Philosophy Commons^™

Two Distinctions About Eating Animals, A.G. Holdier

Between the Species

In this paper I describe two distinctions about what “eating animals” entails which are often confused in conversations or arguments aimed against meat-based diets and try to show how both distinctions, on their own lights, ultimately support a concern for all fellow creatures, regardless of species or other biological categories. The distinctions in question are: the distinction between moral and nonmoral actions, presumptions about which serve to define whether or not particular topics (like meat consumption) deserve moral consideration whatsoever, and the distinction between moral and immoral actions, about which suppositions bear on both reflexive and considered moral …

Ethical Extensionism Defended, Joel P. Macclellan

Between the Species

Ethical extensionism is a common argument pattern in environmental and animal ethics, which takes a morally valuable trait already recognized in us and argues that we should recognize that value in other entities such as nonhuman animals. I exposit ethical extensionism’s core argument, argue for its validity and soundness, and trace its history to 18th century progressivist calls to expand the moral community and legal franchise. However, ethical extensionism has its critics. The bulk of the paper responds to recent criticisms, including (1) environmental ethicists’ objection against its austere conception of moral value (2), feminist ethicists’ claim that extensionism fails …

Review Of Madeleine L.H. Campbell's Animals, Ethics And Us, Teddy Duncan Jr.

Between the Species

In Animals, Ethics, and Us, Dr. Madeleine L.H. Campbell offers insight into the moral landscape of human-animal relations through a specific ethical framework that rejects the rights of non-human animals, opting instead for a “qualified utilitarian approach” (2019, 9). For Campbell, animal ethics should not be bound to animal rights or the autonomy of individual animals; she asserts that animal rights should not factor into the moral consideration of animals at all. Since she does not confer animals a moral status or form of rights and instead relies on the utilitarian approach, Campbell attempts to locate the justifying logic …

Does Suffering Really Predominate In Wild Ecosystems?, Elliot Buss

Between the Species

In recent discussions of the moral value of wild ecosystems it has been claimed that wild ecosystems contain more suffering than positive wellbeing, and therefore that wild ecosystems are overall morally bad for animals. This papers critically assesses this argument. Despite its popularity, I find that this argument is defective, as it rests on unexamined empirical assumptions about the quality of certain animals’ lives. Moreover, I argue that even if we grant these assumptions, the conclusion does not follow unless we make further controversial assumptions about how moral claims are aggregated across different animals. As a result, there is no …

Animal-Rights Primitivism: A Vital Needs Argument Against Modern Technology, James Robert Schultz

Between the Species

In this essay, I argue that those who embrace animal rights should also embrace primitivism—the view that humans should abandon modern technology and take up something like hunter-gatherer technology instead. I call my view “animal-rights primitivism” to distinguish it from human-centered arguments for primitivism. In particular, I employ a vital-needs framework to make my argument. I argue that hunter-gatherer technology is the least harmful kind of technology, it is sufficient to meet human vital needs, and it is possible for humans to make the transition to hunter-gatherer technology while still meeting their vital needs. Alternatively, I argue that even if …

Review Of Bob Fischer's Animal Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, Christopher A. Bobier

Between the Species

No abstract provided.

Has The Philosophical Case For Animal Liberation Been Proved? A Systematic And Narrative Review Of The Philosophical Literature 1975-2020., Michael Morris

Between the Species

I test the hypothesis proposed by Peter Singer that the philosophical case for animal liberation has been won, through a systematic review of papers published by philosophers between 1975 and 2020.

There was a slight but statistically significant correlation between support for an animal liberation vegan position, with year of publication. Support for a better treatment of animals than currently sanctioned by society increased significantly among papers discussing general principals of animal ethics.

Findings support a weaker version of Singer's hypothesis. Among the philosophical community there is greater support for animal liberation, but the debate has not been ‘won’.

What It’S Like, Or Not Like, To Bee, Cheryl E. Abbate

Between the Species

In his recent work, David DeGrazia (2020) explores the possibility of insect sentience, focusing on bees as a case study. He advances a novel evolutionary approach, arguing that, from an evolutionary perspective, it’s more likely that bees are sentient than insentient., insofar as bees (allegedly) would have a selective advantage if they are motivated—in the form of feeling—to achieve their aims. His argument assumes two questionable claims: (1) if X is a selective advantage for an organism, then the organism likely has X, and (2) conscious creatures would have a selective advantage if they are sentient. I challenge both claims, …