the practice of using intuitions about cases lacks justification and, hence, we ought to be skeptical about the evidential weight of moral intuitions. This leads Kagan to conclude that we ought …