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2020

OSSA Conference Archive

Epistemic injustice

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach Jun 2020

Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, Douglas Walton’s Argumentation Schemes and corresponding critical questions are taken through Thomas Huckin’s (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis in order to further demonstrate that a schematic-pragmatic approach to argument evaluation needs to account for bias in and of itself. Building on the work of Audrey Yap (2013, 2015) and Ciurria and Al Tamini (2014) which demonstrates how the schemes have not addressed, and may even intensify, various disadvantages people with systemic identity prejudices face, Huckin’s approach offers additional nuance as to how these concerns can be exacerbated by the schemes. As the schemes have been devised through observations …


Commentary On Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Tracy A. Bowell Jun 2020

Commentary On Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Epistemic Success And Skeptical Norms In Argument, Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht Jun 2020

Epistemic Success And Skeptical Norms In Argument, Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht

OSSA Conference Archive

The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney’s going case, the Penaluna – Leiter exchange, is not attributable to argument’s skeptical norms.